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Sažetak  
Početna je pozicija ovoga rada da je znanstveno znanje nepotpuno bez objašnjenja, gdje se 
razvojem novih teorija to znanje proširuje i produbljuje (tako što temeljne teorije 
objašnjavaju širi spektar pojava i postaju općenitije primjenjive). Povijesno gledano, kvantna 
je teorija (početkom 20. st.), ili inicijalno 'kvantna mehanika', konačno potkopala navodni 
neograničeni uspjeh redukcionističke mehanistične eksplanatorne filozofije (uzevši u obzir i 
konceptualni dodatak koji čini Maxwellova konceptualizacija polja). Tako je ponovo otvoren 
put skepticizmu prema eksplanatornim ciljevima znanosti. U radu mu se suprotstavlja 
obrazloženje temeljne uloge kvantne teorije, bilo kao dijela fundamentalne potpune teorije ili 
iznova osmišljene u okvirima ograničenja prikupljanja informacija o osjetilno nedostupnoj 
ontologiji fizikalnog svijeta.  
Izlaganje počinje pregledom povijesnih stajališta u različitim pokušajima razumijevanja 
materijalnog svijeta od uspona novovjekovne znanosti, sa posebnim naglaskom na ulogu 
kartezijanskih primarnih kvaliteta na eksplanatornu konceptualizaciju. Naglašava se i da iako 
su eksplanatorni narativi u osnovi epistemološke konstrukcije, oni zahtijevaju metafizičku 
podlogu kroz prihvaćanje referencijalnosti pojmova od kojih se sastoje. Nadalje se 
predstavljaju dvije metodološke perspektive na konstrukciju znanstvenih teorija, slijedeći 
Einsteinovu podjelu na principne i konstruktivne teorije. One su prikazane i obzirom na 
njihove metafizičke i eksplanatorne karakteristike i oblikovane u istraživački instrument kroz 
koji se razmatraju pojedine 'studije slučaja' eksplanatorne rekonstrukcije kvantne teorije. 
Specifična strategija zagovaranja znanstvenog realizma (nazvana 'jednostavnom 
transcendentalnom strategijom') se izlaže i povezuje s izazovima koje odreĎene pojave (EPR 
korelacije i 'teleportacija') iz domene suvremene kvantne teorije postavljaju pred nju. Prvo se 
poglavlje zaključuje pregledom općih modela objašnjenja i njihovom pozicioniranjem u 
odnosu na gore spomenutu dihotomiju principno-konstruktivno.  
U konačnici se zagovara eksplanatorni model koji uz protegnute materijalne entitete sadrži i 
dodatni temeljni ontološki element: sveobuhvatni primitivni prirodni zakon. U skladu s time, 
u svrhu odgovora skepticizmu o eksplanatornim ciljevima znanosti, preporuča se i u 
'svakodnevnom pojmovnom okviru' zamijeniti trenutno stanje protegnute materijalne 
strukture, kao temeljne jedinice ontologije realizma, 'poopćenim predmetima' kao 
invarijantama re-identifikacije u procesu promjena.  
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Summary  
The starting position of this dissertation is that scientific knowledge is incomplete without 
explanations, whereupon with the development of new theories our knowledge both broadens 
and deepens (as fundamental theories explain more and become more general). Historically, 
it has  been quantum theory (early 20th century), or initially quantum mechanics, that finally 
undermined the supposed runaway success of reductionist mechanistic philosophy (modulo 
Maxwellian updating), re-opening the door for scepticism about the explanatory aims of 
science. However, recent years have seen a revival of the belief in some version of quantum 
theory, either as part of a fundamental complete theory or as reinvented in terms of 
constraints on information gathering about the underlying unobservable ontology of the 
physical world.  
We begin by surveying the historical positions in different attempts to understand the 
material world since the rise of modern science, with specific focus on the role of Cartesian 
primary qualities in explanatory conceptualisation. Moreover the opening chapter argues that 
although explanatory narratives are essentially epistemological constructions, they require a 
general metaphysical backing through the explainer‘s and explainee‘s commitments to take 
the concepts and higher structures composed of them as directly referential. Two 
methodological perspectives on theory construction, Einstein‘s division into principle and 
constructive theories, are then delineated along the lines of their metaphysical and 
explanatory potential, and presented as the research instrument with which to approach the 
specific-case-study instances of quantum theory reconstruction. A specific strategy of arguing 
for scientific realism (‗the simple transcendental strategy‘) is then presented and connected to 
the challenges that the phenomena (EPR correlations and ‗teleportation‘) from the domain of 
contemporary quantum theory pose for it. The opening chapter concludes with a survey of the 
general models of explanation and their position with respect to the principle-constructive 
dichotomy introduced above. 
Finally, an explanatory model containing extended material-like entities along with further 
primitives, universal laws of temporal evolution, is argued for. Consequently, in the interest 
of a wholesome realistic response to the sceptical challenge about the explanatory aims of 
science, we recommend that even the common sense conceptual framework replaces the 
extended material structure with ‗generalised things‘ as re-identifiable invariants through 
change as the fundamental unit of the realist ontology.  
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INTRODUCTION  
There is a plausible view according to which scientific knowledge consists primarily of 
explanations, whereupon with the development of new theories our knowledge both broadens 
and deepens (as fundamental theories explain more and become more general). One might 
claim that science is, then, aiming at an integrated understanding of reality that consists ―not 
only of reductionist ingredients such as space, time and subatomic particles, but also, for 
example, of life, thought and computation‖ (D. Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality, 1997).  In this 
context, the thesis aims to contribute to the general considerations concerning structure and 
ontological commitments of scientific explanation capable of including the specific case-
study instances.  
Historically, it has been quantum theory (early 20th century), or initially quantum mechanics, 
that finally undermined the supposed runaway success of reductionist mechanistic philosophy 
(modulo Maxwellian updating), re-opening the door for scepticism about the explanatory 
aims of science (2nd half of the 20th century). However, recent years have seen a revival of 
the belief in some version of quantum theory, as part of a fundamental complete theory, as 
well as (alternatively) its ‗reinvention‘ as a weak-realist (in some instances non-physical) 
theory that delineates the constraints of information gathering about the underlying 
unobservable ontology of the physical world (end of 20th and early 21st century).  
Aside from numerous philosophical perplexities associated with interpretations and re-
formulations of the theoretical framework behind the empirical success of quantum 
mechanics, the recent developments named are also interesting for their approaches to 
scientific explanation of the physical phenomena. Due to the potential status of quantum 
mechanics as a fundamental theory, it is important for any scientific explanation, to 
investigate the constraints it imposes on the explanatory aim of science, as well as any 
departure it requires from the basic explanatory construct of matter evolving on the space and 
time stage. In this thesis, two broad perspectives on the integrated understating of reality will 
be delineated: a principle and a constructive one, and these will be applied as criteria in a 
comparative analysis of specific interpretations of contemporary quantum theory. 
The ‗principle‘ and ‗constructive‘ perspectives are formed on the basis of the following 
(broad) criteria: methodological approach to the development of new theories about segments 
of physical reality (principle vs. constructive in the narrow sense), metaphysical attitude 
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towards existence of the unobservable theoretical entities (agnostic weak-realism vs. simple 
realism), and the method of providing an explanation (unification-type vs. causal). With 
regard to the former, from which the two theoretical perspectives draw their names, 
constructive theories attempt to build a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the 
relatively simple ontology from which they conceptually start out. Principle theories, on the 
other hand, employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements that form their basis 
and conceptual starting point are not hypothetically constructed, but empirically discovered, 
general characteristics of natural processes. In other words, the fundamental task of principle 
theories is the analysis of principles, with the aim of arriving at certain necessary conditions 
or constraints on observed phenomena; the phenomena that underwrite and reconcile these 
empirical principles. On the other hand, it has long been received knowledge in the 
philosophy of physics that when we say we have succeeded in understanding a group of 
natural processes, we invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers 
the processes in question.  
Regarding the second criterion, the metaphysical attitude towards existence of the 
unobservable theoretical entities (this need not be just the dimensionally ‗small‘ things) a 
basic realist account of the constructive approach accepts that some mind-independent 
referents, or tokens, of most currently observable common-sense and physical types 
(constituting our known world) objectively exist independently of the mental. The general 
weak-realist stance of the principle approach claims that the independent reality is beyond the 
reach of our knowledge and language (but not that it does not exist), and that the known 
world is partly constructed by the human imposition of concepts. All the worlds defined by 
such concepts differ according to the social group that introduced them, and thus exist only 
relative to the (mental) imposition of concepts. The thesis investigates the concurrence of the 
metaphysical commitments of either account with the simple transcendental strategy for 
realism. Namely, that the concepts employed in an account of everyday experience can have 
a philosophical foundation in the physical constraints imposed by quantum theory.  
Finally, in terms of explanation, explanations aiming at the unification conception of 
understanding (those of our principle approach) primarily focus on uncovering the unity that 
underlies the apparent diversity of the observed phenomena, without particular reliance on 
causality. Explanations in the manner of the causal conception of understanding (our 
constructive approach) highlight the structural mechanisms that cause the observed 
phenomena. In that they can be seen as a subset of the unification-type if the causal picture is 
16 
 
presented as the unity behind diverse phenomena, but needn‘t in those cases where the 
structural mechanisms, characterised as fundamental for other reasons, break the unity and 
only partially account for the diverse set of phenomena. It is generally thought that 
unification-type explanations lag behind the causal ones in stopping the regress of 
explanation, since with the causal explanation (as with realist metaphysics) the explanatory 
regress stops with the bare fact of how things are in the world.  
Historical analysis, though, places the unification-type explanations as a starting point for the 
development of causal ones (as a specifically motivated special case), possibly justifying the 
viewing of explanatory success (of any workable kind) as more fundamental than causal 
relatedness. Direct comparison of the two approaches over case-study instances and their 
framing in the general considerations of deeper explanations invites far-reaching 
consequences for the application of the common sense conceptual framework as the starting 
point of the realist strategy. These call for the abandonment of the instantaneous state of the 
extended material structure as the fundamental unit of the realist ontology, and its 
replacement with ‗generalised things‘ partly defined as objects of fundamental laws.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The opening chapter outlines the details of the 
proposed methodological instrument and justifies its construction, as well as its application to 
theories and associated world-views from the history of science. It draws conclusions for the 
proposed instrument from an in-depth analysis of the research context (including 
contemporary analyses of the history of science) and most notably the proposal of the simple 
transcendental strategy for realism. The latter suggests that it is most rational to assume the 
validity of the conceptual scheme that contains objects existing independently from us in an 
objective framework of space and time, a simple unpacking of the conceptual commitments 
of the everyday language.  
Chapter 2 introduces the main variants of the principle approach as a case-study instance, and 
applies the principle side of the methodological instrument to the explanatorily troublesome 
phenomena from the domain of quantum information theory. The motivation for the principle 
approach, the nature of explanation it is able to provide, as well as the extent of its 
metaphysical commitment, is distilled in the conclusion to this chapter.  
Chapter 3 explores the constructive side of the methodological instrument and aligns it with a 
case-study instance of contemporary Bohmian theory. Furthermore, the chapter explores the 
metaphysical (though still constructive) expansion and alteration of the simple constructive 
17 
 
scheme, as through the introduction of primitive laws of temporal evolution This is explored 
as the desired connection between the requirements of quantum phenomena and the 
construction of explanatory narratives along realist lines.   
In the final, fourth, chapter, principle and constructive perspectives as instantiated in the case-
study instances are brought face to face in comparative analysis, against the theoretical 
accounts of deeper explanations. As a result, suggestions for an altered view of primary 
qualities and immediate objects of experience, with respect to the entrenched nature of the 
basic physical concepts of most human languages and the fundamental scientific role of 
quantum mechanics, is offered. It is argued that constructive approaches along the Bohmian 
lines, even with the modifications of the everyday conceptual framework, offer a deeper 
explanation of the paradoxical phenomena, whilst still respecting the simple transcendental 
strategy for preferring the realist worldview.  
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1. SPATIAL EXTENSION, NONLOCALITY, EXPLANATION   
Thus science seems to be at war with itself: when it 
most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged 
into subjectivity against its will. Naive realism leads 
to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive 
realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is 
false; therefore it is false. (Russell, 1940, p. 15)  
1.1 Understanding the material world  
Philosophy and a physical problem  
In the simplest of terms, this thesis takes it as given that contemporary physics is at an 
impasse concerning the empirical equivalence of formalised quantum theories. In other 
words, science has come up against the wall of empirical equivalence of different formal 
approaches to the problems to be elaborated below, but these approaches carry widely 
differing associated metaphysics. Empirical investigations cannot decide between them. This 
might immediately suggest that we are dealing with a pseudo-problem, something to be 
rejected altogether and replaced by a fresh perspective (such examples have been known in 
the history of science). Scientifically, no such perspective has been offered so far, at least not 
sufficiently overarching so as not to be just another pseudo-solution for the pseudo-problem. 
This, on the other hand, might suggest that we need to at least look at the problem more 
closely using the existing paradigms only in ‗new hands‘. The ‗new hands‘ are to be provided 
by philosophy. The aim is to help science explain.  
So many people today – and even professional 
scientists – seem to me like somebody who has seen 
thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A 
knowledge of the historic and philosophical 
background gives that kind of independence from 
prejudices of his generation from which most 
scientists are suffering. (Einstein to Thornton, 7
th
 
December 1944, indexed in the Einstein Archive as 
61-574; as quoted in (Howard, 2004))  
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Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things 
easily achieve such an authority over us that we 
forget their earthly origins and accept them as 
unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as 
"necessities of thought," "a priori givens," etc. The 
path of scientific advance is often made impassable 
for a long time through such errors. For that reason, 
it is by no means an idle game if we become 
practiced in analyzing the long commonplace 
concepts and exhibiting those circumstances upon 
which their justification and usefulness depend, how 
they have grown up, individually, out of the givens 
of experience. By this means, their all-too-great 
authority will be broken. They will be removed if 
they cannot be properly legitimated, corrected if 
their correlation with given things be far too 
superfluous, replaced by others if a new system can 
be established that we prefer for whatever reason. 
((Einstein, 1916, p. 102); as cited in (Howard, 
2004)) 
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century Pierre Duhem famously claimed that physics and science 
were not expected to provide explanations, but merely descriptions. However, explanations 
remained in the domain of philosophy (which, concerning quantum theory, was not expected 
to be separated from physics before 20
th
 century). A simple illustration from Hitchcock 
(2004) will help us set the stage for the type of explanation we are concerned with (as 
opposed to those that we are not, though will be often skirting them).  
This banishment of explanation from science seems 
to rest on a confusion, however. If we ask ―Why did 
the space shuttle Challenger explode?‖, we might 
mean something like ―Why do such horrible things 
happen to such brave and noble individuals?‖. That 
is certainly a question for religion or philosophy, 
rather than science. But we might instead mean 
20 
 
―What were the events leading up to the explosion, 
and the scientific principles connecting those events 
with the explosion?‖. It seems entirely appropriate 
that science [and, by extension also philosophy of 
science] should attempt to answer that sort of 
question. (Hitchcock, 2004, p. 8)  
But one might object that all the effort expended over the following three chapters in 
comparing the depth and width of proposed explanations is a consequence of a stubborn 
refusal to accept Kuhn‘s view of scientific paradigms. Briefly, in such a view what we are 
dealing with here are two paradigms, concerning the same scientific project, and depending 
on which paradigm wins over the physics community (given the empirical equivalence), we 
will have our problem resolved one way or another. Though frivolously sketched here, this 
issue can be easily dismissed by pointing out that we are dealing with a problem that has to 
be fitted into a larger framework (cf. separability violations), and that therefore paradigm 
shifts would involve more than just the narrow community of specialists. An even simpler, 
but as effective, answer is that we are dealing with a philosophical question of general 
preferability for structures of explanation, and that the community decisions in one historical 
instance do not bear on such matters however powerful they may appear in a given social 
setting or historical context.   
In terms of explanatory ontology, our central problem is whether ―there is a genuine 
nonlocality in the workings of nature, however we attempt to describe it‖ (Albert, 1992 , p. 
70, my bold script), or not. To answer the question affirmatively is to be committed to 
‗hardcore‘ ontological scientific realism and whatever theoretical models it has to carry in 
tow (only one of which we shall investigate as a case study instance). To answer it negatively 
is to seek an explanatory model based on weaker realism (cf. section 1.4. below). But 
crucially we must bear in mind that the latter position is not to be agnostic about nonlocality, 
on the contrary it is to strongly deny it. Yet, to position the debate in terms of nonlocality 
rather than specific physical entities, is to move to a different level of the realism debate. It is 
to rise away from peculiarities of the details of different ontological postulates to the issue of 
overall conceptualisation of the world through physical theory (the task of ‗descrying the 
world in physics‘).  
21 
 
Given empirical equivalence of the theoretical, physical
1
 approaches to the supposedly 
locality-violating phenomena (i.e. lack of prediction of empirical, observable difference 
between the phenomena as predicted by one or the other physical formalisation) what is 
expected from the more general philosophical considerations of explanation? Philosophy, 
done in the wake of Wittgenstein, teaches us to look again, and look hard, at the most obvious 
aspects of the problem before us, because the real solution is hidden behind the simplicity and 
familiarity. The phenomena of teleportation, EPR-style correlations and the like are hardly 
familiar to many people, but their problem-generating aspects such as spatial separation, 
propagation of causal influences, individuation of objects etc. are. It is those familiar aspects, 
such as the conceptualisation of the world founded on geometrical permanence of primary 
qualities at every level of detail, i.e. the conceptual ontological foundation of all of the 
material world on primary qualities, that we need to keep an eye on, most notably when 
describing the unfamiliar phenomena in a language employing a pre-existing conceptual 
scheme.  
As will become very clear from the exposition below, and will be explicitly addressed in 
several more technical instances in what follows, this thesis proposes to look at the 
explanatory structure as it can be distilled from some quantum theories with a slant on its 
ontological characteristics. Some might object that explanations are essentially epistemic 
constructions and that any ontology tied with their particular instances is added at a later 
stage or stems from some requirements that are extraneous to explanation itself. In 
considering a possible realist strategy of response to numerous (for our purposes collected 
and simplified here) ontology-agnostic or explicitly anti-realist philosophies garnered by 
postmodernist movements in general philosophy, it will be of importance to focus in the 
analysis that follows on those explanations that are taken to be of the ontological, or the ontic, 
type and then finally the specific ontological characteristics they display. That this should not 
be an impossible strategy even from the general philosophical perspective can be glimpsed 
from e.g. recurrent theme in Ruben (1990) that explanation is an epistemological concept, 
that requires a general metaphysical (and this includes a more specific ontological) backing. 
Our transcendental strategy, to be introduced in section 1. 4 below, explicitly requires that we 
look into the commitments that stand behind (as a ‗backing‘ of) the concepts we employ even 
in everyday communication.  
                                                             
1
 In the spirit of the opening paragraphs we might say ‘scientific’ here, although the distinction between 
scientific and philosophical aspects of the discussion will increasingly be blurred below.  
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In general it might be assumed, though, that through focus on ontological features of 
explanations we are giving precedence to a particular type of explanation, and with it a 
general scientific world-view, and thus prejudicing the question to be settled through a more 
detailed consideration of the case-study instances of quantum theories below. The supposedly 
preferred type of explanation is the causal-mechanical type (see section 1. 6 below for a more 
detailed exposition), as suggested by Salmon (1984, p. 81): ―to explain an event is to exhibit 
it as a occupying its (nomologically necessary) place in the discernible pattern of the world‖. 
But we shall be interested in leaving an option of ontic explanations more widely accessible, 
as generally requiring of an explanation that it is about some real worldly feature, relation or 
something else (cf. Ruben (1993, p. 5)). Such further relevant concepts might be given by 
Kim‘s (1974) considerations of various determinative or dependency relations, of which 
causal relations are only a smaller sub-kind. This opens up other determinative relations (e.g. 
‗Cambridge dependency‘, supervenience, relation between actions, relation between a 
disposition and its structural basis and the like) that pertain to essential links within the 
observed general conditions and the phenomena to be explained, but are short of identity, to 
be used in ontic explanations by our case-study instances. Whatever the general conclusion of 
these metaphysical considerations it lays sufficient ground for our considerations of the 
ontological characteristics of explanations.  
Explanations in the philosophy of science from a historical perspective    
We shall try to make at least a partial break away from the tradition in the 20
th
 -century-
philosophy-of-science analyses of scientific explanations. Though perhaps the most natural 
reading of the problem we are addressing in terms of explanation would be to consider all 
approaches to the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena from the deductive-nomological paradigm 
(Hempel, 1965) with some aspects of inductive-statistical model
2
 thrown in, we shall not go 
down that route. The primary reason is that it does not provide enough ground to distinguish 
between the two approaches in our case-study instances below. Furthermore, such models by 
and large tend to be anti-metaphysical (Bird, 2005) trying not to squabble over the details of 
ontology behind the phenomena at all, but to merely present the syntactic deduction of the 
formal description of the phenomena as resulting from the formal description of the initially 
observed conditions and the codification of laws. They are thus not suited for investigating 
                                                             
2 Basically, we could deduce the phenomena from the formalism of the theory, allowing for the statistical 
aspects in where the predictions are chancy and our ontology (if we specify it in enough detail) permits the 
introduction of objective statistical elements.  
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the ontological characteristics of different accounts and their agreement with an overall 
worldview.  
When viewing explanations in a different way, more suited to scientific realism, 
classifications of explanations that differentiate between our two case-study approaches open 
up. This different way connects the phenomenon and the background theory through 
semantic entailment (thus saving it from obvious problems faced by the traditional models, 
such as the flagpole-shadow example; for further examples cf. Bromberger (1966)). It is too 
early to get into more detail concerning models of explanation at this stage, but we ought to 
make a note that the search for an explanation with satisfactory ontological characteristics 
will have to take into account more than mere deducibility of phenomena from the theory, it 
will have to show what such deduction would mean for the real world. This will of course be 
of importance when considering the acceptability of the violations of separability, through the 
phenomena exhibiting nonlocal characteristics.  
Most recently (from the historical perspective of this section) Woodward and Hitchcock 
(2003) develop a model of explanation from an argument that to explain why some 
phenomenon occurs is to show what (e.g. other phenomena, presence or not of entities etc.) 
that phenomenon depends upon. Showing the latter satisfactorily is not to play with general 
counterfactual situations based on the phenomenon to be explained, but only with those that 
consider variations in what would happen under interventions on the ‘system at hand’. Thus 
on their account the choice of basic ontology precedes the attempts of explanations, but 
explanations will be more or less successful based on the success of this prior choice. Of 
course, identifying the system at hand may not be so difficult when dealing with macroscopic 
objects, so that may be a good place to start for both our approaches, though in the end some 
sort of reduction to less obvious ontology may be required.  
It is worth adding a warning though, even before we properly discuss the various possible 
ontological aspects of the problem in the case-study instances, that the success of explanatory 
models will not only depend on the choice of ontology, but also on its epistemic accessibility. 
Though subscribing to the overall realist perspective, our approaches are empirically 
equivalent and we have no recourse to the all-knowing arbiter to tell us which of them gets 
closer to the truth. So it is important to limit the explanatory ‗buck-passing‘ that is 
characteristic of the hidden structure strategy (Woodward, 2003), and thus limit the pitfalls 
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of excessively speculative metaphysics. Genuine candidates for explanation will have to 
identify epistemically accessible, non-hidden features in virtue of which they are explanatory.  
On the basis of this some say that explanation in general is impossible in quantum theory 
(Salmon, 2002), whilst others take comfort in the fact that quantum theory can be formulated 
on the basis of a small number of highly general principles, and that it is universally 
applicable as a theory of material phenomena (the essence of the principle approach to be 
outlined in 1. 6. and Chapter 2). For the latter, it is acceptable that quantum theory provides 
unification/type explanations, whilst not providing those of the causal-mechanical sort.
3
 On 
the other hand, Chapter 3 will illustrate that the causal, even mechanical, explanations can be 
constructed, at the price of giving up on locality. The deadlock situation brings quantum 
theory, and with it fundamental physics, close to the more contestable special sciences where 
we can also provide functional explanations of the phenomena without the possibility of 
constructing the causal mechanism behind them. This is why some of our considerations will 
apply more generally, beyond the narrow scope of a few ‗troublesome‘ phenomena in 
contemporary physics. We shall return to the issues of use and depth of explanation in the 
final chapter.   
1. 2 Historical background of explanatory conceptualisation of the world  
Quantum theory and everyday intuitions  
We can thus expect the possibility of theoretical justification for locating the explanatory 
power in physical sciences in ontology, i.e. the primary entities assumed to exist in the 
domain under investigation and producing the observable phenomena through the 
specificities of their interaction (Cao, 2004). As Cao says, ―primary entities are those from 
which all appearances (other entities, events, processes, and regularities) are derivable as 
consequences of their properties and behaviour; these primary entities display regularities and 
obey laws, the so-called fundamental laws in the domain covered‖ (Cao, 2004, p. 175). Yet it 
is precisely this common-sensically sound view that runs into trouble in providing 
explanations based on quantum theory.  
Why should quantum theory be special, as opposed to genetics or meteorology? After all, 
Cao (2004) does not advocate a simple reduction of the observable phenomena to the primary 
entities (as if zooming in with a microscope), nor does he seem to warrant the possibility of 
                                                             
3 For the differences between these types cf. section 1.6. below.  
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explanation of all phenomena solely in terms of the entities open to direct observation and 
experimental experience. What he in fact advocates is the reliance on metaphor, a metaphor 
that allows for change of the primary actors with the adherence to the overall structure. To 
understand the meaning of a phenomenon as presented through an explanation in a specific 
scientific domain, we must provide a chain of metaphors from such fundamental explanation 
to everyday life reliant on the structural similarity possessed by each link of the chain. And a 
great number of these metaphors are historically developed, not created on the spot for the 
purposes of explaining away troublesome phenomena.  
What Cao in (2004) seems to advocate then is to start up with seemingly intuitive 
understanding of the most basic mechanics of the directly observable phenomena, motion of 
human sized objects in the Euclidian space of our visual field and from it link up structurally 
sound metaphors to the supposed existents in the less accessible domains. Yet the less 
accessible domains should also contain entities with properties whose structure of interaction 
we can link (though the chain of metaphors) to our intuitive understanding of the 
macroscopic world around us. Even if we were to accept the existence of such intuit ive 
understanding, quantum mechanics is still capable of denying the tenability of this strategy.  
This is because such quantum existents seem to resist consistent ascription of a factual 
property before its status has been measured. This applies also to the processes following the 
measurement of such property that involve further interactions between existents; they in a 
way lose the firm property until we can establish it by measurement again. Furthermore, this 
instability of property ascription can be taken to the very existence of the entities (i.e. treating 
existence as a property), especially if the latter is characterised by continuous occupation of 
the space-time points (i.e. something like a space-time trajectory). This furthermore threatens 
the construction of a continuous causal process, where the power of the cause reaches from 
one end to the other of the causal chain. Finally, there appears to be an inherent randomness 
in the evolution of causal processes threatening the account of singular causality. What we 
effectively have is the abstract mathematical formalism that expresses general laws and 
principles such that they cannot be taken as representing physical processes visualizable in 
spatial-temporal terms.  
Brief history of primary qualities: how we got where we are now  
Again, there is no room here to properly lay out the historical role played by space and 
primary qualities (susceptible to mechanical treatment) in development of scientific 
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explanations, but a brief outline of the general idea is in order. This can prove illuminating 
due to the importance of something like the primary qualities view in the common sense 
contemporary conceptualisation of the world, as well the preference for causal-mechanical 
explanation in contemporary philosophy of science. Some criticisms of historical 
development of the view popular today may help us open doors to their revision that at first 
glance appeared too radical to muster.  
Ontology  
In classical times two major explanatory worldviews can be contrasted. The perversely 
compounded
4
 Aristotelian-Platonic view construed the everyday world as a confused 
reflection of an underlying reality. In Aristotle‘s view this reality is given by the necessary 
relation between the universals, of which the observed individuals were combined 
instantiations. Explicating the universals instantiated in them is the necessary step in 
understanding the world, for once a given universal is highlighted the understanding follows. 
In the Platonic view, the true reality is merely more perfect, but not structurally radically 
different from the one we observe. In fact, a relationship between a universal and individual 
could be shown to be of importance here as well. But in both we have reality and common-
sense (and scientific) conception of it as an original and its imperfect copy (similar in every 
respect, only of poorer quality).  
A radical discontinuity between the observed and the real is suggested by the atomists 
Democritus and Leucippus (Losee, 1993), because we can no longer view the everyday and 
the real as the original and an imperfect copy. The reality was for them different in kind from 
the world known by the senses. It consisted of the motion of atoms through void (space), and 
these motions and various combinations resulting from them gave rise to the experiences 
such as colours, odours and tastes. But the real existents, the atoms, only bore the properties 
of size, shape, impenetrability and the propensity to enter into various associations. Thus they 
did not themselves bear all the properties they gave rise to, such as colour.  
What is crucial here for explanatory methodology is the notion that observed changes can be 
explained by reference to systematically fundamental processes occurring at a more 
elementary level of organization (Losee, 1993). Seventeenth century philosopher-scientists 
readily adopted this view. In itself this was not a result of fashion or revolutionary feeling, 
                                                             
4 I am not aware of literature that provides such unification of the two dominant classical views. I do not even 
wish to claim that such unification can get far off the ground as a theory in history of philosophy. My main 
purpose is to contrast it with the atomist view.  
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but of observation that it is in fact impossible to adequately explain the qualities and 
processes at one level by the same qualities and processes at a deeper level.
5
 The worry is, 
though, whether this replacement of properties can go too far. Before considering that 
question, let us see a further strength of the atomistic explanation. Namely, the atomists 
suggested the replacement of qualitative changes at the level of observation by the 
quantitative (i.e. mathematically formalizable) changes at the atomic (fundamental) level. 
This was in line with the Pythagorean notion that scientific explanations ought to be given in 
terms of geometrical and numerical relationships (Losee, 1993).  
Yet one difficulty of the atomistic explanations was apparent from the outset: they could not 
be verified by direct observation. Moreover, from the outset they were plagued by some ad-
hoc replacements for the lack of contemporary experimental and observational precision. As 
Losee (1993) illustrates, the atomists could not explain why salt dissolves in water whereas 
sand doesn‘t, other than stating that the salt atoms are such as to produce the phenomenon of 
dissolution whereas the sand ones aren‘t.  
Descartes (and his immediate predecessors and contemporaries also, to a varying degree) 
took the atomistic worldview further, and linked it inextricably to space in proclaiming 
spatial extension as a necessary characteristic of any fundamental physical ontology. To do 
this Descartes sought to extricate what is ‗clear and distinct‘ about all physical objects, and 
deduced that it must be spatial extension (coupled with impenetrability). Thus he 
distinguished between the primary qualities that all bodies must possess in order to be 
material bodies, and secondary qualities that exist only in the perceptual experience of those 
bodies and phenomena that they are a part of.
6
  
In summation, primary qualities were those that really belonged to the material objects, 
whilst the secondary qualities were derived from (i.e. explained by) the state of the objects' 
primary qualities. The primary caused and explained the secondary (Shapin, 1996, p. 53).  
                                                             
5 It can be argued that development of optics, particularly rudimentary microscopy, opened the door to 
radically new structures behind the everyday observable phenomena.  
6 Though, of course Descartes was not the first to introduce the distinction, its elements can be traced back to 
the early atomists, and its first clear seventeenth century articulation is attributed to Galileo (Shapin, 1996, p. 
52).  But more interestingly for us, Descartes’ approach seems to follow the principle paradigm in that he did 
not speculate (in deriving the primacy of extension as a quality) about the detailed structure of the 
construction of material existents, but followed a general rule seeking ‘clear and distinct’ perceptions of 
properties. Moreover, he directly diverged from the atomists over the existence of empty space: in principle 
for him all space had to be filled by matter, i.e. effectively equated with matter. Yet, it can be argued, his 
physics contained manifestations of practical commitment to vacuum and absolute space (Losee, 1993;  
Huggett, 1999).   
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Yet as the corpuscular explanations of the phenomena became more technical the gap 
between the philosophically legitimate account and common sense widened, so that 
increasingly the sensory experience offered no reliable guide to how the world really was. 
Economising on an extended debate over the details of this picture, it suffices to say that the 
corpuscular mechanical explanations were providing a successful alternative to the 
Aristotelian doctrine of ―substantial forms‖ (i.e. abstract and non-quantitative real qualities). 
The ―substantial forms‖ were a product of rational examination of relationships in reality, and 
were ostensively as inaccessible as the atomic corpuscles. But the ‗mechanical philosophers‘ 
(Shapin, 1996) claimed their explanations were more intelligible, or in our terms had greater 
explanatory power. In Lipton‘s (2004) terms they embody a powerful combination of 
unification and causation (by reducing the phenomena to mechanical processes) styles of 
explanation, and avoid the need to introduce a gratuitous multiplicity of explanatory 
principles (Della Rocca, 2002).  
Though unification is undoubtedly their great strength, such reductions to supposed 
underlying mechanism have been known to be pushed too far in an attempt to explain all 
encountered physical phenomena. Thus objections to their historical success have recently 
been raised, suggesting that they may not have universally relied on greater intelligibility, but 
on philosopher-scientists‘ agreement that this simply is the right explanatory paradigm to 
follow (Shapin, 1996, p. 57). We come to notice a ‗circle‘ in that the phenomena to be 
explained were caused by the entities whose structure was such that they caused the 
phenomena (Gabbey, 1985). It has been suggested that the reasons for success of the 
mechanical explanations ought to be sought as much in historical circumstances (such as 
increasing practical success of mechanical machinery (Marsden, 2004)) as in their 
philosophical plausibility.  
Space  
Though the investigation of space has perhaps been the most fruitful interaction between 
physics and philosophy historically, its main debate concentrated on the metaphysical status 
of space: whether it is something absolute (endowed with existence independent of all things 
material
7
) or a construct of relations between other existents (namely, material bodies). 
Though we will primarily be concerned with the explanations that rely on the reduction to the 
                                                             
7 We can, for the purposes of the discussion that is to develop subsequently, ignore the relativistic (i.e. 
pertaining to Relativity Theory) interaction between matter and space. The characteristics of space that 
concern us will not be affected by its ‘bending’ by mass of material existents.  
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microscopic, we can assume, as is generally done in contemporary physics, that ‗space‘ is the 
same concept presupposed by motion (spatial change) of all bodies, from tiniest particles, 
through human-sized bodies to the whole universe. The main debate between the absolute 
and relative views of space will not be our concern here. What is of interest to us is the nature 
of influences, or the forming of correlations, between the changes in objects that are not 
spatially contiguous. Whether there is absolute space between them, or instance of formal 
relation functionally indistinguishable from absolute space, will not influence the outcome of 
our discussion.  
This is because, despite being omnipresent, space in physics (and even relativistic space can 
be shown to fall into this category)
8
 is exceptionally inert. It does not even have the indirect 
causal effect such as we attribute to the supposed unobservable material existents. As shall be 
explained in more detail later, for our purposes, space acts as a barrier, a constriction on the 
proposed explanatory models. The problem is that without this barrier we are unable to do 
structured physics the way we have been used to doing even from classical antiquity. 
Abandoning space, thus, may be too high a price to pay, one we shall not be risking here. 
Yet, we will expect of our barrier to not act in a haphazard way: standing up or falling down 
randomly. This consistency is something easily visualizable from everyday life: separations 
are sturdy and we do not expect them to expand, shrink or disappear at whim. This does not 
make them impenetrable, but merely penetrable according to consistent ‗laws‘: separated 
things can influence each other, but they have to do so by transmitting ‗the influence‘ through 
every bit of space between them. This can be formalised even if ‗space‘ does not exist, but is 
a mere relation between the bodies. This relation is consistently systematic.  
But we cannot completely ignore issues of space in the history of physics, because somewhat 
like unobservable microscopic entities, space has been employed in physics to provide better 
explanations. And this use was then backed up by metaphysical speculations about its nature. 
So we have to be aware of the ground the concept stands on physically, when employing it in 
the discussion to come. The other reason is that in the metaphysical model founded on 
primary qualities as measurable, and thus real and firm, properties of the foundational 
                                                             
8 There have been suggestions to exploit extreme bends, shortcuts in space-time, known as wormholes, to 
explain the apparent connection between otherwise spatially separated objects in quantum mechanics. But as 
Maudlin (2002) elucidates, this is not a promising route to take, as the wormholes would have to have strange 
choice of appearance, as well as allowing the hypothesised ‘information’ to pass between the objects, but not 
the objects themselves, or their radiation or massive parts. Most importantly, if wormholes are indeed a part 
of the game, then one ought to be able to use them to send superluminal signals, which is not the case in the 
‘troublesome’ situations we are dealing with.  
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physical ontology, space plays an undeniable role. It shares the same essence with all matter 
(according to some interpretations, it is a part of the essence of matter): extension. On the 
other hand, in the very formalism of quantum mechanics, space does not appear as a 
fundamental element of the theory or a fundamental observable. But, when combined with 
macroscopically observable phenomena it has to be accounted for, as space is an essential 
part of the conceptual scheme at that level. Effectively, we want macroscopically spatially 
separated objects not to be conjoined, contiguous or interwoven at the microscopic level as 
that produces problems in the structural isomorphism between the observable phenomena and 
their explanatory reduction. And the isomorphism, easily formalizable through geometry, was 
one of the strong reasons for choosing this particular aspect to be fundamental (rather than, 
say, colour, scent or rate of vibration). Einstein can be interpreted as saying as much (cf. 
(Born, 1971) and quotes below) when claiming that the whole of physics as we know it 
depends on it.  
Method   
The ways to deal with the problem then, require ontology of explanations that either does not 
need space such as it had been historically presented (including the properties of matter that 
are associated with it: namely the fundamental role of the primary qualities) or that introduces 
ontological elements that are independent of space. Historically, that calls for the mystical 
substance of mind, but we shall not go down that route. We can introduce completely new 
ontologies that do not rest on extension. The interesting issue, of course, is to see how those 
figments of imagination can be made to fit with the rest of the standard conceptual scheme so 
as to save most of our appearances and not call for a single-sweep and all-pervading 
replacement of the world-view. What we need is a change of paradigm, such that it replaces 
the problematic parts, whilst keeping the rest of the picture as much like the old one as 
possible. The question is whether the explanations based on primary qualities can be simply 
augmented, or whether we will, in the end, be forced to abandon them. If the latter is the case 
what can come to replace them, given their deep entrenchment in the ordinary conceptual 
scheme?  
But there are historical precursors to our predicament, in for example Kepler‘s approach to 
the empirical equivalence of the contemporary competing ‗astronomical hypotheses‘. 
Predictive success of either could not help choose between them, and Kepler had to resort to 
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other means to achieve, as he termed it ‗change of syllogistic context‘.9 Kepler terms all the 
problems that result from empirical equivalence pseudo-problems, and advocates changing 
the syllogistic context so that the competing hypotheses no longer display empirical 
equivalence and thus the impasse of the pseudo-problem is overcome. So far, this is what 
most science textbooks advocate also, one must find the means by which to falsify some 
hypotheses and corroborate others. But of course, there are real experimental situations in 
physics in which this can‘t easily be done. And, history teaches us, this is where we step 
outside the realm of pure physics, into philosophical, even aesthetical, speculation. What 
Kepler did was to look into physical plausibility (above mere calculational adequacy) of a 
mechanical model that was to support the observed phenomena on either hypothesis. Nothing 
revolutionary by today‘s standards (e.g. choose the simplest hypothesis), but an important 
historical precursor nonetheless, because it indicates that in search for a better explanation we 
must consider the wider picture (without prejudicing the choice between causal and 
unificatory explanation-types here, cf. section 1.6. below, both can provide the fitting into the 
wider picture). But in Kepler‘s case there is a much more elaborate justification for an appeal 
to simplicity, namely as an understandable geometrical order underlying apparently diverse 
phenomena. This was not a mere appeal for a search for the grand unifying theory no matter 
how crazy it may be (for example a numerological explanation of the planetary distances), 
but also a call for further-reaching testing opportunities
10
, and avoidance of ad hoc 
modifications (Martens, 1999). And the unification in Kepler‘s style, as Martens argues, leads 
to a wider explanation of the very different phenomena, i.e. points to the truly fundamental 
elements of explanation, including the ontological ones. The second example of the escape 
from impasse based on the simple foundational principles is the famous one of Einstein‘ s 
Special Theory of Relativity, which is to be recounted in greater detail below (section 1.3. 
and Chapter 2).   
Quantum theory in the historical narrative  
The twentieth century produced two radical 
revisions of the physical worldview – relativity and 
quantum mechanics. Although it is the theory of 
relativity that has more deeply pervaded the public 
consciousness, in many ways quantum mechanics 
                                                             
9 I am indebted to Rhonda Martens for useful pointers on this issue.  
10
 As testing on isolated samples affects the understanding of the whole, requiring a single cause for all the 
diverse phenomena, or at least a single principle behind the causes of the diverse phenomena.  
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represented the more radical change. Relativity 
required its own accommodations, but at least it still 
allowed the retention of classical views of 
determinism and local causality, as well as the 
conceptual separation of the experimental object 
from the measuring apparatus. (Evans, 2007, p. 1) 
This supposed rejection of the classical worldview was received with different attitudes 
amongst the developers of the theory in the first part of the twentieth century. Whilst some, 
most notably Werner Heisenberg welcomed it, others, such as Albert Einstein, Erwin 
Schrödinger and Louis de Broglie worried about its implications, with Einstein steadfastly 
rejecting their metaphysical side. Niels Bohr seemed to make peace with a necessary cut 
between the classical conceptualisation of our everyday physical experience, that of the 
macroscopic objects, and the novel, strange but orderly non-classicality of the microscopic 
entities described by quantum mechanics. As Evans (2007) points out, this divide between 
the microscopic and the macroscopic along the lines of quantum and classical was (or is) no 
less drastic than the Aristotelian separation between the celestial and sublunar realm, or 
Descartes‘ division between the substances of matter and spirit.  
By and large, the ‗troublesome‘ aspects of the theory hinge on the notion of entanglement:  
When two systems, of which we know the states by 
their respective representatives, enter into temporary 
physical interaction due to known forces between 
them, and when after a time of mutual influence the 
systems separate again, then they can no longer be 
described in the same way as before, viz. by 
endowing each of them with a representative of its 
own. I would not call that one but rather the 
characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the 
one that enforces its entire departure from 
classical lines of thought. By the interaction the two 
representatives [the quantum states] have become 
entangled. (Schrödinger, 1935, p. 555) (my bold 
typeface)  
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Soon enough further, formally justifiable, conceptual problems had arisen out of this, most 
notably with the EPR situation. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen claimed as early as 1935 
(Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen, 1935) that the theoretical formalism predicts the occurrence of 
certain phenomena that go against the grain of both common sense and classical-physical 
conception of reality, and thus the formalism must be incomplete and in need of further 
development (i.e. better alignment with what is really going on in the physical world). 
Einstein saw the realistic interpretation of the quantum formalism to be attacking the 
important principle of separability, the one he claimed the whole of physics (and we might 
project even further: the whole of common sense conceptual scheme) rested on.  
His argument rests on the situation in which a pair physical systems A and B, jointly 
described in the language of quantum theoretical formalism by an entangled (joint quantum) 
state, which does not tell us anything about the individual properties of the systems become 
functionally spatially separate (i.e. become operationally distinct). When a measurement of a 
certain property is performed on the system A, the outcome of the measurement together with 
the laws of the formalism, immediately assigns a new state to the distant system B. 
Subsequent measurement can confirm the correctness of this ascription in accordance with 
the standard rule for ascription of states in quantum formalism. As our conceptual 
framework, and the description of this hypothetical situation, makes the system sufficiently 
separated to bar physical influence propagating between them
11
, we must conclude that no 
physical change has occurred with the ascription of the new state to the system B. But if there 
had been no change, that means that the system B already had the contested property at the 
outset, before the measurement on system A. This leads Einstein et al. to conclude that the 
quantum theoretic descriptions of the world (most commonly those that hinge on entangled 
states, but not necessarily cf. Horodecki et al. (1999)) are just not complete.  
For some time the foundational problems had been swept under the proverbial carpet, due, in 
part, to great practical success of the theory, but also the belief that the divide is benign. 
Though the quantum world of the small was conceptually threatening it seemed to remain 
contained (pace Schrödinger‘s‘ cat‘s ill fate) behind the said divide, not endangering tables, 
chairs and cannon balls. In the 1960s, influenced by the work of John Bell, even physicists 
began to take the foundational issues, those of the theory‘s place in the overall worldview, 
seriously once again. Most of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena (such as macroscopic 
                                                             
11
 Or at least, the separation is such to make any known physical influence (such as an electromagnetic signal 
or alteration in potential energy in the relationship of the pair) at least detectable if not downright impossible.  
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exploitations of the supposed entanglement of the microscopic objects, or the demonstration 
of their teleportation) that will be the focus of so much of the discussion to come are the 
recent theoretical and experimental breakthrough stemming from that reawakening.
12
  
Subsequently, this led to the advances in what is today an independent field of research, the 
Quantum Information Theory. The work in that field that is of interest to us because the 
occurrence of some of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena rests on the technologically exploitable 
non-local correlations among macroscopically observed phenomena: theoretical formalism 
predicts that in certain situations the outcomes of interactions with matter conducted very far 
from each other are coordinated, and this is empirically confirmed and cannot be explained 
by any local theory. Cushing (1991) says that in the realm of quantum phenomena the 
―apparently nonlocal nature of the effects‖ goes over and above the irreducible mystery (the 
regress of the ‗why‘ question) contained in any explanation. He claims that the importance of 
locality for explanations is that local interactions allow one to follow the time evolution of 
the physical processes ‗in the mind‘s eye‘, which again follow from  the deep-seated  
(though, possibly unjustified) expectations we have of the physical world. The problem arises 
when nonlocal phenomena clash with those expectations (cf. sections 1.4. and 1.5.).   
It is suggested that nonlocal phenomena, even before the appearance of those resulting from 
the Quantum Information Theory, mandate the modification of at least some of the 
assumptions that are part and parcel of the core of traditional scientific metaphysics. Yet, one 
might say, we have been here before, action-at-a-distance (or at least passion-at-a-distance) 
has always been a problem in scientific metaphysics, the best known example being one of 
Newton‘s gravitational interaction. Yet, there are differences between the two situations 
taken as indicative of further complications in the case of quantum theory. In the quantum 
case, unlike the one of gravitation, the mysterious interaction is fully instantaneous and does 
not weaken with spatial distance; it in fact exhibits a complete disregard for the ‗quantity of 
space‘. Also, it is limited only to the physical systems from the initial pre-separation set-up 
(as if a private connection of its own), regardless of how many systems of the same type there 
are in the surrounding space (Maudlin, 2002).  
At the expense of repeating the central tenet of this thesis, two ways out of this predicament 
take centre stage in our case studies (Chapters 2 and 3). One is to attempt to sever the 
‗metaphysical‘ link between the underlying structure of reality and the interpretation of the 
                                                             
12 For a more detailed timeline, for which there is no room here, cf. (Evans, 2007, pp. 2-7).  
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phenomena as currently available to us: principle approaches holding firm to the epistemic 
interpretation of the elements of quantum formalism that give rise to the ‗troublesome‘ 
phenomena. The other, to hold fast to the ‗metaphysical‘ link and claim that the phenomena 
are an empirical proof that our hitherto (traditional, standard, classical, everyday) conception 
of reality is mistaken. The mysterious connection is real and must be accounted for in 
explanation.  
1. 3 The research instrument: principle and constructive approaches  
What is a principle theory?  
There are probably as many motivations for the principle approach as there are different 
adherents of it, or at least as many as different versions of the approach, but the drop that 
started the overflow seems to be the exploitation of the theoretical notion of entanglement in 
Quantum Information Theory. Once entanglement came to be viewed as a tool in 
technologically valuable processes a new perspective on its ‗troublesome‘ consequences 
developed.  
After decades in which everyone talked about 
entanglement but no one did anything about it, 
physicists have begun to do things with 
entanglement. (Popescu & Rohrlich, 1998, p. 
introduction)   
Though the principle/constructive theories distinction appeared before Einstein (Howard, 
2004) he brought it into a sharper focus in his philosophy of science, particularly his 
justifications of the methodology used in the derivation of the Special Theory of Relativity. 
Most theories in physics are constructive theories, theories that go hand-in-hand with 
reductive explanations of observed phenomena in terms of causal interactions between 
foundational entities. In Einstein‘s own words, constructive theories attempt to ―build up a 
picture of the more complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple formal 
scheme from which they start out‖ (Einstein, 1954, p. 228). Einstein calls upon a model of 
kinetic theory of gases which reduces the mechanical, thermal and heat-diffusion processes to 
movements of molecules, i.e. reconstructs those processes on the hypothesis of motion of the 
constituents of the gases described.  
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Principle theories, on the other hand, use the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The 
elements that form their starting point are general characteristics of the observed phenomena, 
formulated as mathematical criteria (constrictions) which the phenomena or their theoretical 
representations have to satisfy. The example Einstein uses here is thermodynamics which 
seeks to describe (explain) the behaviour of gases without speculating about their constituent 
elements, but by simply constraining it by the universal principles derived from the 
experienced fact that perpetual motion is impossible.  
Bub (2000) summarises the difference thus. A constructive theory begins with certain 
hypothetical elements, the elementary entities in terms of which it attempts to construct 
models of more complex processes representing the phenomena that we directly observe. The 
fundamental problem for such a theory is how to synthesize the complex processes out of the 
hypothesized fundamental entities, i.e. how to reduce the complex phenomena to the 
properties and interactions of those entities. The starting point of a principle theory is a set of 
empirical ‗laws‘ or principles which provide unexceptionable generalizations of the directly 
observable properties of the experienced phenomena. The fundamental theoretical task for 
such theories is to derive a set of formally expressed necessary conditions or constraints on 
events (events covered by the theoretical framework) that can be seen as fundamental laws 
behind the observed empirical generalizations. It aims to explain what the world must be like, 
what the necessary constraints on events must be, if certain empirical laws are to hold (i.e. if 
observed generalizations are to be recognised as ‗laws of nature‘).  
There are a number of problems with the clear cut division presented above, and it is to be 
used as a guiding model, but one that we needn‘t adhere to literally at every step. First of all, 
as later discussions will show there is a clear popular preference for constructive theories in 
the philosophy of science. We could, in fact, view the foundations of modern science as 
shaped in terms of constructive theories based on material existents endowed with primary 
qualities. Einstein himself states that in terms of explanation nothing beats constructive 
theories:  
When we say we have succeeded in understanding a 
group of natural processes, we invariably mean that 
a constructive theory has been found which covers 
the processes in question. (Einstein, 1954, p. 228) 
37 
 
Yet he is also reported to have added (Howard, 2004) that progress in theory construction 
(and subsequent explanation provision) is often impeded by premature attempts to develop 
constructive theories in the absence of sufficient constraints. That is, we get wildly 
speculative about the nature of the elementary entities running into the danger of ‗creating‘ 
entities with no more reality than a disposition to fit into the explanatory models we have 
constructed for them top down, eventually sliding into the danger of the so-called 
generalization of secondary qualities (cf. Chapters 3 and 4 ). Howard interprets Einstein as 
advocating reliance on principle theories as a first step in progress to complete understanding 
of the phenomena in question. Ergo, his derivation of the Special Theory of Relativity as an 
intermediate step towards the General Theory. In a situation characterised by long-standing 
lack of explanation (cf. (Cushing, 1991), (Reutsche, 2002), (Maudlin, 2002), (Putnam, 2005)) 
straightforwardly unifiable with the common sense conception of the material world, and the 
explanatory constructions of other physical theories, this need not be seen as an unnecessarily 
complicated strategy.  
There is however a further objection that such an idealisation into a  two-step conceptually 
clear process will simply not work. That is, Brown and Pooley (2001) claim that Einstein‘s 
own derivation of Special Theory of Relativity does not adhere sufficiently to the principle 
theory model. Namely, they show that in the said derivation Einstein makes implicit 
assumptions about the dynamical behaviour of the rods and clocks (material objects) used to 
define the reference frames in relative motion. Even though he claims to make no 
assumptions about the nature of the underlying entities out of which material objects in 
motion are constructed, his second application of the Principle of Relativity in derivation of 
kinematical transformations rests on the assumption that motion has no absolute effect on the 
microstructure of the objects used to define the reference frames. This is certainly not an 
explicit description of the elementary entities out of which the observable measuring rods and 
clocks are constructed, but is a step towards listing their properties that is not explicated as 
the universal constraint from empirical generalisation.
13
 Though Einstein nowhere exhibits 
awareness of this non-principle step he is clearly uneasy about the special status accorded to 
measuring rods and clocks in the Special Theory (Brown & Pooley, 2001).  
                                                             
13 It is important to bear in mind the difference between dynamics and kinematics here. Einstein’s derivations 
concern kinematical transformations, observable macroscopic effects of motion, but make no explicit claims 
(and indicate no interest in making them) about dynamics, about forces acting on or within the moving bodies.   
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[…] strictly speaking measuring rods and clocks 
would have to be represented as solutions of the 
basic equations (objects consisting of moving atomic 
configurations), not as it were, as theoretically self-
sufficient entities. (Einstein, 1951, pp. 59, 61)  
Yet, it is also obvious that although a deviation from the principle theory ideal, this is by no 
means its utter falsification. The measuring rods and clocks hold a special status, but only as 
‗special‘ entities anyway as they are used to conceptualise the reference frames not provide 
real-life measurements. The assumption about absence of effects of motion on the 
microstructure is seen as even less worrying once we adopt Einstein‘s denigration of the 
absolute rest frame (aether, absolute space or some such) as then the rods and clocks are 
properly speaking ‗at rest‘ in their rest-frame and in the absence of the dynamical interaction 
between rest frames in relative motion there is no reason to suppose anything but the 
principle of relativity holds for their microstructure as well. Nonetheless, it is a deviation 
from the principle ideal that makes no speculations about the microstructure except for the 
explicitly stated constraining principles.  
Finally, it is worth briefly surveying the objection that principles in ‗principle theories‘ 
should have the status of axioms and should not be derivable from the completed formal 
expression of the theory. If the latter were the case they would be theorems not foundational 
principles (axioms) upon which the theory is built. Hilgevoord and Uffink (2006) argue that 
though this is a fine logical requirement, it fails to be satisfied even by Einstein‘s exemplary 
principle theory: thermodynamics. Namely, once the theory of thermodynamics is formalised 
(or at least formulated as clearly as possible), one can derive the impossibility of various 
kinds of perpetual motion (from the violation of the laws of energy conservation and entropy 
increase). Likewise, once we have the formal apparatus of Special Theory of Relativity, we 
can prove the validity of the light postulate and the Principle of Relativity in formal notation. 
But this does not deny them the status of the foundational principles because in their non-
formal expression they did not rely on the theoretical concepts (such as entropy and energy) 
for their meaning. That is, the ‗rule of thumb‘ says that foundational principles ought to be 
understood without the introduction of any new special concepts inimical to the theory being 
developed, i.e. the concepts assigned hypothetical status such as the entities and their 
properties bear in the constructive theories.  
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It may seem a lot of concern is placed here on the principle theories, without additional 
discussions concerning the constructive ones. The reason for this is that constructive theories 
are more familiar, more common, whilst principle theories are rare, problematic in the sense 
of explanatory models offered above, and certainly mysterious about the characteristics of 
ontology they rely on. At first glance they actually say nothing about the ontology behind the 
phenomena, but it would be a mistake to assume them to be purely instrumentalist. They 
merely refrain from the speculations about the various details of the entities, even about their 
most essential (in some cases we might call these ‗primary‘) qualities, over and above what 
can be gleaned from the constraints imposed by the natural understanding of the foundational 
principles. But we shall discover more about the principle/constructive distinction as we work 
through the case-study instances in the subsequent chapters.  
Non-methodological aspects of the principle-constructive dichotomy  
Before introducing those instances, something more has to be said about the goggles through 
which they will be viewed and, finally, compared; the so-called research instrument. The 
primary dichotomy in the research instrument is one of the principle or constructive approach 
and follows closely the methodological dichotomy outlined above. It is not freely selected 
here, but is adopted from the authors of the case-study instance formulations of quantum 
theory (introduced in the subsequent chapters). Yet, for the purposes of comparing them 
along the lines of explanation, our research instrument has to explicate divisions between the 
two approaches that go beyond methodology of theory-construction. We need to glance at 
most natural explanatory models to associate with the given methodology, as well as the 
metaphysical status of the theoretical concepts, or more precisely the ontological entities 
assumed to be the building blocks of the objects participating in the processes the phenomena 
to be explained consist of.  
Chapter 2 presents the principle approach to the phenomena to be explained. 
Methodologically it relies on the formal expression and subsequent formalised theory 
construction of the general constraints observed in the phenomena. It is not anti-realist in the 
sense of making the theory a mere instrument for outcome prediction, as that would not lay 
sufficient grounds for physical explanation of the phenomena. It is anti-realist though in the 
sense of being agnostic about the nature and mechanical construction of the unobservable 
entities supposed to produce the phenomena. Its own version of realism gains strong foothold 
in adherence to separability as the crucial criterion for reality of all physical entities including 
the possible microstructure behind the phenomena. Real individual entities must for certain 
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experimental purposes be isolated from the rest of the physical universe, or sufficiently 
isolated so that the effects of their connection to the rest of the universe can be ignored. 
Hypothetical entities that cannot satisfy this requirement cannot, on this view, be considered 
real. Through this insistence on separability (to be reviewed in more detail further in the 
subsequent section of this chapter) the principle approach of Chapter 2 subscribes to the 
unification model of explanation, as the separability foothold provides for the explanatory 
terms sufficiently clear from other physical theories and the common-sense worldview. They 
basically say they don‘t know the detailed structure that brings about the phenomena, but 
they know what the real elements of the structure must carry.  
The constructive approach, presented in Chapter 3, poses explicit hypotheses about the nature 
of the entities out of which the explanation of the phenomena can be built. It is realist in the 
strong sense of taking the unobservable entities as true constituents of the material reality, 
with properties such that they can give rise to the observed phenomena. They are unashamed 
of the potential conflict the entities with such properties may have with the common-sense 
view, most notably the requirement for separability. In their view if explanation of 
phenomena requires entities that violate separability then we must get used to living in the 
world in which the fundamental entities are not separable in a way required by Einstein (in 
(Born, 1971, pp. 170-171)). Obviously this kind of explanation is closer to the causal-
mechanical model in which the understanding is provided by detailing the causal interactions 
between the structural elements. As such, it adheres to the preferred model of theory 
construction and explanation at the possible expense of having to revise much of the 
common-sense worldview and the unification of physical explanations.  
Modulo potential overlaps between the given idealisations, about which we shall aim to be as 
explicit as possible, our stage is set to search for the preferred approach to satisfy our 
explanatory hunger, given the starting point of common-sense conceptualisation of the 
material world in terms of primary qualities. Our research task is to lay pointers for preferring 
either approach with a minimal expense to what we already take as understood, most notably 
the status traditional primary qualities have in the conceptualisation of the isomorphism 
between the explanatory ontology and the observable characteristics of the phenomena. 
However, the approaches provision of explanation that we shall survey all rest on the work-
in-progress advances in physical sciences and will in some cases not be able to present 
definitive conclusions as yet. In that case we shall have to do with having pointed out the 
problems clearly enough.  
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1. 4 Philosophy and the two approaches   
In connecting the explanatory strategies of the case-study instances with the wider 
philosophical world-views concerning status of knowledge, truth and reality in science and 
scientific practice two philosophical traditions most readily stand out. Even though the 
principle and constructive approaches presented above will focus on a narrow specialised 
issue, in a highly theoretical domain of physics, if the conclusions reached are to have a wider 
application they will touch upon the issues of epistemological status of science as a whole. 
That is, issues of scientific explanation, whichever narrow domain of science they may 
originate from, will come across the postmodernist anti-realist criticism. In that respect it is 
worth positioning the key players in that overarching debate, as well as be aware of the points 
of contact between any of the overarching schools and the case-study instances of 
explanatory frameworks presented in the following chapters (primarily, Chapters 2 and 3).  
Thus we have scientific realism (for more see below), a doctrine that spans the empiricist and 
rationalist epistemologies, and maintains that there is an absolute reality beyond the 
experimenters‘ consciousness and interpretative alteration. Such reality is translatable and 
explainable under the employment of prearranged (most notably, objective) method of 
investigation. The much more heterogeneous doctrine of postmodernism, roughly a 
continuant of the historical philosophical doctrines of idealism and nominalism, denies it is 
possible to ever ground knowledge in some absolutist or naturalistic view of reality, 
guaranteed by firm methodological procedures of investigation. All knowledge, whatever its 
content and however it may have been arrived at, is forever mediated by language and 
interpretation (Ward, 1996). The third possible doctrine, though some may see it as part of 
the overall postmodern critique, social realism, will not be further elaborated on here, as it 
more properly belongs to sociological analysis of science in the footsteps of Thomas Kuhn, 
and as stated above there is no room here for a sociological analysis.
14
  
The ‗postmodernists‘ (henceforth addressed as antirealists, focusing on that aspect of their 
position, as broadly illustrated in the positions of (Rorty, 1980); (Putnam, 1981); more 
recently (Pettit, Realism and Resposnse-Dependence, 1991); (Pettit, 1998)) may raise a 
challenge that both case-study approaches have little or nothing to do with reality (especially 
as they deal with such a fringe segment of contemporary physics) and that we are, again, 
deciding between two world-views preferred by two social groups (perhaps directly 
                                                             
14
 As our conceptual frameworks shape our record of observations as well, the observable (empirical) aspects 
of the two approaches have to largely agree on conceptual frameworks in order to be comparable at all.  
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competing for power). In the least case, antirealists may claim that neither approach can 
guarantee the access to the ―cosmic register of truths‖ (Luntley, 1995) which would 
demonstrate that one worldview, however myopic due to limitations of human perception and 
conceptualization, is on the right track (i.e. closer to truth than the others). Though aiming to 
respect (as far as that is possible in the details of individual theoretical speculations) the 
abolishment of the dichotomy between the reality and the conceptual framework we describe 
it in, ―giving up dependence on the concept of uninterrupted reality, something outside all 
schemes and science‖ (Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, 1974), most of 
the work done here will precisely concern the modifications of the overall conceptual 
framework so that it may exemplify greater internal coherence in the absence of the precise 
empirical reference fixing.
15
 The latter is not a consequence of the ‗metaphysical‘ holism, 
such as is advocated by Davidson and Quine ( (Davidson, 1977); (Quine, 1969)), though it 
falls under their general theoretical framework, but of the scientifically ascertainable 
empirical adequacy of both case-study instances under consideration. It is the leitmotif of this 
entire work to evaluate under explanation what cannot be adjudicated between with respect to 
truth (usual standard of comparison of holistic frameworks), with the hope that some 
overarching conclusions can be drawn as lessons useful even for the ‗bigger picture‘.  
The general discussion concerning scientific realism (cf. (Gutting, 1982); (Boyd, 2002)) 
suggests the following starting point for a minimal realist ontological requirement. Both the 
‗hardcore‘ realist and the constructive empiricist (a softer version of our antirealists above) 
agree on the coarse ontological requirements of the everyday conceptual framework (tables 
and chairs, Sellars‘ ―manifest image‖ (Sellars, 1963)). The stronger realist sees the need to go 
beyond that in describing and explaining real phenomena. The weaker (i.e. closer to 
constructive empiricist) denies this need, i.e. claims that anything beyond this common 
ground is speculation. Useful speculation, but speculation nonetheless. Manifest image, and 
more importantly only its coarse version,
16
 is the minimal requirement both will agree on.  
It is easily acceptable that from a historical perspective science has made an enormous 
progress in explanation, prediction and subsequent control of the material reality we find 
ourselves a part of. In this case we shall focus only on the explanation aspect, thus 
                                                             
15
 And this, on the face of it, seems to be pushing towards the unificatory model of explanation, but a more 
explicit argument is needed to labour that point. On the other hand it should not be seen as pushing for a 
specific type of realist argument based on internal coherence of a realist world-view alone.   
16
 Coarse because there are details of the manifest image itself which are unobservable, such as unobservable 
properties of observable entities.  
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circumnavigating the objections to the consequences of its other two interactions with 
material reality as given above, cf. (Luntley, 1995, pp. 45-47) . In terms of explanations we 
expect science to rely on the conceptual framework that is capable of describing the world 
independently of the dispositional aspects that we find peculiar to our particular position (be 
it ‗human‘ position, the vaguely ‗macroscopic‘ position, a ‗provincial‘ galactic position, or 
some such). This is another way of requiring objectivity in the explanatory reports, i.e. 
excluding from them all aspects dependent on the peculiarities of individual viewpoints. It is 
very tempting therefore to argue in the modernist fashion that the scientific explanatory 
conceptual framework rests on the privileged link to what Luntely (1995) terms the ‗cosmic 
register of truths‘. Such conception immediately brings with it the notion of a language, as a 
system of concepts, that can be understood by any creature regardless of how it was 
constructed or what its spatiotemporal relation to the rest of the universe was, what kind of 
mind or perception it had or what its history and culture was (Luntley, 1995, p. 48). And we 
standardly assume that the language of mathematical physics provides just such foundation 
and it therefore affords us the most fundamental explanations of the world as it is 
independent of our individual perception of it, as well as the explanation of how our 
individual perception arises.  
Several problems arise for this picture that are relevant for this thesis, but we cannot go into 
all of them to the same degree. We have to take as more or less given that the postmodern 
criticism is capable of challenging the above presupposition of the primacy of link between 
the scientific conceptualisation of the world and the ‗cosmic register of truths‘ in general. 
Luntley (1995) can be taken to provide a good introductory summary of the postmodern 
arguments in this vein (for more detailed accounts and different strategies see for example 
(Ward, 1996) and (Goldman, 1999)). What is particularly interesting in our case, and 
something that we shall dedicate more time to is that the case-study instances of quantum 
theory that we consider in this thesis seem to add grist to the post-modernist mill though both 
are well versed in the vagaries of mathematical physics and contain elaborate formal accounts 
of how to address the phenomena we deem ‗troublesome‘. This is because we take them to be 
formally equally empirically adequate with respect to providing predictive accounts of what 
takes place in the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena. Now antirealists have something to point to and 
claim that mathematical physics itself has through the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena in quantum 
theory hit the wall of relativism of metaphysical explanations and cannot employ its own 
supposedly superior methods to get out of the dire predicament.  
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The antirealist points out that the history of science shows that no set of agreed observations 
can of its own accord falsify a theoretical conceptual framework, that all of the latter can 
always be made observationally compatible with the agreed upon set of data. Such sloppiness 
is defended against in the philosophy of science by abhorrence of the ad hoc additions to a 
theory and general pursuit of both unification and simplicity. Yet, the antirealists may 
challenge, even with rigour imposed by the philosophy of science in the case of quantum 
theories you have a clear case in point, rigorous and formally well supported interpretations 
are to a large extent conceptually at odds with each other concerning what the minimal 
metaphysical requirements of the world-interpretation (or explanation of the material 
processes we encounter or engender) are. They conclude that there is no purely rational 
procedure (even when enshrined in the theoretical formalism) that can take us from an 
account of experience to a decision as to which of the two competing theoretical frameworks 
is true (Luntley, 1995, p. 80).  
They can then generalize this to a conclusion that given that all experience is based on 
interpretation (as presumably the competing conceptual frameworks differ precisely in 
interpretation, and cannot rest on concepts rooted in experience that would be guaranteed to 
be free from it), and that there are no other more secure foundations of knowledge (such as 
Descartes found in the epistemological protection provided by the benevolent deity), there 
can be no single conceptual framework suitable for reporting majority of what we say about 
the world (Luntley, 1995). So, from the perspective of explanation there is no need to even 
burden ourselves with the heavy conceptual framework of the contemporary science, as that 
is explanatorily as valid as any other ‗wish-wash‘ narrative one cares to produce, provided it 
can account for the experience of the human subjects (the explainee). This conclusion can be 
reached by other anti-realist routes (cf. (van Fraassen, 1980) on the pragmatic, not epistemic 
utility of explanations), but this is a particularly interesting one for our purposes. 
Precipitating a more detailed exposition in Chapter 3 such arguments suggest that ―everything 
we say about an object is of the form: it is such as to affect us in such-and-such way. Nothing 
at all we say about any object describes the objects as it is in itself, independently of its 
effects on us‖ (Putnam, 1981, p. 61). This, however, is a highly impractical position to take, 
the one that does not allow any realist background against which details of competing 
explanations can be checked, whilst still asking for some hint of an explanation as to why a 
particular account is one way and not the other. Even though there is no direct answer to such 
scepticism, there is a simple strategy that we shall follow below: to ask for a minimal set of 
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‗typings of objects‘ (Devitt, 1997) that are not dependent on human conceptualisation to 
explain the experiences they produce. An anti-realist position such as Putnam advocates 
above has not got such a minimal set to even begin to explain anything.   
This is a strategy similar to Descartes‘ original search for the escape from doubt (though 
without the role for the deity). Namely, a bit of a transcendental argument and some common 
sense can help anyone who wants to be helped to escape the antirealist doubt. What even the 
staunch antirealists have to agree to is that there are external limitations to what we can and 
cannot do in life, to what it is and is not sensible to believe (cf. (Devitt, 2006) and section 3. 2 
below). Even the antirealists don‘t go jumping off buildings expecting to defy gravity nor do 
they tend to stop eating upon discovering the underdetermination of the theories of 
nourishment.  
Now this is not to argue that all worries about the reliability and utility of our conceptual 
framework and the accompanying explanations are just academic exercises, in positing 
worries as much as in refuting them. What we are counting on, following Luntley (1995, pp. 
110-115) is the fact that acceptance of even those basic limitations to our acting and thinking 
commits us to the sensibility of the notion of things as they are independently of our thinking 
about them. That is we seem to hold some elements of the conceptual framework to be non-
dispositional. As the experience of and interactions with the material objects form one of our 
most basic such non-phantasmal experiences (i.e. experiences characterized by seemingly 
externally imposed limitations), Luntley proposes a transcendental argument
17
 that it is most 
rational to assume the conceptual scheme that contains objects existing independently from 
                                                             
17
 Though it may be objected that the ‘transcendental argument’ is a misnomer in this case, from the 
perspective of the more famous forms of such arguments, we shall adhere to using the terms for the following 
reasons. ‘Inference to the best explanation’ is a much used term in philosophy of science and carries a lot of 
philosophical baggage which there is no room to get into here. Though our transcendental argument could be 
seen as an instance of inference to the best explanation, for reasons of generality the former term is preferred. 
It is also not a form of the general transcendental argument that relies on necessity of some step to push for 
the conclusion. We merely aim to argue, following Luntley and Devitt, for the sensibility of application of the 
transcendental step: it is not necessary to see the common-sense conceptual framework as originating in the 
realist ontology, but it is sensible to do so when explanations of the experienced phenomena are sought. As 
Luntley puts it, an understanding of the concepts of experience commits us to a belief in the external world, 
rather than showing the external world to be a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. As to the 
related objection that transcendental steps are not fully justified and can still lead to errors, this is acceptable 
from the simple realist position that Luntley (1995) advocates. For the rest of the discussion to make sense we 
do not require that inferences based on the transcendental step be certain beyond all doubt, but merely that 
they be seen as sensible enough in search for an explanation. Again, if this brings us back to the ‘inference to 
the best explanation’, so be it, but it is illuminating to arrive at it via a different route which does not 
presuppose the familiarity with much of the existing debate in the philosophy of science; a fresh approach of 
sorts.  
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us in an objective framework of space and time (Luntley, 1995, p. 111).
18
 Yet to differentiate 
it from philosophically burdened traditional form of transcendental argument that proposes as 
necessary condition in the transcendental step a conceptual background of acceptance of 
some starting position, whereas all we require is the unpacking of conceptual commitments, 
we shall henceforth call it the transcendental strategy. That is, given that even the antirealists 
(of the ‗postmodern kind‘ as suggested above) are committed to thoughts about such objects, 
Luntley argues that it is more rationally prudent to take them to be originating in some way 
from the objects themselves, rather than just seeming to us that they do. In a similar vein one 
might put it to the antirealist that he does not doubt the reality of past events, even though 
they are not directly empirically accessible, but can be reasonably reconstructed from the 
present evidence. This of course is a summary of the age old argument for simple realism, but 
toned here to serve a particular purpose. A very strong argument for accepting the given 
conceptual scheme, the conceptual scheme of objects in space-time, in just such a way is that 
it plays a vital role in almost every language known to us and is capable of generating an 
extensively rich set of beliefs about the world. It is so wide-spread and strong that even the 
antirealists use it when they go about their daily activities. Luntley argues that they must 
accept it even at an academically more serious level, and even proposes ways for them to 
accommodate it deeper into their own particular modifications of the worldview.  
Yet, we shall soon (and more extensively in Chapter 4) be forced to argue that science forces 
us to accepts modifications of the said conceptual scheme, both in adding to and in changing 
some of its more central aspects, and that may seem to jeopardize its validity in this thesis 
again. The saving grace is to make (along with the ancient atomists, and in modern times 
Descartes and Locke for example) some aspects of it more foundational and unchallengeable 
and other subject to gradual change under the increase of empirical knowledge. As the 
changes potentially go astray it is always possible to fall back on the foundational elements. 
The foundational element is provided, loosely speaking, by the geometrical isomorphism of 
extension as essential constituent of all material objects, regardless of how large or small they 
are compared to us. This is the well known story of the primacy of extension, of considering 
extension and its modes as primary qualities of everything material. With particular reference 
to our case-study instances, this seems to be the aspect of material reality that neither of them 
                                                             
18 We have to be careful to note here that requiring the conceptual foundation of explanation routed in the 
unambiguous description of definite objects with definite properties is not identical to Bohrian demands for 
necessary use of classical concepts in providing objective descriptions of all physical phenomena. We shall 
delve more into the Bohrian world-view in the following chapter (Chapter 2).  
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can deny. What is more they must find a way to include it in the construction of their 
explanations of the troublesome phenomena.  
And this is where we come to the final problem for the primacy of the scientific explanatory 
framework of material world, as suggested above. Quantum theory introduces some 
phenomena that require a careful selection of the agreed upon set of characteristics so as to 
construct explanations that respect the essential elements of the common-sense conceptual 
framework. For, at first glance, and we shall look into this in more detail below, these very 
phenomena seem to again provide the postmodern-style critic with material to claim the 
whole scientific conceptual framework has run into serious conceptual difficulties and not 
only can it not find a way out of an impasse of the empirical equivalence of different 
interpretations of the formalism (that, we might argue is very specific and academic), but 
calls for explanatory conceptualizations that do not share the widespread and foundationally 
firm minimal conceptual framework of objects in space and time. And they do this by 
supposedly violating separability.  
Briefly (as we shall look into this in more detail in section 1. 5 and Chapter 4), violations of 
separability threaten to knock-down the whole house of cards defence from postmodernism 
as given above by denying the sensibility of the foundations of the common-sense conceptual 
scheme. As the following section shows, the idea of physical things existing and arranged 
into ―a space-time continuum‖ (Einstein, 1948, p. 321) requires that they can ―claim an 
existence independent of one another, insofar as these things ―lie in different parts of space‖‖ 
(Einstein, 1948, p. 321). In other words these objects arranged in space, as required by the 
core elements of our foundational conceptual scheme, ought to have an intrinsic thisness
19
, 
i.e. whether they are interacting or not they should have separate intrinsic states (Howard, 
1994, p. 206).  The states can change as a result of interactions, but those interactions can be 
accounted for again in terms of the extension through the space-time continuum and, 
provided that the interaction is epistemically accessible in the given small region of space the 
object occupies, it is always to be separately definable. Furthermore, all composite objects 
                                                             
19 This should not be confounded with the notion of primitive thisness and identity as championed most 
notably in the works of R. M Adams. It allocates a foundational identity, for want of a better term an ‘itness’ 
(as suggested by D. Lehmkuhl in private correspondence), to the elements of reality but not one they retain 
independent of their potential for interaction with other elements of reality. At this stage we have to contend 
with an intuitive understanding of this term, given the proviso that it is not the technical term as advocated by 
Adams. For our purposes it suffices at this stage to allocate intrinsic states to elements of reality that are not 
wholly dependent on their ocurrent interactions with other such elements, i.e. not requiring an ontological 
holism in accounts of the material constituents of reality.  
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acquire all their properties from the constituents‘ intrinsic states and locally intrinsic 
interactions.  
And, as our troublesome phenomena will purport to illustrate, quantum formalism seems to 
deny this property to the objects in its domain. The fundamental formal difference is that 
classical formalism allows for the lack of definite separable (formally factorizable) 
descriptions of the phenomena as ignorance, i.e. enables us to claim that the participating 
objects are properly separable only we don‘t have enough information to formally represent 
that; whereas quantum theory formally precludes such interpretation of the situation (by 
precluding the aforementioned factorizability).
20
  This means that either quantum theory is 
not a fundamental physical theory and is not concerned with fundamental scientific 
explanatory ontology, or that we have to find some way of explaining how such separability 
violations are either benign (to our fundamental conceptual scheme) or just an illusion that 
does not actually affect the fundamental common sense explanatory conceptualization based 
on the notion of primary qualities (as sketched above). We have to bear in mind that at least 
for some properties (and the crucial question is whether for those we are most interested in: 
the traditional primary qualities) separability allows us to say that this definite object 
possesses this definite property (Howard, 1994, p. 209), and also to account for the changes 
of that property through the processes that foundationally rely on the primacy of extension in 
material world. The depth of explanation accounts (cf. Chapter 4) tend to require 
conceptualization of manipulations of definite object properties. It will then be our task to 
investigate what that provision does for the construction of explanatory accounts of the 
material processes, especially those involved in the troublesome phenomena themselves. 
Before that we will have to see just how each of our case-study instances proposes to deal 
with possible separability violations, as well as whether we can find a way of understanding 
separability so that the proposed violations are not damaging to the foundational aspects of 
the conceptual scheme.  
So what remains of our conceptual scheme and the transcendental strategy, if separability is 
violated? Howard (1989) interprets Einstein as claiming that separability is the only 
conceivable objective criterion for ascription of intrinsic ‗thisness‘ to elements of reality, to 
their objective (and this is important in our transcendental strategy) individuation. This rests 
                                                             
20 Winsberg and Fine (2003) argue that metaphysical separability does not imply the factorizability of the 
formal functions associated with the phenomena, but their argument poses further difficulties for the aims of 
our transcendental argument. We shall return to those issues in more detail in the middle sections of Chapter 
4.  
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on an even deeper metaphysical assumption that spatiotemporal separation is the only 
conceivable
21
 objective criterion of individuation and definition of the foundational ontology. 
Philosophically this is not an entirely pedestrian observation, as Strawson‘s (1959) theory of 
the role of the concept of material object in the conceptual scheme in terms of which we think 
(and talk) about particulars illustrates. The particulars, along the lines of ‗local beables‘ 
above and historically exemplified by the macroscopic objects in space and time, form the 
foundation of our most universal conceptual scheme. In other words they form the core 
element of every conceptual scheme as they are particulars that can be identified and re-
identified without reference to the particulars of a different sort; they are ontologically 
foundational.  
We might wonder what the role of the space and time is then. The objective particulars (the 
‗local beables‘) serve as our empirical access point to the conception of space and time, as 
they are three-dimensional (or spatially extended in our terminology above) and enduring 
through time (allowing not only for identification, but also for re-identification). At the 
bottom of this conceptual scheme lies a conception of separable (i.e. locally completely 
definable) space (or space-time) providing for unique objective relations between material 
particulars and all conscious (and this presumes: linguistically capable) agents. An important 
aspect of Strawson‘s ontological foundation for the conceptual scheme must be noted, 
especially in the light of the forthcoming ‗troublesome‘ phenomena22: the elements of 
ontology (the particulars) that provide the foundation of the conceptual framework must be 
taken to exist continuously through changes of place and time, so that we could re-identify 
them and thus rely on unique conceptualization for all conscious agents. The question arises 
what happens if the assumption of the continuous existence is threatened, not haphazardly but 
in a formal and systematic way. Can we still maintain the necessary re-identification and thus 
a simple rational assumption of the independent existence of the said ‗particulars‘ when no 
conscious agent is performing the identification, nor is even suitably disposed to in-principle 
perform it? 
                                                             
21 But, Howard (1989, p. 243) notes, we must distinguish this from possible in the sense of either logical or 
physical as expressed though theory formalisms. In fact, ‘conceivable’ here marks out precisely what our 
transcendental argument needs so as to work on the postmodernist as well: that which is conditioned by 
objective and historical factors, the models with which “we have been outfitted”.  
22 What we shall be concerned with in the following chapters is the possibility of granting the existence of the 
spatially extended basic particulars, but not necessarily their continuous endurance, i.e. we might have to try 
to contend with them making ‘jumps’ in identity, if possible.  
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1. 5 Conceptual problems and quantum ‘troublesome’ phenomena  
Separability is the principle behind classical physical explanations of the world, and states 
that material (include fields here as well) occupants of any two parts of space sufficiently 
distant from one another
23
 must be considered separate in a sense that they each have their 
own definite set of qualities and that their joint set of qualities is wholly determined by these 
separate sets (Maudlin, 2002, p. 97). An immediate dynamical consequence of such an 
assumption is known as the principle of locality: an event sufficiently separated (spacelike 
separated in the language of Special Theory of Relativity) from a given small region cannot 
influence the physical state assigned to that region. But Bell‘s theorem shows that quantum 
theory cannot conform to this picture ((Bell, On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox, 
1964); (Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, 1987); (Maudlin, 2002)). It 
accounts for the occurrence of phenomena in which some behaviour of separated pairs of 
objects (physical systems) cannot be explained by any local physical theory (be it current 
quantum theory or some general theory that might replace it) without including some non-
local interaction between the objects.  
Yet, it must be stressed that the nonlocality as implied by the quantum theory is subtle, and 
despite providing for some further interesting phenomena in the Quantum Information 
Theory, it does not allow for unpalatable science-fiction-style phenomena akin to telepathy 
(distant communication without use of classical communication channels) or ‗quantum‘ 
jumps (non-classically-assisted modifications of properties of distant objects). In summary 
the said nonlocality (Maudlin, 2002) does not require nor mandate:  
1. superluminal exchange of matter or energy,   
2. superluminal signalling,   
but does require:  
3. superluminal causal connections,  or 
4. superluminal information transmission.24  
                                                             
23
 Of course, this needs in fact to be supplemented with a more complete account of physical isolation, 
including isolating/individuating effects achieved in some other way, e.g. boxes or other barriers. But even 
those are describable in terms of properties based on extension.  
24 This does not contradict the above anti-telepathy claim, unless one takes information to be necessarily 
exchanged between human sender and receiver. But in parts of this thesis information transfer is a necessary 
prerequisite of superluminal causal connections and does not necessarily involve human subjects, but can be 
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Nonetheless, from the simple explanatory perspective, separability cannot be upheld, as 
despite of what probabilistic predictions we can make about the distant objects, the 
explanation of the changes they undergo will require some account of the characteristics of 
the situation which arises holistically over and above what we know about each separated 
object individually. Moreover, some of these characteristics will only be available to some 
experimenters in special circumstances (i.e. will not seem to objective relations established 
between objects and available to every investigator). We get a feeling that given the 
connections established between distant objects, perhaps they are not distinct objects or do 
not really occupy the different regions of space. But this options should not be so lightly 
accepted for we shall investigate below whether Einstein‘s expectations of a stable reality 
arise from their ‗thisness‘ being fully independently specifiable (Maudlin, 1998, p. 54)).   
The discussion about the subtle nature of these phenomena is wide ranging, but for the time 
being it suffices to illustrate how it clashes with the standard explanatory world-view, without 
committing to the technical details. Namely, traditional folk (everyday) and physical 
(technical, scientific) conceptual construction of the material world couples the assumption of 
individual ‗thisness‘ with the principle of separability, to provide an account of individuation 
(as a basis for interaction) of material objects (our physical systems). Howard (1989, p. 244) 
says that separability is the physical necessity for any account of extension (understood as a 
sufficient criterion of metaphysical individuation, cf. also (Howard, 1994)), as to make 
explanatory sense of it we need the extension to come in discrete individuated packets (this is 
not a claim for necessity of atoms, but for a necessity of provisionally individuatable parcels 
of matter smaller than the totality of the matter in the universe; in fact small enough to fit on 
the table top and be susceptible to experiments). A theory that denies separability, such as 
quantum theory, jeopardises explanations built on this scheme by making the properties of 
some parcel of the extended stuff depend on something other than the properties of 
(surrounding) local extension (shape, position, motion or field-based local interactions) alone. 
The mysterious holistic connection provides for changes in the separated, thus individuated, 
parcels of the extended stuff, such that they cannot in principle be accounted for by the 
(known) physical interaction (i.e. by energy, signals or matter; arising from the locally 
constructed account of the extended stuff) and the properties of the individual parcels 
themselves. In formal terms: classical phase space built on the notion of extension as primary 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
assumed exchanged between inanimate physical systems. Though, how much this characterization will help us 
with the final explanatory project remains to be seen.  
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is expressed in terms of position and momentum. The quantum phase space is different, and it 
seems that this will need to be reflected in the metaphysics and the explanation of the 
phenomena.  
The separability principle is, according to Howard (1989), tacitly behind the ascription of 
primary qualities as the only objective qualities of material existents in Newtonian physics, 
and their further gradual reduction to position as the sole objective criterion in distinguishing 
elements of material reality subject to formal theoretical description. This is of course 
supplemented by the divisibility of material objects along the lines of extension down to point 
particles, and finally with the need to explain interaction between the fundamental existents 
by spatial influences other than perfectly elastic contact action. Thus, all on tacit assumption 
of separability, we historically build up a half-scientific half-lay conceptual scheme of objects 
interacting along identifiable continuous ‗lines‘ in space time. This conceptual scheme (for 
reasons logical or historical is not of utmost importance to us) provides a smooth transition 
between the explanations resulting from formal physical theories to the common-sense 
world-view of objects existing outside ourselves and in physical interaction with our material 
aspect. To abandon this tradition, claims Howard (1989, p. 244), is possibly to go along the 
lines of Leibnizian metaphysics which (however potentially philosophically complex and 
sound) was never a widespread foundation for the explanation of the real phenomena, nor 
was it easily accommodated with the wide-spread (so as to include the antirealist, as well) 
everyday conceptual scheme.  
Dickson (1998, p. 156) objects to the tenability of holism alone as a scientific, and especially 
as an explanatory doctrine. Holistic metaphysics allows for no individuation of objects that 
can be said to be in an interaction, nor for their re-identification across space and time. In that 
sense it is robbing us of the core of our conceptual scheme, its essential part needed to 
construct an explanation of the phenomena. Also, its connection to the concepts of everyday 
parlance, all of them structured on objects with intrinsic ‗thisness‘ would be difficult to 
construct in a manageable number of steps. Namely, permitting the holistic aspect to 
theoretical metaphysics leaves the generation of the everyday conceptual framework out of 
the theoretical conceptual framework as essentially unexplainable, bluntly postulated and 
required but not counterfactually manipulable. We then seem to be back to the knuckles of 
the early measurement problem: ―[...] in what sense and with what objects have we [brought 
about the occurrence of our ‗troublesome‘ phenomena]? And how are [the phenomena that 
really occurred] related to the phenomena we thought [we observed]?‖ (Dickson, 1998, p. 
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156). And Dickson is quick to point just how a simple resignation to holism does not help 
remove the worry that the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena raised for the possibility of explanations 
from physics. For whether we call the correlations formally apparent in the ‗troublesome‘ 
phenomena results of action at a distance, or the observant correlations between the two parts 
of the same objects, we still have to explain how the correlations of the space-like separated 
events come to be formally established and empirically verified.  
One possibility is to distinguish separable and non-separable aspects of ontology, maintaining 
that the link between separability and the core of the conceptual scheme can be achieved 
solely through the separable part. Thus, Maudlin (2007b, p. 3158) argues that for the 
conceptual connection between the contemporary physical theories and the common-sense to 
hold, only some of its foundational elements need to be local (i.e. conform to the 
requirements of separability), whilst the separability violating segments can be relegated 
squarely to the section of ontology, different in kind, that is non-local. In Maudlin‘s words: 
we can have local beables and the non-local laws.
25
 He says this is actually the case in that 
classical beacon, Newtonian mechanics. One could not get a complete picture of the physical 
phenomena in the theory solely from the observation of the isolated region of space, as the 
objects there might behave as if caused to do so from outside the region. That is, a more 
satisfactory, from a unification of phenomena point of view, explanation is achieved if it is 
observed that the local objects can change their behaviour under influences from outside the 
region that are not evident on the local picture. (Of course if we posited the existence of some 
causal mechanism that governs the troublesome Newtonian action-at-a-distance, such as the 
exchange of force particles then we could localize all dynamical phenomena in the region.) In 
Newtonian mechanics, as it is most commonly understood, a change in a distant gravitating 
body can bring about a change in the local body in the proximal region. To account for that 
the explanatory conceptualization that includes Newtonian mechanics and the common sense 
experience posits the existence of local ontology of objects and the non-locality of laws 
governing change in those objects.  
The other is to try to diffuse the potential effects of the separability-violating phenomena as 
either illusions arising from an ontological mis-ascription of the elements of quantum 
formalism to the elements of fundamental ontology, or to show them to be constricted by 
                                                             
25 To be precise Maudlin does not attribute the laws to ontological postulations in this text, and in fact talks 
about the local ontology and non-local laws. With foresight to the discussions in the following chapters we can 
call them both elements of the explanatory ontology here.  
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limitations so as not to endanger our everyday conceptualization (something along the lines 
of: our fundamental building blocks are non-local, but only on occasions in which they are 
not providing the function we crucially expect from them, i.e. playing the role of the 
fundamental building blocks in the phenomena that feature in our experiences). From 
explanatory perspective and the requirement to relate the elements of the common-sense 
conceptual scheme to those of quantum theory, we must then either show how the mis-
ascription arises or how what was intended as fundamental theory manages to produce so 
radically different common sense concepts. This is to admit that there can be no conceptually 
foundational connection made between the common sense and the contemporary theories. It 
then leaves an open question in science, but also a task in philosophy, of explaining how 
come quantum systems are so radically different, given that they are expected to be the 
building blocks of all other objects in the physical world (Wessels, 1989, p. 96).  
Quantum teleportation  
A further, and for present purposes more interesting ‗troublesome‘ phenomenon, is provided 
by the so-called teleportation protocol. In the protocol the sender and receiver again separate 
each with one end of the entangled physical system A and B, respectively. For sake of clarity, 
let us assume each of the systems A and B is a photon, and the photon-pair starts off in a state 
‗described‘ by the entangled quantum state. The sender has in possession another photon in 
some unknown state of polarisation, u. She then performs local operations on two photons in 
her possession, so that the formalism predicts that the distant (receiver‘s) photon will be 
disentangled and the sender‘s two photons will become entangled. But the receiver‘s photon 
is not simply left in any odd state, but is steered by the ‗disentanglement‘ procedure into a 
state u*, which is related to state u in a definite way (Bub, 2007). After the sender then 
communicates the outcome of her operations (i.e. the result of the measurement on her two 
photons) to the receiver through a classical communication channel, he knows that his photon 
is either in a state u*=u or how to transform u* to u by a local operation at his end.  
To hammer this point home, consider what Bub (Bub, 2006) says about the density of coding 
(the quantity of information) employed in this transfer, by the sender and receiver he calls 
Alice and Bob.  
What is extraordinary about this phenomenon is that 
Alice and Bob have managed to use their shared 
entangled state as a quantum communication 
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channel to destroy the state u of a photon in Alice's 
part of the universe and recreate it in Bob's part of 
the universe. Since the state of a photon requires 
specifying a direction in space (essentially the value 
of an angle that can vary continuously), without a 
shared entangled state Alice would have to convey 
an infinite amount of classical information to Bob 
for Bob to be able to reconstruct the state u 
precisely. […This is because] to specify the value of 
an arbitrary angle variable requires an infinite 
number of bits. To specify the outcome of Alice's 
operation, which has four possible outcomes, with 
equal a priori probabilities, requires two bits of 
classical information. Remarkably, Bob can 
reconstruct the state u on the basis of just two bits of 
classical information communicated by Alice, 
apparently by exploiting the entangled state as a 
quantum communication channel to transfer the 
remaining information. (Bub, 2006)  
―The state has ‗disappeared‘ from Alice‘s region and ‗reappeared‘ in Bob‘s, hence the use of 
the of the term teleportation for this phenomenon‖ (Timpson, 2004, p. 66). Of course, a lot of 
detail is missing from this introductory presentation and will be furnished when revisiting it 
in the sections below (alternatively, sufficiently detailed presentation can be found in 
(Timpson, 2004), and a more precise technical exposition in e.g. (Diosi, 2007)). For present 
purposes suffices to say that the phenomenon is ‗troublesome‘ because nothing like that is 
possible in classical physical theories, however imprecise the discussion of information 
theory associated with the situation (i.e. whatever one‘s views of information-ontologies) 
may be. It is instructive, though, that it is the information transfer and not the matter or 
energy transfer that creates the puzzling effects here, perhaps another hint as to what 
direction to look in for the constraining principle of nature. The receiver has not created a 
photon out of nothing, but has merely transformed his existing photon into the distant one, 
without knowing exactly what the distant one was like in the first place. In fact no one knew 
exactly what the transmitted photon looked like before it was sent, not even the sender, no 
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one had the infinite information. Unless a mysterious connection between all provisionally 
distant objects in the universe is postulated, we are ‗troubled‘ by trying to explain what goes 
on here. Similarly in the ‗dense coding‘ situation to be presented in the following chapter, the 
classical analogue requires that the separated communicators know in advance what the 
distant half of the coded message says (which is ex hypothesi impossible) in order to recreate 
the coded messages that can arise through manipulations of the quantum formalism and the 
attendant elements of material reality.  
But stepping back from ‗information-speak‘, that is to be more thoroughly analysed below, 
the teleportation phenomenon is still puzzling from the perspective of the potential for 
construction of the transcendental strategy of section 1. 4. Namely, it seems to deny an 
individuating ‗thisness‘ to the supposed fundamental objects behind the phenomena by 
actively reducing their continuous space-time existence to the formal manipulations by 
experimenters. It illustrates most forcefully how the properties of the fundamental objects are 
dependent on the proscriptions from the formalism, and thus non-separably manipulable, 
rather than intrinsically inherent in the objects themselves. The experimenter that is able to 
more closely read the proscriptions of the wavefunction can come to know more about the 
distant object than the experimenter in possession of the object. The question then arises what 
other characteristics, other than being-thus, our fundamental objects have, and whether their 
location is a sufficient conceptual foundation to be connected with the common-sense 
conceptual framework. Teleportation is just a vivid illustration of how the fundamental 
objects are rid of all but their point positions.
26
 Is that enough to reconstruct the phenomena 
of everyday experience?  
Maudlin (2007a) argues that for the proposed transcendental account to go through the 
conceptual connection between the contemporary physical theories and common-sense must 
have at least some ―local beables‖.27 This is not to say that it can‘t postulate any non-local 
such beable, but merely that for the connection to be established in the most straightforward 
                                                             
26 For a detailed exposition of similar experimental situations that illustrate the qualitative paucity of the 
localized fundamental objects cf. (Brown, Elby, & Weingard, 1996).  
27 This is a terminology introduced in Bell (1987), where a ‘beable’ is a speculative piece of ontology, 
something that a theory postulates as being physically real. It is the foundational stone of our constructive 
approaches, the very construct that the explanation along the causal-mechanical lines rests on. Beables are 
the physical ontology that a theory postulates to exist. (These will be further explicated in the forthcoming 
sections.) ‘Local beables’, on the other hand, “do not merely exist: they exist somewhere.” (Maudlin, 2007a, p. 
3157). If local beables are all there is to physical ontology, then we get a Humean Mosaic, a global state of 
affairs constructed linearly out of a combination of local states, a simple summation of all local beables. 
Whether this can be done in quantum theory is the contentious issue to be discussed in the thesis.  
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way it must contain at least some. ―We take the world to contain localized objects (of 
unknown composition) in a certain disposition that changes through time. These are the sorts 
of beliefs we begin with.‖ (Maudlin, 2007a: 3160). In principle a theory without local beables 
could also account for these beliefs, but the construction of explanation from such a theory 
would prove a much harder task and one ridden with many more frailties, claims Maudlin. 
And the role of ―local beables‖ is similar to that required of the material structure described 
essentially in terms of primary qualities, for they allow for a most direct connection between 
the experience of the phenomena and the ontology that explanatorily accounts for them by 
providing a most commonly agreeable vocabulary, a conceptual framework, through which to 
account for that connection (Maudlin, 2007a, p. 3160). The question that the teleportation, as 
the key ‗troublesome‘ phenomenon, raises is: given how much of the conceptual framework 
is relegated to the non-local beable, are the local beables conceptually strong enough to 
uphold the simple transcendental strategy?  
1. 6 The research instrument and explanation  
Though models of explanations abound in literature it is never straightforward to apply any of 
them to the particular scientific phenomena other than those they had been specifically 
designed for. It is sometimes said that we even need not fashion individual scientific 
explanations after general models. We shall have to take from each of the models that which 
is useful for the case-study instances and apply it in the present context. Precious little 
guidance can be gleaned from literature in that respect, as there is a scarcity of systematic 
accounts of the notion of explanatory depth, over and above proscriptive and descriptive 
delineations of the overarching explanatory models  (Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003, p. 181). 
Explanations are often subjective beasts, when I consider something explained others might 
not. So one option would be to leave the issue out of the discussion altogether, we could just 
compare directly the two approaches presented in the thesis and see which one ‗clicks‘ better. 
But that would be to give in too much to the subjectivity; I should in that case explain why I 
really like one of them so much over the other and hope the reader will like them too. 
Maudlin (2002) calls this choosing scientific theories on aesthetic grounds.  
A more objective (and let‘s leave ‗objective‘ as implicitly understood here) route would be to 
try to explicitly devise the criteria upon which the value will be conferred to either of the 
approaches and then carefully collect the points of each on a scoreboard, using the final tally 
as an objective guide as to which one of them to ‗like‘ more. What is needed is adjudication, 
over and above the descriptive account of the proposed explanations of the phenomena.  
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Upon such a strategy we need to try to box each of the approaches under a model as much as 
it will fit, in order to speed up the scoring, the more appealing the general model the more 
appealing will be the accounts subsumed under it.
28
 In this respect we shall follow an 
instruction found in (Lipton, 2004)
29
 to distinguish between, tentatively termed, epistemic 
and ontological (or metaphysical) explanations. Epistemic explanations cash in on satisfying 
our epistemic cravings alone: they provide us with good reasons to believe the phenomenon 
(explanandum) did actually occur or reduce the problematic phenomenon to what is already 
familiar. The ontological explanations, on the other hand, aim to present the phenomenon as a 
consequence of the way things really are in the world, regardless of how they may seem to us 
or how familiar they may be. As to how epistemology is connected to metaphysics, or more 
specifically ontology, in the simple transcendental strategy, we can follow Ruben‘s 
conclusions that explanations can and do have a virtue over a bare pragmatic satisfaction of 
‗explanatory hunger‘ (thus potentially making them mere narrative constructions).  
Explanations work only because things make things 
happen or make things have some feature (‗things‘ 
should be taken in an anodyne sense, to include 
whatever the reader wishes to count as a denizen of 
reality). And making can be taken in a deterministic 
or in a nondeterministic (dependency) sense.  
And this, I think, is the ultimate basis for any reply 
to an explanation theorist who holds that full 
explanation is only and entirely a pragmatic or 
otherwise anthropomorphic conception. On my 
view, explanation is epistemic, but with a solid 
metaphysical basis. A realist theory of explanation 
that links the determinative (or dependency) 
                                                             
28 They will also allow easier linking of explanatory strategies in individual instances into a wider reaching 
world-view.  
29 Lipton’s account provides a useful starting point as he approaches the delineation of models from a 
utilitarian, not a purely descriptive, perspective. He asks what good an explanation is in science (and in 
sometimes related disciplines such as mathematics and philosophy) and sets up a simple ‘three essential 
features of explanation’ test that aims to respect these utilitarian goals. This test is not only useful in checking 
which models approach the utilitarian goal best, but also in alluding to the epistemic/ontological distinction. 
The three features test also appears to be applicable to the very instances that the explanations from the 
different theoretical approaches try to provide, and not just to the success of the models covering them. 
(Lipton, 2004, pp. 1-10).  
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relations in the world with explanation gets at the 
intuitively acceptable idea that we explain 
something by showing what is responsible for it or 
what makes it as it is.‖ (Ruben, 1990 , pp. 232-233)  
As our transcendental strategy of section 1. 4 clearly requires ontological explanations to 
achieve realist conclusions, we shall focus on two such models to be applied to the case-study 
instances. These are the ―unification conception of understanding‖ and the ―causal conception 
of understanding‖ (Lipton, 2004, pp. 7-8).30 As the unification model in general weavers 
between both epistemological and ontological explanations it will be interesting to investigate 
whether it can be pinned to the ontological side without being turned into a causal conception 
(with the pitfalls inherent in that from our ‗troublesome‘ phenomena).31 In that respect, as the 
historical analysis has illustrated (section 1.2.), causal conception can be seen as a subset of 
the unification conception; it provides unification through reduction of the wide range of 
phenomena to the universal causal mechanism. So the pure unification conception here will 
have to be what is outside that subset, the unificatory but not causal (or more precisely, 
causal-mechanical) segment of the model.  
We will, thus, survey two conceptual approaches arguably aligned with the two types of 
explanatory models presented above. The aim is to investigate their explanatory content and 
scope, and especially to appraise the ontological characteristics of the explanatory narratives 
they provide for the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena (as well as the wider scientific world-view). 
Each following chapter provides a more detailed introduction to the views of each of the 
conceptual and methodological approaches (the principle and the constructive one). A final 
tally is attempted in the last chapter where the explanatory success of the two approaches is 
directly compared.  
Comparative presentation of Lipton’s models of explanation  
Lipton (2004) devises makeshift criteria which help adjudicate explanatory worth (in the 
absence of a more lengthy analysis of ‗understanding‘) based on a few simple insights about 
                                                             
30 Lipton (2004) freely exchanges ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’ in the text, as explanation is the means to 
achieve understanding. It would probably be clearer to call them conceptions of explanation, for 
understanding may be an unanalysable end-product of explanation. But it is the mystification of understanding 
that Lipton tries to avoid by, among other things, showing it to be something different than knowledge and 
practically available through the methods we use to explain things by.  
31 It is a mark of Kitcher’s original advocacy (1989) of unificationist account, though not of Friedman’s (1974) 
initial unificationist proposal, that in the realm of fundamental physics it is equated with the causal account, 
though in the special sciences it allows the divergence from the necessary construction of causal mechanisms.  
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the state we call understanding, both ‗phenomenological‘ and comparative to other similar 
states. Thus understanding must be separated from bare knowledge by a gap that has to be 
additionally bridged, it must stop the endless why-regress at least until explicit further 
enticements (such as more detailed analysis or new phenomena) appear and it must have that 
wholesome character of all its elements obviously fitting into their places to form a uniform 
whole. These criteria Lipton terms, respectively, the  
(i) Knowledge versus Understanding,  
(ii) Why Regress, and   
(iii) Self-evidencing Explanation
32
.  
In general, Lipton (2004) claims that casual-mechanical explanations fare better on the 
satisfaction of the three criteria and are on the whole best at satisfying the explanatory 
hunger. There is no need to quarrel with Lipton‘s analysis here, nor to repeat it. What is more 
interesting is to apply the research instrument devised in this section, i.e. to show how the 
explicit instances of unification and causal explanations that we have chosen through our 
case-study instance actually satisfy the stated requirements.  
But before that, it is worth summarising once more why Lipton deems the causal 
explanations as most successful in passing all the criteria and thus as the most desirable 
model of explanation in science. This is important also because it points to the direction our 
unification model of explanation should orientate itself in order to successfully compete with 
the general preference for the mechanical models (despite some of their failures that are to be 
discussed below). Lipton himself admits that the most tempting and succinct answer as to 
why causes provide better explanations than their effects, is that the causes have the power to 
confer understanding, at least in science. The idea would be: show the cause of a 
phenomenon and you have conferred understanding as to why the phenomenon occurs. But 
there are obvious problems with that, the first being that even though we could through 
                                                             
32 A successful explanation not only conceptually unites the occurrence of the phenomenon into a wider 
conceptual scheme but shows just how the occurrence of the phenomenon is an essential part of our reason 
for believing that the explanation itself is correct (Lipton, 2004, p. 3). It ties the phenomenon and the 
explanation into a firm conceptual whole. It is hard to go deeper into structural analysis of this feature, and we 
take the lack of universal formal analysis of the syntactic structure of explanations to be a good indication that 
it needn’t be done here. Examples in this case seem to go a long way in replacing the formal analysis, such as 
Lipton’s illustration of the velocity of the recession of a galaxy as an explanation of its red shift even in the 
situation where the shift is an essential part of the evidence for the specified rate of recession (Lipton, 2004, p. 
4). 
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counterfactual dependence show some event to be taken as the cause of the other, if there is 
no wider elaboration as to how it is its cause then understanding may still be missing. All we 
would have done is increased the stock of knowledge of facts, in this case that occurrence of 
the first phenomenon will under some circumstances lead to the occurrence of the other, that 
it will be the cause for it.  
His second attempt is to say that causes ‗bring about‘ the occurrence of effects, but that might 
be taken as just synonymous for ‗causes cause effects‘. To avoid such a reading one has to 
look more closely at the temporal asymmetry of the phenomena deemed to be cause and 
effect, as well as abandon the Humean mosaic view of causation as entrenched but contingent 
conjunction.  For at least one of our case-study instances that should not be a problem, as it 
relies heavily on just such a philosophical move. The other instance, should it make an 
attempt to move closer to the causation explanatory model will have to accommodate this 
distancing from Humeanism as well.  
A much stronger support for causal explanation is provided by causes ‗making a difference‘ 
between the phenomenon occurring and not occurring. In explaining a phenomenon, or more 
precisely its occurrence, that seems to be exactly what we are after i.e. showing what resides 
between the phenomenon occurring as it did and it not occurring at all. It is causes that often 
make a difference in this sense in science, whilst the phenomena we would deem their effects 
as rule do not (i.e. the asymmetry is not abolished). This kind of reading helps even in the 
situation where there are multiple possible causes or several of them contribute jointly. It is 
still the case that a better understanding is gained by selecting a cluster of causes that made 
the difference (preferably the crucial difference) to the phenomenon occurring, whilst at the 
same time having knowledge of their individual influences and joint interaction. Thus we 
come to another, often hidden value in explanation and that is not just showing that the event 
occurred but giving some detail (though not excessively) as to how it came about as well. A 
well structured causal explanation can do just this; provide a successful narrative of why and 
how our phenomenon occurred. Once that is done we may consider the phenomenon 
explained.  
But there is a downside to this justification for the primacy of causal explanations, the use of 
contrastive explanations (Lipton, 2004, p. 16). Our desire to have the phenomenon explained 
often stems not from simple desire to learn why and how it came about, but from an implicit 
question why that particular phenomenon came about and not some other, similar 
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phenomenon. Without going into further discussions of individuation of phenomena, it is 
clear that often in asking for an explanation of a phenomenon we are asking for an 
explanation of some crucial feature of the phenomenon, i.e. for explanation of why that 
feature obtains and not some other closely related feature. And causal explanations are not 
straightforwardly married with the ‗contrastive requirement‘, as it is precisely the wider story 
and the more complex narrative construction that is needed to show how a particular cause, 
out of a cluster of closely related potential siblings, brought about a particular effect.
33
 But on 
adding this criterion some causes can be shown to be weaker in providing explanations than 
the elements of other explanatory models, and this will be our concern in the section on depth 
of explanation. Of course those causes that surmount this hurdle will provide even better 
explanations. When explanations compete we want a ‗deeper‘ one.  
                                                             
33 This need not go to the extreme of denying chanciness and random outcomes even at the fundamental 
level. It is merely to claim that in competing explanations that which came closer to showing how a particular 
phenomenon came about from a particular cause will be considered a better explanation provided that both 
are equally empirically adequate.  
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2. PRINCIPLE APPROACHES  
Historically, much of fundamental physics has been 
concerned with discovering the fundamental 
particles of nature and the equations which describe 
their motions and interactions. It now appears that a 
different programme may be equally important: to 
discover the ways that nature allows, and prevents, 
information to be expressed and manipulated, rather 
than particles to move. (Steane, Quantum 
Computing, 1998, p. 119)  
2. 1. Bohr and neo-Bohrianism  
The founding father and his philosophy  
Niels Bohr, a self-confessed non-philosopher, and one of the founding fathers of quantum 
theory, believed the ―irrational element‖ (the Planck quantum of action) discovered through 
development of quantum theory has brought us against the insurmountable epistemic wall 
when it comes to the exploration and explanation of the physical world.
34
 He expected 
philosophy to provide a ‗band-aid‘ for the damage this wall has caused to the forehead of 
empirical research, but no more than that, as there is no way out of the dire predicament 
(Vukelja, 2004). Niels Bohr believed that quantum theory would have to adopt a radically 
different approach to investigation of physical reality, from the theories under the umbrella of 
classical physics.  
In Bohr‘s eyes, due to the finite size of the Planck quantum of action, we can no longer 
perform experiments on objects that are elements of physical reality, without disturbing them 
‗beyond recognition‘. The objects, independent physical entities, no longer exist in their own 
right, within the conceptual explanatory framework of the theory. This is not to say that there 
is no physical reality, or elements of physical reality, at the microscopic (‗quantum‘) level (in 
a metaphysical sense), but that they have to stay forever epistemically inaccessible (or, 
epistemically insufficiently accessible) with respect to determination of individuality and 
physical characteristics. Thus we cannot construct a ‗mechanical‘ conceptual scheme to 
describe the realm of the quantum.  
                                                             
34
 “There is an “irrational” element to nature: so stands the measurement problem on Bohr’s philosophy” says 
Saunders in an updated version of (Saunders, 1994).  
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He took the major difference between the new language of quantum theory and that of the 
previous theories to be in that quantum theory‘s lacked the following four characteristics:  
1. Determinism (or causality, Bohr finds the two terms almost synonymous, (Scheibe, 
1973, p. 13)),  
2. Terminology of pictorial description,  
3. Independence of objects of observation from the experimental apparatus  
4. Possibility of the combined use of the space-time concepts and dynamical 
conservation laws (Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge , 1958, pp. 67-82).  
The everyday (classical) language we use when discussing physical reality includes the above 
features, and is therefore not suitable to describe the reality as given by quantum theory. In 
Bohr‘s own words:  
All description of experiences has so far been based 
upon the assumption, already inherent in ordinary 
conventions of language, that it is possible to 
distinguish sharply between the behaviour of objects 
and the means of observation. This assumption is not 
only fully justified by all everyday experience but 
even constitutes the whole basis of classical physics. 
(Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge , 
1958, p. 25)  
However we still have to use the classical terminology, the one we understand well from 
everyday use, to describe the results of the quantum measurement. This requirement is 
imposed so that those observations could be communicated, and made public, or even more 
precisely: the foundation of the realist explanatory conceptual scheme of physics is built on 
it.
35
 
                                                             
35 We are treading over some fine notions here, most notably Bohr’s understanding of ‘objectivity’. Howard 
(1994) argues that Bohr made a break with a traditional concept of objectivity as independence of objects 
from observers, by defining it as “unambiguous communicability” of the scientist’s descriptions of experiments 
and their results. Limitations of space preclude a wider discussion, though the notion will obviously be relevant 
to the expectations of ontology to be given by Bohr’s ‘interpretation of the formalism’. We can simply take this 
shift of definition to suggest similarities between Bohr’s attitude to constructive ontology and the attitude of 
principle approaches to be presented below.  
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Bohr then considered that the chief aim of a consistent quantum theory is an unambiguous 
description of quantum phenomena, but obtained by including in their description the 
experimental conditions in which the phenomena occur (Scheibe, 1973, p. 18). Those 
experimental conditions are not to be clearly separated from the object, as in classical 
terminology.
36 
But a problem arises because the apparatus is described by classical physics 
and the object by the quantum mechanical formalism, or in Bohr‘s words: ―the essentially 
new feature in the analysis of quantum phenomena is…the introduction of a fundamental 
distinction between the measuring apparatus and the objects under investigation.‖ (Bohr, 
1963, p. 3). They no longer belong to the same language. Two different languages are 
required to describe what we expected is the same physical world on a continuous extension 
scale.  
From the above considerations, it should be clear 
that the whole situation in atomic physics deprives 
of all meaning such inherent attributes as the 
idealisations of classical physics would ascribe to 
the object. (Bohr, 1937, p. 293)  
There is no room to enter into a detailed discussion of the route to Bohrian position, nor its 
eventual inadequacies from the present day vantage point. Insightful analyses can be found in 
(Vukelja, 2004); (Saunders, What is the Problem of Measurement?, 1994), (Saunders, 2005); 
(Barbour, 1999); (Hilgevoord & Uffink, 2006); (Bub, 2000);  (Bub, 2004). What we really 
need here is an attempt to establish the outlines of his position with respect to methodology, 
metaphysics and explanations resulting from quantum theory, and how his views relate to the 
contemporary principle approaches which are often characterised as neo-Bohrian. Due to 
complexities of Bohr‘s own writing (Vukelja, 2004, p. 26) and extension of subsequent 
debate, the summation offered here serves the purposes of the wider positions outlined in the 
thesis without the luxury of argument and justification for such use (again due to limitation of 
space).  
Treacherous metaphysics and limited explanatory potential  
As is outlined above, in perhaps too coy terms, Bohr advocated the agnosticism towards the 
constructive elements of reality at the quantum level due to the inadequacy of the mechanistic 
                                                             
36
 Bohr introduces a term ‘phenomenon’ to replace the object of observation, the apparatus used to observe 
the object and their mutual interaction that takes place during the process of measurement.  
66 
 
worldview in providing a description of them. But, as our existing, and culturally 
unchangeable, conceptual framework relies precisely on the mechanistic worldview, and is 
perfectly adequate for the description of the non-quantum experience
37
, we are forced to use 
it to the best possible fit, even when describing ‗quantum phenomena‘. This is simply 
because of a contingent fact that it is the conceptual framework we have and one that we 
can‘t step out of when constructing another one anew.38 This best fit is achieved by 
considering each measurement of the state of the inaccessible quantum object in isolation, but 
under internal holism. This is the uniqueness of individual phenomena. They become isolated 
from the wider context (e.g. physical history leading to the individual measurement) and thus 
do not allow formation of unifiable knowledge (Vukelja, 2004) about the individual elements 
of reality. On the other hand, the holistic element within each phenomenon precludes a clear-
cut separation between the observer, the measuring apparatus and the object, so as to lead 
towards at least potential unification of the ‗picture‘ of all of the object‘s properties.   
This implies that there is no possibility of providing a constructive-style theory of the 
elements of reality that interact with the measuring apparatus and the observer, assuming it 
subscribes to the causal-mechanical model of explanation. The language employed by 
quantum theory as a constructive theory cannot use the familiar concepts from the classical, 
everyday realm in the same sense that they are normally used in. The wholeness of the 
‗phenomenon‘ excludes the possibility of a clear delineation of new existents, their 
identification as objects traceable across different experimental contexts. Following on from 
that we cannot distil a unified picture of the object of observation, which is a telltale 
characteristic of the non-unifiable knowledge, and which, in turn, is the best we can achieve 
about ‗microscopic/quantum phenomena‘. Thus, in terms of epistemic access required for 
explanation we have to contend with wholesome phenomena, parcelled out from one another 
by the sea of standard mechanistically conceptualised experience.  
Yet, this novel epistemology, rests on a metaphysical premise that is largely unacceptable 
today: the postulation of the existence of the ―irrational element‖ that creates epistemic havoc 
                                                             
37
 For presentation of Bohr’s extensions of his ‘quantum philosophy’ to the realms of relativity theory, biology 
and psychology, see (Vukelja, 2004).  
38 That is, on a general level language contains a world-view and we cannot start constructing new private 
languages with altogether different world-views. Though we can correct the level of detail, in world-view 
construction we cannot start fundamentally from scratch, from some sort of non-linguistic starting point. Bohr 
thought that abandoning the mechanical view would require such a radical revision.  
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in each instance of knowledge gathering in the quantum realm.
39
 In each measurement 
interaction the ―irrational element‖ disturbs the system, and this is why it is necessary to 
abandon hope of a ‗phantasmal‘40 nature of observation that allows the observer to simply 
‗absorb‘ the state affairs, as it is in itself, unaffected by the act of observation. Thus, Bohr 
relies on a constructive step about the existence of an ―irrational‖ element in order to avoid 
the discrepancy between the predictions of the theory and the observed outcomes (as 
contained in the measurement problem). In an ontological sense, we can almost picture the 
business as usual mechanics of the very small, treacherously disturbed by the unaccountable 
and unpredictable irrational element. However, the supposed ―irrational‖ element does not 
feature in the quantum formalism, it is a purely interpretative philosophical addition 
(Saunders, 1994). But without the element, it is harder to accept the, almost metaphysical, 
necessity of limiting ourselves to non-unifiable knowledge of the ‗quantum reality‘ however 
scarce that knowledge may be presently. In fact, Beller (1999, pp. 171-190; 197) cites 
opposition to Bohr‘s view from the likes of M. Born and W. Heisenberg, who held that there 
is no need to adopt such neo-Kantian view, and that a conceptual framework that includes 
quantum phenomena should be a correction of the inaccuracies discovered in the current 
everyday (classical) one.  
A more charitable reading of Bohr‘s approach, in Howard (1994) does not stress the reliance 
on the irrational element, but in fact sees Einstein‘s separability principle as the guiding idea 
behind Bohr‘s explanation of the phenomena. On Howard‘s account, the necessity of 
separability of elements of the universe is, according to Bohr, untenable in quantum theory. 
As the notion of objectivity as metaphysical independence of object and observer was also 
based on separability
41, it had to be redefined into ‗unambiguous communicability‘ (see ftn. 
35 above). On this reading Bohr‘s explanation of the phenomena rests on taking separability 
as the foundational presumption of our conceptual framework (i.e. language) and this is in 
perfect agreement with the theories of classical physics. In the quantum realm separability is 
violated and the language based on it cannot adequately describe the situation. Thus, we 
cannot have unifiable knowledge/explanation of the phenomena in that realm. With the 
                                                             
39 This is a curious mixing of the principle and constructive methodology, as Bohr postulates a new existent of a 
special kind (the “irrational element”) and uses that postulation as a constraining principle on the possibility of 
analysis and explanation of the experimental situation.  
40
 Classical causal explanations of phenomena rest on the said ‘phantasmal’ nature of observation, i.e. 
possibility of detachment of the observer from the unfolding of the physical process (Vukelja, 2004).   
41 Namely, that the act of observation, a passive act by the observer, does not affect the outcome of the 
physical process as the whole process of observation consists of separable segments of physical process and a 
recording by the observer.  
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separability broken, due to ―irrational element‖ or something else, our conceptual framework 
has hit against the limit of understanding, and we must contend with agnosticism concerning 
the ontology at this level of reality.
42
 One might also suggest that Bohr‘s acceptance of non-
unifiable knowledge presents a criticism of the evidently limited mechanical-causal 
explanatory framework.  
 The methodological legacy  
Vukelja claims that it is Bohr‘s general position on the role of science that it should not aim 
at a conceptual mapping of reality, in a constructive sense of delineating existents and their 
interactions, but should instead aim to systematically unify human experience through 
objective presentation of the experienced phenomena (Vukelja, 2004). Hilgevoord and Uffink 
say that Bohr renounces ―the idea that [conceptual] pictures refer, in a literal one-to-one 
correspondence, to physical reality‖ (Hilgevoord & Uffink, 2006). As will be discussed later, 
with reference to Einstein‘s explanation of his reasoning behind the use of principle 
approach, these can be seen as conforming with the principle methodology requirement of 
trying to abstract as much as possible from the assumptions and postulates about ontology, 
and formulating empirical generalisations expected to survive any foreseeable ontological 
clarification. Yet, this is not a full-blown principle approach based on achieving desired 
unification through one or more foundational generalising principles, and allows the use of 
alternative constructive conceptualisations (wave and particle mechanics) as useful fictions in 
individual contexts. Bub (2000) on the other hand, is not perturbed by this constructive 
misdemeanour, and claims that Bohr‘s position treats quantum theory as a principle theory 
with a Kantian twist (the necessity of using classical concepts).
43
 As for the formalism, Bohr 
sees no reason to attribute credence to any of its particular demands as to the nature of reality.  
                                                             
42 Of course, an important question of where exactly this cut between the levels is placed can be posed. Some 
commentators leave it as a weakness in Bohr’s position to place it ‘somewhere’ between the scales of the 
macroscopic measuring instrument and the ‘atomic’ object. Hence, the metaphysical importance of the 
“irrational element” being the Planck quantum of action. Others, hold that the formalism should not permit 
‘quantum effects’ to be amplified to the macroscopic size (though we do not observe that, and thus get the 
problem of measurement) and that the cut is not a matter of scale of material extension, but of choosing those 
parameters from the formalism that permit the accurate prediction of the desired experimental outcomes and 
the description that respects separability of object and apparatus. Such a description can be found in the 
formalism, at the expense of rendering unknowable other characteristics of the overall system. Thus, our 
description conforms to the classical conceptual framework but is irrevocably incomplete and does not allow 
construction of a unified explanation.  
43 Another similarity, presented in (Bub, 2004) is the denial of the measurement problem in Bohr’s philosophy 
and the CBH principle approach. The former, according to Bub, simply placed the measuring instruments 
outside the domain of the theoretical description, however arbitrary the cut might seem. This way there was 
no problem to be solved (we were not to ask what happens to the measuring instruments between the 
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The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for 
deriving predictions, of definite or statistical 
character, as regards information obtainable under 
experimental conditions described in classical terms 
[…]. These symbols themselves, […], are not 
susceptible to pictorial interpretation; and even [the 
formal predictions] are only to be regarded as 
expressing the probabilities for the occurrence of 
individual events observable under well-defined 
experimental conditions. (Bohr, 1948, p. 314) 
On the other hand, what makes contemporary principle approaches of this chapter neo-
Bohrian is their agreement that a constructive picture along the classical lines of the 
phenomena guided by the quantum formalism cannot be built. In fact both Fuchs and Bub 
admit Bohrian leanings, towards Bohr‘s position as they understand it to be ( (Fuchs, 2002b); 
(Bub, 2004)). We cannot construct metaphysical postulates that will satisfactorily fit into the 
existing overall conceptual scheme and provide a mechanical underpinning of the said 
phenomena. The quantum realm is conceptually radically different from the classical one, and 
we have to learn to respect that. Without any speculation as to the nature of ontology, we can 
ascertain that quantum formalism and separability are in conflict. Yet, the constructive 
approach of Chapter 3 is also willing to accept this, but build a modified mechanical picture 
of the processes ‗producing‘ the experienced phenomena. Perhaps Bohr was simply wrong at 
the last step, and given some hindsight available to contemporary physicists he would have 
sided with the constructive picture and abandoned calls for non-unifiable knowledge (this 
would in effect be giving in to the criticism of Heisenberg and Born, as reported in (Beller, 
1999)).  
What can be seen as characteristic of the principle methodology in Bohr‘s position is the 
overall reduction in explanatory utility of the quantum formalism, whilst nevertheless holding 
on to some sort of determinism and realism. All principle approaches (which distinguishes 
them from pure unashamed instrumentalism) see the reduction as an indication of constraints 
on what can be known about the quantum-domain phenomena imposed by the reality itself 
(to a greater or lesser degree), thus not as a consequence of pure technical ignorance that 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
‘ready’-state and the measurement interaction). The latter, purport to show that the measurement problem is 
a pseudo-problem that different interpretations waste time ‘solving’ (Bub, 2004, pp. 262-263).   
70 
 
further research might remove. Constructive approaches postulate entities that they hope will 
lead us out of such self-imposed ignorance with questions in the right direction.
44
 The 
principle approaches and Bohr also treat the formalism as an instrumental tool and not an 
ontological pointer.  
Quantum [formalism] postulates a geometry of 
propositions because complete knowledge of the 
system is not possible; the geometry both guides and 
constrains the extent of our fragmentary knowledge 
of the properties associated with an instantaneous 
state. […] Our knowledge of the propositions true of 
the system is unstable and changing. It is so unstable 
that quantum mechanics proceeds by articulating 
only the exact fashion in which this instability is 
evidenced. (Demopoulos, 2004, pp. 103-104) 
2. 2. Quantum information theory and principle approaches  
Step one and step two in principle-based explanations  
Methodologically, the principle approaches of this chapter set out from the observation that 
formal theoretic accounts of the phenomena considered characteristic of quantum theory can 
be derived from a limited set of formalised principles about constrictions on the amount of 
knowledge an observer can have about reality, or similar principles about information 
acquisition and transmission when dealing with ‗reality measuring‘ instruments. A common 
denominator for the approaches surveyed here is that they are explicitly in the state of 
development, i.e. that they do not offer complete explanatory accounts of the phenomena in 
question that are sufficiently couched in the wider explanatory framework concerning the 
physical world. We shall survey two such approaches, though most of the discussion in the 
end will be focused on one of them, a formally more complete one.  
Yet, as their proposal is a deviation from the standard preference in physical explanation for 
causal-mechanical accounts the actual formal methodology of their derivation will have to be 
outlined to a greater extent. In that, the Fuchs programme can be seen as, conceptually, an 
intermediary step towards the more abstract CBH programme. As we shall see, though the 
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 Though, even they are aware of some serious obstacles on that route, as given by the in-principle 
unknowability of some important states of the universe.  
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more abstract programme is harder to fathom, it is less committed to ‗sins‘ inherent in the 
principle approaches (cf. exposition of Einstein‘s principle derivation of Special Relativity in 
Chapter 1, section 1. 3. 1). Also, as both programmes are fresh and to a great extent still 
under development we can learn more for the purposes of assessing explanatory accounts 
based on them by considering two, rather than just the preferred one of those accounts. 
Likewise, with the non-constructive accounts being less common in philosophy of science, 
two are included here to help clarify matters. As a rule, at this stage they set the foundations 
and delineate questions to be addressed in future research. They are also not fully formally 
equivalent with ‗standard‘ quantum theory, and seek to uncover ‗metaphysical clues‘ from 
the ways of bridging the gap between their formalism and the ‗standard‘ one.45  
These clues come from some formally describable situations (entanglement assisted 
communication, non-commutativity, dense coding, superdense coding, teleportation and the 
like), at least one of which we have introduced in the previous chapter. In attempt not to stray 
into too technical aspects of the discussion and lose sight of the primary aim of providing an 
explanatory framework of the phenomena intuitive enough to appeal to a wide enough 
audience, it suffices to say that the quantum information theory uses a well-known and tested 
classical information theory appropriated to the quantum context. Classical information 
theory concerns mathematical formalisation of quantification of transmittance and loss of 
information through classical communication channels (such as pieces of paper with pre-
arranged code pushed through a boundary impenetrable to other information, or a standard 
telephone line, or a mobile phone radio frequency). The quantum context is provided by 
replacement of formal states of the communication devices expressed in terms of classical 
variables
46
 by the formal states as expressed in terms of quantum variables.  
Information: classical and quantum  
Before even introducing the two principle approaches, each of which has some unavoidable 
formal aspects associated, it is worth examining a general situation of dense coding (Clifton, 
2004, pp. 431-432) in order to better illustrate why principle approaches are strongly oriented 
on the epistemic (and to a degree subjective) aspects of the situation. Namely, the classical 
                                                             
45 Though more explicit about this than the constructive approach surveyed in Chapter 3, this does not put 
them in a great disadvantage to the latter as those are also, at this stage, unable to complete the explanatory 
framework in every detail (as will be discussed in Chapter 3).  
46 These, of course, needn’t and as a rule won’t be the basic classical variables of a standard Newtonian phase 
space, unless one chooses to communicate through physically interacting point-particles, which is not the case 
in information theory. But classical variables are also other variables (such as orientation of an arrow or the 
amount of the electric current) codified in accordance with the mathematical formalism of classical physics.  
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analogue employs a system of codes inscribed onto blank cards and exchanged between 
agents. The situation is so set up that the receiving agent needs two cards (one initially taken 
with him, and the other received through the communication channel) to subsequently 
recover 2bits of information the sender is transmitting through the communication channel. 
The receiver, that is, needs both cards to make sense of the 2bit message, no relevant 
information is carried by either card in isolation. The codes on the cards are ‗entangled‘ to 
provide a whole message.  
If the analogy is perfectly appropriate, it seems to suggest that the information carried by the 
communication channel need not be parcelled out amongst the physical systems making up 
the channel, and thus that we need not invoke the metaphysical (even if we do it formally in 
terms of calculations) mysteries of entanglement to account for the dense coding phenomena. 
If the analogy is perfectly appropriate, there is no need to look for the ontology inherent in 
the quantum formalism over and above trying to fit that formalism with the classical ontology 
we are already happy with (and as has been repeatedly attempted for the past 100 years that 
quantum theory has been formulated). But the classical communication protocol Clifton 
describes is disanalogous to the quantum ‗dense coding‘ situation in one important respect: 
for the sender to be able to choose the right sign (a piece of code) with which to convey the 
said 2bit message she must know in advance what is already written on the receiver’s first 
card (the one he initially takes with him). And in the quantum versions of the protocol such 
foreknowledge is not envisaged, nor is it explicitly required (over and above whatever may 
be encoded in the formalism per se) for the protocol to be successfully completed. Thus, it 
seems at this tentative stage the quantum formalism somehow embodies the ‗knowledge‘ 
required in the classical case. How the sender comes to acquire this knowledge remains a 
mystery (i.e. it is either a foreknowledge akin to common cause explanations, or it is a 
knowledge somehow acquired in the process akin to a holistic superluminal connection) that 
the principle approaches try to resolve (cf. Chapter 1, section 1. 5. 2 on teleportation, as 
well).
47
  
Yet, we will not move sufficiently away from the ‗troublesome‘ aspects of the phenomena if 
we attempt to explain away the mysteries by structural accounts of encoding large amounts of 
information directly into the material existents (this may also be a pointer in moving from 
                                                             
47 Of course, the constructive approaches we shall consider later need not concern themselves with the 
mystery of foreknowledge as they have a metaphysical mechanism by which the non-local or holistic effects 
can be produced by local interventions, such as choice of signs to write on a card is.  
73 
 
Fuchs to CBH). We should not turn mystery of one kind (superluminal causal connection) to 
that of the other kind (instantaneous exchange of large amounts of information). Steane 
(2003) claims that processes involving quantum information transfer and manipulation, 
quantum computation, are not superior to classical computational processes in terms of 
efficiency. There is no mysterious transfer of large amounts of information.  
What in fact happens in the quantum case is that the physical situation corresponding to 
entangled states, a physical entanglement, provides a sort of a ‗physical shorthand‘ in 
information transmission and manipulation. That is, we get the appearance of efficiency in 
quantum information processes because ―quantum entanglement offers a way to generate and 
manipulate a physical representation of the correlations between [entities represented by 
formal expressions of quantum states] without the need to completely represent the entities 
themselves‖ (Steane, 2003, p. 476).48 What the characteristic of quantum entanglement 
provides is a way to represent and manipulate correlations directly, without having to go 
through a lengthier and computationally more expensive route of manipulation of the 
correlated entities.  In conclusion, the principle approaches then try to present the 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena in a perspective that aims to remove from their description all that 
is metaphysically postulated but does not seem to do any work on conceptually linking the 
elements of the phenomena. And mechanical details of the physical systems might be just the 
thing if the phenomena are viewed in terms of outcome correlations on the black-box 
instruments. Thought this might be explanatorily ‗efficient‘ in a sense of generating a 
wholesome narrative from a limited set of concepts, it faces the problem of satisfying 
explanatory depth (cf. section 4. 1) and conceptual connection with the simple transcendental 
strategy (as in section 1. 4).  
Metaphysics: epistemic and ontic states  
The ontological characteristics of the principle and constructive approaches are most clearly 
seen in the interpretation of the ‗quantum state‘. A quantum state is a part of the quantum 
formalism that purports to provide a formal description of the relevant characteristics of the 
physical system, thus a ‗formal state‘. It is useful here to introduce a dichotomy between 
                                                             
48
 This means that the computational correlations can be so set up as to be able to produce desired results 
without the need to calculate a lot of ‘spectator’ results. For example, one can find the period of a function 
without calculating all the evaluations of the function, one can find a specific property of a quantum system 
(such as energy level) without also finding the complete quantum state, one can communicate some shared 
aspect of distributed information without transmitting as much of the information as one would otherwise 
need to. (Steane, 2003, p. 477)  
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states of reality and states of knowledge, following (Spekkens, 2007), as used in 
interpretations of formalism (thus, also of formal quantum states) of physical theories. 
Spekkens terms these ontic and epistemic states, respectively. From a classical and realist 
perspective, an ideal state in physics is an ontic state. An ontic state provides a complete 
specification of all the properties of the system.
49
 An example of such state is a point in 
classical phase space.  
But classical physics also provides examples of epistemic states, namely when the formal 
state specification expresses a probability distribution over phase space. In this case the 
formal state represents a relative likelihood (a probability distribution is a function, but this 
aspect need not concern us here) that some (human) agent assigns to the ontic states 
associated with the points of phase space ‗covered‘ by the distribution. ―The distribution [a 
formal state in this case] describes only what this agent knows about the system‖ (Spekkens, 
2007, pp. 032110-2). Note that it is not claimed that there are no properties of the system, or 
that the system is not in some sense fully real (endowed with a full set of necessary physical 
properties).
50
 It is rather that in the given experimental (physical) situation the agent is not in 
a position to know what ontic state corresponds to the true state of the system, but given some 
set of constraints is able to ascertain a probability distribution over some set of relevant ontic 
states. The metaphysical projection states that the system is in a state corresponding to one of 
the ontic states, but the agent cannot be sure which, though she can specify the difference in 
likelihood between those states.  
Of course, the ideal situation is the one where the ontic and the epistemic states coincide, i.e. 
where the epistemic states encode complete knowledge and thus a complete specification of a 
system‘s properties. It is the claim of the principle approach that using epistemic states 
provides conceptually superior explanations of the ‗troublesome‘ quantum phenomena 
(Spekkens, 2007, pp. 032110-2), even though constructive approaches are taken to provide 
equally valid demonstrations of the said phenomena as mathematical consequences of the 
theoretical formalism. Principle approaches concede that the explanations from the 
constructive approach (taking quantum states as ontic states) are conceptually equally well 
                                                             
49 These properties needn’t all be explicitly listed in the specification of the state, i.e. some of them can be 
derived from the specification of the state and the overarching theoretical formalism. But the crucial point is 
that these ‘implicit’ properties can in principle be so derived at any stage with complete certainty. In other 
words, all the properties of the state are at all times in-principle epistemically accessible.  
50 One might interpret Bohrian metaphysics as claiming that there is no fact of the matter as to whether the 
system possesses all the properties, including those unknown or unknowable to the agent, but this is not what 
is claimed here.  
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founded if one were to abandon certain preconceived notions about physical reality (such as 
the principle of separability, for example). But they argue that such abandonment does not 
make the phenomena sufficiently intuitive because, among other possible complications, it 
makes the construction of the overarching explanatory framework for the understanding of 
reality impossible (or at least too difficult to be worth the effort).  
Yet, at present the principle approaches have a recurrent explanatory pitfall of their own, one 
taken to be the plague of the pure unification-type explanations in general (Lipton, 2004, p. 
7), in the lack of answer to what the epistemic state is knowledge about; what exactly in 
reality is the source of the knowledge codified in the epistemic state.
51
 This is where a 
clarification of the analogy with the example from classical physics above may be useful. 
Whereas in the classical case the identification of the epistemic and ontic states was 
precluded on practical grounds (due to insensitivity of the measuring instruments or the 
practical limits of computational power), in the quantum case (i.e. according to our principle 
approach) it is precluded on theoretical grounds. The principle approach claims that it is not 
our lack of knowledge of some local and noncontextual hidden variables, or our ability to 
manipulate those computationally through the formalism, that prevents us from interpreting 
the quantum state as ontic state. They in fact take it (to a varying degree
52
) as the 
foundational principle of nature that the two states cannot be equated in interpretation of 
quantum theory, but as yet lack a further explanatory account as to why this is so.  
This is not to say that the question is not important. 
Rather, we see the epistemic approach as an 
unfinished project, and this question is the central 
obstacle to its completion. Nonetheless, we argue 
that even in the absence of an answer to this 
                                                             
51 It is assumed here that having such knowledge would cure the unificationist type of many ills at once, most 
notable of the weakness in stopping the why-regress (Lipton, 2004) as description of material existents and 
their properties as a source of some phenomena observed about them is taken as a stronger explanatory 
foundation than the claim that a set of abstract principles holds about some phenomena we observe.  
52 Due to varying degrees of development and metaphysical commitment that the research programmes 
subsumed here under the umbrella of principle approach currently undertake it is difficult to provide a 
clearcut summary on this point, providing room for discussion to appear in this text as well. Some of the 
approaches considered take the most direct view that the epistemic states are just best rational guesstimates 
of the agents as to the instantaneous value of the relevant properties of the physical state (Fuchs, 2002). This 
is perhaps most akin to the classical analogue, only the preclusion of the identification of the epistemic and 
ontic states is seen as a ‘law of nature’ and not a technical difficulty. Others are much less direct and more 
explicit in claiming only an initial step in development of the satisfactory account, thus choosing to at this stage 
remain “agnostic about the nature of the reality to which the knowledge represented by quantum states 
pertains” (Spekkens, 2007, pp. 032110-2).  
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question, a case can be made for the epistemic view. 
The key is that one can hope to identify phenomena 
that are characteristic of states of incomplete 
knowledge regardless of what this knowledge is 
about. (Spekkens, 2007, pp. 032110-3) 
C. A. Fuchs: constraining principles from a deep conviction  
A simple method  
In Fuchs‘ programme we could view the claim, rephrased to suit the Spekkens terminology 
above, that ‗quantum states are irreducibly epistemic states‘ as one of his foundational 
constraining principles. By respecting the nonlocal nature of the EPR situation Fuchs claims 
that quantum states cannot be ontic states, as if they were separability would be violated as a 
universal principle (we can thus take the expression of separability as another of his 
foundational principles). Fuchs further relies on the pre-communication segment of the 
teleportation phenomenon to argue that quantum states cannot be objective even in principle, 
and thus must be epistemic and uniquely tied to the individual experimenters that employ 
them. That is, before Alice in the teleportation protocol broadcasts her 2bit message no one 
can even begin to perform the operations that will complete the conversion of the distant state 
into the outcome of teleportation. And yet, the ontic interpretation of the state would expect 
the material for the conversion to already be in (the distant) place.  
If Alice fails to reveal her information to anyone else 
in the world, there is no one else who can predict 
[the final outcome of the teleportation] with 
certainty. More importantly, there is nothing in 
quantum mechanics that gives the [the power to 
reveal its ontic state out of possible a spectrum of 
epistemic states]. If Alice does not take the time to 
walk over to it and interact with it, there is no 
revelation. There is only the confidence in Alice‘s 
mind that, should she interact with it, she could 
predict the consequence of that interaction. (Fuchs, 
2002a, p. 12) 
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However, Fuchs‘ programme still sees the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena as outcomes of 
imperfect interaction between conscious observers and a strangely constructed reality. 
Though the quantum formalism is not a fully objective description of the physical system, it 
is somehow related to it, whilst containing many elements that are dependent on the 
individual observer. It is the aim of Fuchs‘s programme to wean the objective from the 
subjective elements.  
There is something about the world that keeps us 
from ever getting more information than can be 
captured through the formal structure of quantum 
mechanics. Einstein had wanted us to look further – 
to find out how the incomplete information could be 
completed – but perhaps the real question is, ―Why 
can it not be completed?‖ (Fuchs, 2002a, p. 11)  
Methodologically, the programme aims to re-derive the quantum formalism whilst ignoring 
all of its ad hoc metaphysical connections (such as what elements of the physical system have 
to correspond to which elements of the formalism, and what happens to the systems upon 
measurements) and respecting only his foundational principle that the states of the formalism 
are epistemic. In narrative terms Fuchs sees the formal states as individual conscious agents‘ 
guesstimates about the possible states of the physical system, guesstimates which then have 
to be updated upon each interaction with the system (the measurement intervention) in 
accordance with rational procedures of the Bayesian probability calculus.
53
 Where the re-
derived formalism differs from the historically developed ‗standard‘ quantum formalism, we 
get a glimpse of the objective characteristics of interaction with ‗quantum-level‘ reality 
different from what we have come across classically. One such glimpse says:  
The objective content of quantum mechanics (or at 
least part of it) is that if we subjectively set our 
probabilities for the outcomes of [any as-complete-
as-possible measurement on some segment of the 
material reality], we are no longer free to set them 
arbitrarily for any other [outcome of same or 
                                                             
53 It suffices to say here that Bayesian statistics is a formal mathematical for updating beliefs about future 
chancy outcomes based on the evidence previously gathered. It is the most rational form guesstimating 
available.  
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different type of measurement]. (Fuchs, 2002b, p. 
32) 
Explanation: you mess up and you try to estimate the damage  
We may recall that one of the primary philosophical problems accompanying the 
development of quantum theory was the problem of measurement, i.e. the problem of 
explaining the collapse of the wavefunction during the measurement process. But more 
importantly, where explanation of the phenomena is based on the outcomes of interaction 
with the physical systems, measurement process plays an inexorable role. According to 
Fuchs, if we believe that the quantum state is rigidly bound to the elements of reality we ―will 
never find a way out of the conundrum of ―unreasonableness‖ associated with ―state-vector 
collapse at a distance‖‖, i.e. the nonlocal causal connection between the separated phenomena 
(Fuchs, 2002b, p. 164). Fuchs divides the measurement process into two parts, each of which 
is clearly illustrated by the limiting cases. The measurement process thus consists of (1) 
Bayesian conditionalisation and (2) further mental readjustment. (1) is the raw collapse of the 
wave function, the improvement of the ‗guesstimate‘ of future measurements based on the 
outcome of the present one. It relies on Bayes‘ rule of ‗factorising the fact‘ (the observed 
measurement outcome) out of the probability distribution. This is an entirely classical 
procedure that depends on the rational rules of Bayesian statistics and not some hidden 
characteristic of nature. Fuchs calls this the ‗knowledge refinement‘.  
(2) is a further constriction, specific to quantum theory. It is a theoretical representation of the 
supposed intrinsic sensitivity of reality to experimental interventions. Fuchs calls it the ‗back-
action‘54 or ‗feedback‘ that the measurement device inflicts on the system being measured, 
and that is dependent on the details of the measurement interaction, individual outcomes of 
measurement and the initial quantum state assigned by the observer. This ‗back-action‘ is the 
specific quantum addition that is not found in the classical probability theory and that 
depends on the observer‘s rationalised subjective estimate of the consequences of her 
experimental intervention. Fuchs concludes:  
Quantum measurement is nothing more, and nothing 
less, than a refinement and a readjustment of one's 
initial state of belief. (Fuchs, 2002b, p. 34) 
                                                             
54
 The idea of back-action does not originate with (Fuchs, Quantum mechanics as quantum information (and 
only a little more), 2002). See (Valente, 2003) for further bibliography.  
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Thus Fuchs explains the basic interaction with a system in a state that one posses maximal 
possible information about as pure occurrence of the ‗back-action‘ of the interaction with a 
reality sensitive to touch. Such a measurement does not provide the observer with any new 
information, but merely affects what she can predict due to the side effects of the 
experimental intervention. ―That is to say, there is a sense in which the measurement is solely 
disturbance‖ (Fuchs, 2002b, p. 34) 
But more interestingly, in the case of distant part of the system in the EPR situation, the 
experimenter has another limiting case of the two components of the measurement process, 
the refinement of beliefs without any disturbing interaction with the system. There is thus no 
violation of separability as no real change is induced in the system itself, but merely in the 
experimenters‘ ascription of a state to the distant system. The change in the quantum state 
that is assigned to the distant system on the basis of such measurement corresponds to the 
pure (i.e. classical-like) Bayesian factorisation without any further ‗mental readjustment‘.  
It is these ‗mental readjustments‘ that put Fuchs firmly on the Bohrian train, along with all 
the conceptual problems that may bring. But even before that, we have to note that in 
ascribing this intrinsic and insurmountable sensitivity to reality Fuchs breaks away from the 
principle approach into speculation about the nature of ontology at the quantum level. Yet, 
this speculation does not seem to be better supported than it was in Bohr‘s day, i.e. exhibits 
great resemblance to the influence of the ―irrational element‖. According to Fuchs, the reality 
itself changes under invasive interaction (the measurement), thus we can never repeat the 
same type of measurement on the same system in order to achieve a fully complete 
description. It appears that in this case the constructive speculation does not rest on a 
satisfactorily complete principle-based explanatory account, but is in fact introduced to 
complete it. It is also not a formally negligible speculation, that might come about as a result 
of an oversight, as one could say about Einstein‘s implicit assumption about the internal 
dynamics of measuring rods and clocks (cf. Chapter 1, section 1. 3. 1).  
We thus do not get a sufficiently principle-based explanation of the troublesome phenomena. 
Though Fuchs claims no mysterious interaction between the separated segments of the 
entangled system taken place, he goes on to include a constructive postulate of ‗inherent 
sensitivity‘ into the explanatory account. The correlations in the EPR-like situations are a 
product of the common cause that does not violate the separability, but that is, by some 
natural trickery, forever hidden from us. We shall never be able to gain complete knowledge 
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about the initial state of the system, so are forced to surprising updates of it (such as the one 
in EPR situation) when the abstract formalism permits it. In the teleportation case, such 
updates are only possible with the assistance from other experimenters.  
We conclude this section with the observation that though initially based on the intuitive 
generalisations from our ‗troublesome‘ phenomena, namely that quantum states are 
inherently epistemic; this approach fails to show sufficient coherence to stand against the 
competing constructive approaches. This is largely due to its venture into the constructive 
domain where it bases the explanation of the phenomena at least in part on the changes of the 
physical systems themselves, which is conceptually on the same level as the constructive 
approaches. This in the end forces it into an explanatorily self-constrained position
55
 akin to 
Bohr‘s and this is not solid enough ground to build explanatory accounts to compete against 
the causal mechanical account of Chapter 3. On an ontological side the explanation from 
Fuchs seems to rest on the narrative of changes to primary entities characterised by specific 
properties, but that only have a statistical existence, i.e. can never be claimed to exist (bearing 
the said properties) with certainty.  
The Clifton-Bub-Halvorson (CBH)
56
 programme  
A different sub-class of principle approaches is the route that does not start with the epistemic 
interpretation of the quantum state per se, but sets off by looking for more general principles 
of information reception and transfer (via microphysical material world, but not relying on 
any of its particular characteristics). Thus, on the question of nature of quantum states it 
remains as agnostic as possible, this way moving even further from the metaphysical 
projections (as the quantum state is probably closest one can come to the connecting point 
between the formalism and the existents supposedly behind it).  
[…] the CBH [programme] should not be 
understood as providing a ‗constructive‘ [sic] 
explanation of the quantum formalism, along the 
lines suggested by Chris Fuchs [ (Fuchs, 2002a) …], 
                                                             
55 Recently, Timpson (Timpson, 2008) argues, rightly, that Fuchs is not a full blown instrumentalist. Fuchs 
remains agnostic about the details of the underlying reality, but is very much committed to its existence. Yet, 
with regards to the reality of the quantum state, i.e. interpretation of the quantum state (an element of the 
formalism) as a formal description of the physical state of the system, he is instrumentalist. That is, he denies 
the reality of the description and yet maintains the usefulness of the quantum state in making predictions 
about future interactions with reality. And that ‘localized’ instrumentalism is what we are concerned with 
here.  
56 Named after R. Clifton, J. Bub and H. Halvorson.  
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but rather as a ‗principled‘ reconstruction of the 
theory within a suitably general mathematical 
framework. (Bub, 2008, p. 15)) 
Thus adopting lessons from the pitfalls of the Fuchs programme (above), the CBH 
programme makes no use of the postulates about the nature of the physical systems employed 
in producing the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena that result in the ‗mysterious‘ correlations of 
measurement outcomes. In fact, it makes no use of the systems, measurements and outcomes 
in its derivation of the formalism, but focuses on constructing a mathematical description of 
the relationships between the formal expressions used as input and formal expressions for 
output of such procedures. Thus the phenomena to be explained on their view are 
mathematical structures that result from a coding game experimenters play with the lab 
instruments. No use of the structure of the instruments or their ‗objects of observation‘ is 
made, in fact the CBH proponents prefer to call them ‗black boxes‘. What they show is that if 
the game is played respecting certain principle constrictions on the moves (other than those 
restrictions that the formalism itself imposes, i.e. the internal mathematical rules) the 
resulting formal structure is sufficiently similar to the formal representation of quantum 
theory with the interpretative assumptions about the nonlocal interaction of the physical 
systems.  
Here is a brief presentation of the principles in a language that avoids reference to complex 
algebras and connects the content of the principles to the more standard informal 
presentations of the ‗theorems‘ of quantum theory, as given in (Timpson, 2004, pp. 199-205). 
The first principle forbids superluminal signalling via measurement, and corresponds to the 
more standard no-signalling via entanglement prohibition in standard quantum theory (to be 
explored in greater detail in section 4. 3). The principle mandates that the state assigned to 
the system at B, shall not be affected by any operation performed on the distant system A. 
The second principle in general forbids the ‗broadcasting; of states, which can be seen as a 
generalisation of the ‗no-cloning‘ restriction (applicable only to pure states). Simply put it 
forbids that a manipulating device takes a system to which we assign a certain mixed state 
and produces as an output two systems A and B, each of which will (through some further 
manipulations of the formalism) have a version of the initial state assigned to it. Though the 
exposition is more technical, intuitively we can understand the ‗no-cloning‘ aspect of the 
prohibition as forbidding the systematic multiplication of the states assigned to systems 
through manipulations of material measuring instruments. The final principle, the no-bit-
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commitment, is even more technical, but following Timpson (2004, p. 203), we can 
understand it as a formal requirement that provides for the selection of formalisms that do 
allow entanglement, just as the standard (empirically adequate) quantum formalism does. 
This may be seen as a purely methodological move, for if we are trying to derive a formalism 
from the principles we want to hone in on the characteristics (however problematic) of the 
existing standard formalism, and exclude those formal constructions that deviate from it in 
significant respects.  
In summary the methodological process strives to ―derive the basic kinematic features of a 
quantum-theoretic description of physical systems – essentially noncommutativity and 
entanglement – from [the] three fundamental information-theoretic constraints‖ (Bub, 2004, 
p. 241), i.e. from the assumption that we live in the a world in which there are certain 
constraints on the acquisition, representation, and communication of information. Thus, it 
assumes that what defines any theoretical formalism as ‗quantum formalism‘ is a certain 
characteristic algebraic (in other words abstract mathematical) structure of what the 
formalism takes to be observables and states. This structure is to be identical to the elements 
of the traditionally derived quantum formalism that are taken to exemplify noncommutativity 
and entanglement (as above). An example of these ‗traditionally derived‘ formalisms is 
standard quantum mechanics of a system with a finite number of degrees of freedom 
represented on a single Hilbert space with a unitary dynamics defined by a given 
Hamiltonian, i.e. the standard university-course formalism of the quantum theory.  
So, the methodological starting point in this case is twofold: on the one hand there is the 
abstract mathematical generalisation (some kind of constraint on what it takes for a chunk of 
formalism to be a quantum theoretical formalism), and on the other is the mathematical 
generalisation of the said information-theoretic principles. In terms of ontology, the former 
has more potential to smuggle in some metaphysics than the latter, though (as we shall see 
later) the latter on its own and in combination with the former carries some metaphysical 
assumptions about the world as well. In having to prove the similarities with the more 
constructive interpretations of the formalism, the CBH proponents have to keep going back to 
the conceptual framework of systems and properties.
57
 Methodologically this is not a ‗sin‘ in 
                                                             
57
 At this stage the CBH projects relies heavily on the standard metaphysically burdened language of (at least) 
minimal interpretation of quantum formalism. Yet, as the presentation of the methodology above tried to 
outline this should not properly be the case, as the CBH approach professes to stay as far away as possible 
from the metaphysical speculations about the nature of the elements of reality behind the ‘troublesome’ (and 
other) phenomena. For the time being we can try to excuse this as an attempt to convince the standard 
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itself, provided the assumptions are explicated and we can keep an eye on them through the 
development of the formalism (i.e. through its approach to the structure of ‗quantum 
formalism‘).  
[…] if there is no minimum amount of mathematical 
structure shared by all theories, and if any fairy tale 
can count as a legitimate ―toy theory‖ — then it 
would be hopeless to try to derive QM from 
information theoretic principles, or from any other 
sort of principles for that matter. (E.g., why assume 
that the results of measurements are real numbers? 
Why assume that measurements have single 
outcomes? Why assume that the laws of physics are 
the same from one moment to the next?) (Halvorson, 
On information-theoretic characterizations of 
physical theories, 2004, p. 292)  
CBH do grant existence to physical systems, but it remains unclear just how much 
individuality (and in some respect: independent existence) these things have. The formalism, 
as derived by CBH, is only used to mathematically represent the statistical correlations 
between ‗measurement‘ outcomes. Even ‗measurement‘ is a problematic term here, for at this 
stage the measurement involves an epistemically rather agnostic situation of black boxes used 
to derive statistical correlations
58
 (Bub, 2004). Yet, Bub also claims that the formalism 
constructed the CBH way excludes ―haecceitist theories that associate a primitive ‗thisness‘ 
with physical systems‖ (Bub, 2004, p. 253) in the description of the phenomena.  
To associate the observables of the theoretical formalism with the properties of a physical 
system, as a system that is individuated and does have a primitive ‗thisness‘, requires a 
metaphysical commitment to elements of reality with a ‗mysterious‘ nonlocal connection, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
practitioners, physicists using the formalism together with the language, of the worth of the newly derived 
formalism, i.e. of its equivalence with quantum formalism. 
58 Bub likens this situation to the one outlined at the beginning of Albert’s (1992 ) book Quantum Mechanics 
and Experience, a familiar example in literature, in which the measurement simply takes “a system in an input 
state *… and produces+ a system in one of two output states, with a certain probability that depends on the 
input state” (Bub, 2004, p. 253).  
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because of the appearance of entangled states. And this contradicts the authors‘ deep-seated 
expectations of explanatory ontology.
59
 Bub quotes Einstein‘s letter to Born:  
[…] whatever we regard as existing (real) should 
somehow be localized in time and space. That is, the 
real in part of space A should (in theory) somehow 
‗exist‘ independently of what is thought of as real in 
space B. When a system in physics extends over the 
parts of space A and B, then that which exists in B 
should somehow exist independently of that which 
exists in A. That which really exists in B should 
therefore not depend on what kind of measurement 
is carried out in part of space A; it should also be 
independent of whether or not any measurement at 
all is carried out in space A. […] However, if one 
abandons the assumption that what exists in different 
parts of space has its own, independent, real 
existence, then I simply cannot see what it is that 
physics is meant to describe. For what is thought to 
be a ‗system‘ is, after all, just a convention, and I 
cannot see how one could divide the world 
objectively in such a way that one could make 
statements about parts of it. (Einstein, Letter to M. 
Born, 18th March 1948, 1971, pp. 164-165)  
Furthermore, given teleportation and assignment of primitive ‗thisness‘ to physical states it is 
possible to devise a hypothetical protocol, such that would allow the separated agents to send 
signals to each other, almost instantaneously and faster than the speed of light, relying on the 
measurement of the distant particle (the state of which will be steered by the operations on 
the proximal particles in the standard teleportation protocol) (Halvorson & Bub, Can 
quantum cryptography imply quantum mechanics? Reply to Smolin, 2008, p. 3). So 
respecting quantum information theory and the phenomenon of teleportation, along with 
                                                             
59 Consider: “*…+ an independence condition for distinct *spacelike separated+ systems *…+ is taken for granted 
in both classical and quantum mechanics.” (Halvorson & Bub, Can quantum cryptography imply quantum 
mechanics? Reply to Smolin, 2008, p. 1)  
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classical (and empirical quantum) demands for no superluminal signalling, indicates that the 
physical states ‗corresponding‘ to quantum states in the formalism do not have an 
individuating ‗thisness‘. In other words, ‗teleportation is just a flashy name, but nothing 
material traverses the distance between the experimenters. The trick is then to explain what 
happens that enables the experimenters to know (and verify) what they do, and still try to 
respect the separable existence of material objects.  
Given all this, the authors choose to remain in a precariously suspended state of denying a 
primitive ‗thisness‘ to physical systems that are a part of the phenomena they aim to explain, 
and yet to use the concept of ‗physical system‘ in providing a non-formal account of the 
phenomena. This brings us back to the track of neo-Bohrianism: denying the reference to the 
terms we are nonetheless forced to use in accounting for the phenomena. On the other hand, 
we lack a positive account of what it is that the structured regularities of the CBH formalism 
correspond to, what the phenomenal structure that is mapped by the algebraic structure of the 
formalism is. Despite the precariousness of their position, the CBH claim that the most 
rational position to take is one of cautious agnosticism about any metaphysical commitments 
(despite being forced to use a metaphysically richer language than, perhaps, they would like, 
in order to communicate to the physics community). This is because they see the ontic 
commitments and interpretations of the formalism beyond what is given above, as extensions 
of a quantum theory for the purposes of mechanical visualization, explanation and 
understanding. But as the formalisms associated with such extensions cannot produce 
additional empirical evidence
60
 for the additional  ‗mechanical elements‘ over and above the 
evidence used to produce statistical correlations predicted by the bare formalism of a 
quantum theory, they see it as most rational to withhold metaphysical commitment in any 
direction.
61
  
Still, one might wonder whether this is not putting things the wrong way round: surely we 
should use some theory about the structure of matter to show how the information-theoretic 
                                                             
60 Albert, 1992 also seems to imply that there are metaphysical commitments of different interpretations of 
the quantum formalism that cannot be decided amongst by experiment, i.e. that are empirically equivalent. 
(Albert, 1992 , p. 189)  
61 Though on the whole he finds a lot of problems in the CBH approach, and Bub’s further elaboration of the 
philosophy behind it, even Duwell (shortly to be presented criticising the CBH approach) in the end expresses 
sympathy towards this metaphysical supposition. He says we can always prefer one theory over another 
(though, note, Bub is actually talking about theory extensions from the common core), but that it is not 
rational to have a cognitive state as extreme as belief that one theory is true and its empirically equivalent 
rivals false (Duwell, Re-conceiving quantum theories in terms of information-theoretic constraints, 2007, p. 
198) [my emphasis].  
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constraints arise. Not so, according to CBH, for that would not be respecting the full 
metaphysical implications of the principle methodology. The principle methodology, as 
explicated in the Bub (2008) article, does not seek to fight head to head with the constructive 
alternatives, but redefine the battleground altogether. This is not a difference between a top-
down and a bottom-up approach, but one of radically different ontological world-views. Not 
just a list of what does and does not exist, but also how that which exists behaves and 
interacts (e.g. whether an electromagnetic field requires aether as a carrier, and whether all 
rods and clocks have ultimately fixable positions relative to the aether). This is what the CBH 
want by requesting that information be understood as a new physical primitive. The 
theoretical formalism then builds on this assumption:  
Quantum mechanics represents the discovery that 
there are new sorts of information sources and 
communication channels in nature (represented by 
quantum states), and the theory is about the 
properties of these information sources and 
communication channels. (Bub, 2008, p. 14)  
[…]the claim that quantum mechanics is about 
quantum information—that quantum mechanics is a 
principle theory of information (in the sense in 
which Einstein regarded special relativity as a 
principle theory)—and that this physical notion of 
information is not reducible to the properties of 
particles or fields, is not to be construed as the claim 
that quantum mechanics is about observers and their 
epistemological concerns, […] nor that the basic 
stuff of the world is informational in an intentional 
sense. Rather, the claim is that the lesson of modern 
physics is that a principle theory is the best one can 
hope to achieve as an explanatory account of 
quantum phenomena. (Bub, 2008, pp. 15-16) 
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Explanation 
According to the CBH programme we should not be trying to explain what happened 
mechanically in the ‗troublesome phenomena‘, as we don‘t even have sufficient tools to 
properly account for the interaction between the object-systems, the instruments used to 
observe them and ourselves (or at least the hypothetical experimenters).  We should instead 
view the situation as containing epistemological black boxes, which may in part be 
successfully described by some other physical theories, but not in terms that account for the 
‗troublesome‘ measurement outcomes. The black boxes in turn produce signals, that can be 
formally accounted for by the theory, and based on which establish signal correlations 
between different (and possibly distant) black boxes. The theoretical formalism allows the 
experimenters to attach some probabilities to certain signal correlations and not others. If the 
black boxes are ‗real objects‘ (whatever they may be made of) it seems certain information 
transmission protocols are ‗permitted‘ by reality and others are not (Bub, 2004).  
But if the game of predicting signals is all that we can safely say to be doing in ‗quantum 
experiments‘ then, Bub claims, the quantum formalism (‗quantum theory‘ in Bub‘s terms) 
provides a theory about representation and manipulation of information, and not a theory 
about the ways in which non-classical waves of particles move, or the ways in which the 
universes split and recombine. As, on the CBH approach, the representation and manipulation 
of information is constrained by the information-theoretic principles, accounting for those 
principles becomes the fundamental explanatory aim of (this segment of) physics. This newly 
discovered aim has not produced many outcomes as yet, but the shift of focus marks an 
important departure for the provision of explanation from contemporary physical theories. 
Yet the primary focus in this thesis is on the ontological characteristics, so we will want to 
know what can be deduced about ‗what is out there‘ from the constraints on the 
representation and manipulation of information that hold in our world.  
The explanation for the impossibility of a 
[description in terms of a classical conceptual 
framework] then lies in the constraints on the 
representation and manipulation of information that 
hold in our world. (Bub, 2004, p. 259) 
 Of course the ambitious aim lacks the sturdy output as yet, but Bub warns that we must 
―recognize information as a new sort of physical entity, not reducible to the motion of 
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particles or fields‖ (Bub, 2004, p. 262). In principle this does satisfy the first question about 
the ontological characteristics of explanations from this type of contemporary quantum 
theory, namely that they should concern a new kind of ‗stuff‘: information. Yet, this is a 
short-lived satisfaction for we are essentially changing categories altogether here. As will be 
discussed subsequently, it is disputable whether we can think of information as stuff at all. 
But even if we could, this is radically different stuff from our more familiar matter. And yet, 
we are by no means replacing matter with the new stuff (this would be a welcome and simple 
situation, then we could simply compare the explanatory success of the two). But as the 
above section on metaphysics indicates, the CBH are not suggesting that the world is ‗made 
of information‘, or that material physical systems and the measuring instruments we use do 
not exist in material sense.
62
 To explain what is going on in the world, what produces the 
phenomena we experience, we still need some account of the physical matter; or some 
account as to why we think there is a material world that produces phenomena in us in the 
first place.  
But in the narrow domain of experience that is dominated by the prediction and measurement 
games of quantum physics, we have thus far been mistaken in thinking that the games we 
successfully played allowed us a glimpse of the structure of physical reality. We must now 
wake up to the fact, the CBH claim, that quantum physics was never about constituents of 
reality but about information manipulation. But information, that new stuff, is somehow 
linked to reality, and by investigating the link we can gain some understanding about the 
nature of reality, though probably (if the CBH theory derivation and assumptions are right) 
not about the mechanical aspects of its nature. There seem to be two possible routes to follow 
(which we shall investigate in greater detail in Chapter 4): (1) to sufficiently modify, or even 
replace the ‗extended stuff‘ explanatory conceptualization (as perhaps presenting all 
‗extended stuff‘ as an illusion reducible to something else); or (2) to find ways to reduce the 
properties of the new stuff (information) to those of the primary qualities of the ‗extended 
stuff‘. There is as yet no suggestion in literature as to how the information-stuff and the 
extended stuff can coexist at the fundamental level. And as a way of introduction to 
discussion in Chapter 4, let us recall the notion of depth of explanation, briefly introduced in 
Chapter 1 (cf. (Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003)), that stresses the importance of the detailed 
                                                             
62 Though they do suggest a quibble with a ‘primitive thisness’ of those instruments, and their individuation 
may end up in some non-standard, albeit material, form. It remains an important open question how the 
proponents of this principle approach propose to connect the information-oriented research with the ‘material 
foundation’ of the common conceptual scheme.  
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account of the controllable variations in objects that the changes to be explained happen to. 
What replaces the objects in information-ontology will be important for discussion in Chapter 
4.     
2. 3. Principle approaches: problems and objections  
The types of objections to different stages of the derivation of principle versions of quantum 
theory can be divided into those that object to the principle methodology (either that the 
adherents do not truly stick to it, or that principle methodology cannot be a valid road to 
explanation), to the metaphysical shyness (seen, perhaps, as deceit or trickery) and to 
explanatory robustness and lack of attention to detail. We shall try to survey all three types of 
them, though often the critique of one type is interconnected with another or they entail one 
another. The common point of most criticism can be summed up as the strong conviction that 
only constructive accounts can be sufficiently explanatory, and that no convincing 
explanation can stop at the principle stage without outlining the details of the metaphysics of 
the causal processes behind the phenomena.  
Methodology 
Most vociferous criticism of the methodology of the principle approach, focused on the CBH 
version here unless explicitly stated otherwise, is that following Einstein‘s principle 
methodology of the 1905 Special Relativity derivation is unjustified in the current state of 
research in physics. Namely, Brown and Timpson (2006) claim that Einstein‘s own approach 
of 1905 represents a victory of pragmatism over explanatory depth that was only justified by 
the context of the chaotic state of physics at the start of the 20
th
 century. They aim to stress 
that taking Einstein‘s 1905 approach as a role model fails to appreciate his own admission 
that such strategy was ―a policy of despair, and represented a strategic retreat from the more 
desirable but, in his view temporarily unavailable constructive approach‖ (Brown & 
Timpson, 2006, p. 31). It seems Einstein never wanted to be followed in this respect, though 
it will take some further argument that he never should be (i.e. that his recommendation 
should be obeyed).  
It seems to me too that a physical theory can be 
satisfactory only when it builds up its structure from 
elementary foundations. […] If the Michelson-
Morley experiment had not put us in the worst 
predicament, no one would have perceived the 
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[special] relativity theory as a (half) salvation. 
(Einstein, 1995, p. 50) (bold emphasis mine)  
Brown and Timpson proceed to explicate just why the special theory of relativity is only a 
‗half salvation‘. They illustrate how a much more satisfactory (though computationally more 
laborious) explanation of the workings of the single piston heat engine undergoing a Carnot 
cycle can be provided by statistical mechanics than by thermodynamics. Most notably they 
criticise the fact that the thermodynamical approach for failing to answer why the perpetual 
motion machines cannot exist, though it explicitly forbids them through its foundational 
principles. ―What this theory gains in practicality and in the evident empirical solidity of its 
premises, it loses in providing physical insight‖ (Brown & Timpson, 2006, p. 32). And such 
theories are only acceptable in special circumstances, and then explicitly as temporary 
solutions until an overarching constructive theory is produced (―When we say that we have 
succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we invariably mean that a 
constructive theory has been found which covers the processes in question‖ (Einstein, 1954, 
p. 228)). So for our principle approach the proponents should demonstrate that the situation in 
the quantum theory and the explication of phenomena from quantum information theory is 
akin to the ―worst predicament‖ of the Michelson-Morley experiment (cf. (Einstein, 1995), 
the quotation given above).  
And Brown and Timpson rightly pick at segments of CBH‘s reading of history of Special 
Relativity (Clifton, Bub, & Halvorson, 2003) that are contentious in the philosophy of 
physics community today (cf. (Brown & Timpson, 2006, pp. 36-38), for a discussion of 
whether Minkowskian geometry should be seen as an algorithm for kinematic effects that 
require explanation through Einstein‘s theory or whether Minkowskian geometry is itself a 
constructive part of the special theory of relativity). Yet their own careful and thorough 
analysis seems to suggest that it was the impeding problems of quantum theory, namely the 
wave-particle duality which threatened to preclude a formation of a theoretically (i.e. 
precisely mandated by the mathematical formalism) sound conceptual framework for the 
electromagnetic and mechanical phenomena, that prompted Einstein to adopt the principle 
approach. Namely, he could not envisage the metaphysical conceptual framework that can 
‗reproduce‘ the phenomena in the climate of wave-particle duality, and these concerns over 
metaphysics pushed him to look for a solution in an unlikely place. He searched for a theory 
that could ‗reproduce‘ the phenomena, even if all of the previously adopted metaphysics has 
to be abandoned (as it was undergoing a revision). If these difficulties with quantum theory 
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metaphysics still give reason for concern today (as we have been trying to outline above), 
does that not give some impetus for a principle approach, despite Brown and Timpson‘s 
objections?  
Thermodynamics was in Einstein‘s eyes the only theory to reproduce the phenomena without 
the troublesome metaphysics at the time, for whatever the speculations about the structure of 
matter, he could not envisage a situation in which its phenomenological principles were 
shown not to hold. So he opted for a methodological guidance from thermodynamics and 
searched for those aspects of the phenomena in electromagnetism (the domain of the 
‗troublesome‘ Michelson-Morley experiment) whose conceptual formulation could survive 
whatever structural hypothesis proposed for their constructive reduction.  
[…]the speed of light is independent of the speed of 
the source and isotropic – something every ether 
theorist took for granted when the frame in question 
is taken to be the fundamental ether rest frame and 
something which remarkably Einstein felt would 
survive whatever the eventual quantum theory of 
radiation would reveal. (Brown & Timpson, 2006, p. 
36) 
Thus, it seems that despite the potentially erroneous ―CBH historical fable‖ it is not entirely 
unjustified to treat the current situation in quantum theory as one where doubts about the 
metaphysical foundation for a unified conceptualisation of reality prompt for a principle 
speculation: for a search for those aspects of the phenomena that can survive any eventual 
construction of the explanatory metaphysics.  It is of course, worth noting the warning from 
Brown and Timpson that even following the empirical success of Special Theory of 
Relativity, Einstein remained uneasy about the ―sin‖ of the role that the ideal rods and clocks 
played in the theory (Brown & Timpson, 2006, p. 36). Special relativity, in Einstein‘s own 
words, divided the world into ―(1) measuring rods and clocks, (2) all other things, e.g. the 
electromagnetic field, the material point etc.‖ (Einstein, 1951, p. 59). Einstein admits that this 
is unacceptable in the long run, but also that it was a necessary, though unwanted, 
consequence of the derivation of the theory from the generalised phenomenological 
principles. In some sense, this is warning us that principle theories cannot in and of 
themselves (without further metaphysical speculation and theoretical construction) yield their 
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own constructive replacements. But it is also giving us a historical example of how, despite 
the self-confessed conceptual shortfalls, principle theories can make advances in 
conceptualisation of the explanatory framework (even if, in places, pointing to its inherent 
explicit shortfalls).  
A situation present in the quantum theory today, including the phenomena in the domain of 
quantum information theory, can be seen as justifying the return to the drawing board and a 
search for the foundational principles (as phenomenological generalisations). Namely it is 
difficult to see a conceptual framework for the theory that will combine the requirement of 
separability of physical systems and locality of physical processes, with the demonstrated 
phenomena such as teleportation. We might be prompted to search for those aspects of the 
phenomena that are best positioned to survive any future constructive speculation. Thus, a 
principle approach may be called for, though it is by no means clear which of the offered 
principle approaches it should be. But even if the CBH story (Clifton, Bub, & Halvorson, 
2003) of Einstein‘s special theory of relativity furnishing an acceptable principle 
interpretation for the already existing empirically adequate Minkowskian formalism is not 
historically correct, it can be dismissed as an unsatisfactory analogy, without questioning the 
justification for the overall principle project.  
Let us turn briefly to the criticism that in the proposed principle approaches (most notably 
that of CBH) the foundational principles do not correspond to the requirement of simple, 
intuitive generalisation of the key aspects of the phenomena. Most notably Duwell (2007) 
claims that the supposed natural empirically discovered constraints of natural processes (in 
this case information-theoretic processes) are not empirically discovered constraints at all. 
Namely, if the foundational principles are to be mathematically expressible generalisations of 
the phenomena, what exactly are the phenomena that the information-theoretic constraints 
generalise? Duwell claims that the evidence for the constraints is indirect and challengeable, 
for they are not unshakeable enduring straightforwardly observable characteristics of the 
phenomena, but are mere predictions of the standard theory. But then he goes on to say that 
such is the nature of any constraint, which constrains what is possible and cannot be tested 
directly (i.e. we cannot test how well we have recognised what is possible, as the impossible 
– the other side of the constraints on the possible – is not empirically/epistemically accessible 
at all, being physically impossible).  Predictions, Duwell says, can be verified more 
straightforwardly, but constraints can‘t. However, in the light of the methodological 
discussion on whether to follow Einstein‘s example of the 1905 Special Relativity derivation, 
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this criticism applies across the board for Einstein too had no means of testing whether the 
constraints he ‗imposed‘ on the natural processes truly hold out in the world63 (until they are 
demonstrably broken, that is). The situation can be taken as far back as Einstein‘s 
methodological role model, thermodynamics, for there too the fundamental principles of the 
theory are the constraints on the unfolding of natural processes, and this is precisely where 
the sturdiness of the theory lies.  
Yet it is worth following this complaint a little further. The CBH constraints (unlike the 
‗Fuchs negative principles‘) do not appear to be empirical/phenomenal, nor straightforward. 
Perhaps the previous discussion showed, though, that their most remarkable characteristic 
should be their strength in the light of potential changes of the constructive structure that they 
might some day be reduced to. They must be the characteristics of the natural process that we 
expect will never disappear as ‗unreal‘ from our explanations of the phenomena.64 For 
example, the ban on superluminal information transfer via measurement is one such sturdy 
constraint, the one that seems to hide the deeply entrenched expectation of the separability 
behind it. But the ban on bit commitment would not seem even to many physicists as a 
physically necessary characteristic of reality (though it might be).
65
  
Though this would be leaning away from the direct proscription by Einstein to look for the 
unchangeable characteristics of the phenomena, adoption of a mathematical formalism could 
help here, for we may find that some ‗sturdy‘ characteristics are most economically expressed 
formally, even if this makes them less accessible to a wider audience. In a theory that aims to 
account not just for what people see (like maybe length contraction theory might be expected 
to do, be it a dynamical account through structure or a phenomenological account through 
                                                             
63 Think for example of the light postulate that has no direct verification, and where the debate about the 
conventionality of simultaneity (and thus the isotropic spread of the light wave) is still open in the philosophy 
of physics.  
64 We could for example liken them to primary qualities, namely the famous Cartesian derivation of the 
extension of the wax as its unchangeable quality (in Meditations). Unlike the secondary qualities that do not 
retain their phenomenal sturdiness when subjected to the explanation of what is really going on, i.e. 
secondary qualities as essentially dispositional and unreal.  
65 Duwell is in fact even more critical, he says the constraints only hold from the perspective of standard 
quantum mechanics, but not from that of other quantum theories (Duwell, Re-conceiving quantum theories in 
terms of information-theoretic constraints, 2007, p. 199). There is no room to enter that discussion here, but 
from the rest of the text it will become evident that this claim is tied to an erroneous assumption that the CBH 
argument starts from the ‘standard quantum mechanics’ and not the bare formalism common to all theories. 
Perhaps the warning by Halvorson and Bub (2008) that the CBH version of the theory is not developed in 
isolation from ‘theoretical context’ can be interpreted the Duwell way, but it needn’t. The context can likewise 
be provided by the empirical results and the background assumptions about physical reality in general (such as 
is the one of separability) without subscribing to any particular interpretation of the quantum formalism 
beforehand.  
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principles), but also for what they get after manipulating instruments in accordance with their 
expectations of what they should have (could have?) gotten, it may not be so preposterous to 
introduce fundamental principles expressed in terms of some shorthand or mathematical 
formalism. But even if this were granted, Duwell objects to the choice of the mathematical 
framework that the constraints are situated in (Duwell, Re-conceiving quantum theories in 
terms of information-theoretic constraints, 2007, p. 184). He, rightly, expects the 
mathematical framework, the formalism, to be neutral regarding the choice of physical 
ontology to accompany the eventual quantum formalism. But, as Spekkens (2007) illustrates, 
the mathematical framework and the constraints are capable of yielding non-quantum 
theories, so the choice of formalism needs to be strengthened so as to exclude unwanted 
theories, such as the toy theory of Spekkens (2007). It remains an open problem of the 
programme whether all the possible, but unwanted, toy theories should be excluded by 
further modifications of the choice of mathematical framework (which will inevitably affect 
the choice of the metaphysical assumptions that go with it), or whether we should find what 
are reasonable constraints for the formulation of physical theories and rule them out on 
grounds of those.  
Part of the answer to this question is given in Halvorson and Bub‘s response to Smolin‘s 
criticism of the CBH methodology (Halvorson & Bub, Can quantum cryptography imply 
quantum mechanics? Reply to Smolin, 2008). Smolin proposes to derive a mathematical 
formalism from the information-theoretic constraints that will not be the quantum formalism 
sought by CBH (Smolin, 2003). However, Halvorson and Bub swiftly respond that it was 
never the intention of the authors of the CBH approach to take the constraints in isolation 
from any theoretical (assuming this to mean physical, as well) context. Halvorson and Bub 
indeed acknowledge a whole host of explicit and implicit background assumptions (some of 
which have been considered here) that contribute to the particular derivation of the quantum 
formalism, and do not result in an altogether abstract mathematical game.
66
  
Metaphysics  
As has been indicated above, and in the previous chapter, every principle approach carries 
with it some metaphysical assumptions that can point to the search for a more constructive 
conceptual framework, so it is worth investigating the objections to the metaphysics of the 
                                                             
66 They, in fact, go further to find and point out more technical problems with Smolin’s account, which make 
his mathematical formalism unacceptable as any sort of physical theory, but those details are beyond the 
scope of this discussion.  
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proposed principle approaches. But the approach of CBH has some even more provocative 
and explicit metaphysical commitments, namely the claim that a quantum theory should 
primarily be viewed as theory of information processing in ‗the quantum world‘, and that 
information should be introduced as the new primitive in physics. This claim rests on a 
deeper principle that when mechanical theories (in this case theories of everything material 
and non-informational, from particles to waves) fail to show empirical supremacy over the 
metaphysically more conservative ones, then the latter should be preferred. A further step 
then requires that the representation and manipulation of information be recognised as the 
appropriate aim of physics (or the quantum segment of it).  
It is the deeper principle that is seen as problematic. Depending on different formulations, 
different readings of it in the literature, it either rests on the bare quantum formalism, or the 
more (though not much more) meaty ‗standard theory‘. If Bub‘s deeper methodological 
principle rests on the ‗standard (quantum) theory‘ as the starting point for validating 
metaphysical speculations of other theoretical interpretations, then Duwell‘s (2007) criticism 
(explicitly credited to (Timpson, 2004)) that the CBH start from minimal metaphysical 
expectations of interpretative ‗standard quantum mechanics‘ and not the bare mathematical 
formalism stands. Namely, what right do we have, other than historical contingency, for 
taking the ‗standard (quantum) theory‘ as the basis for all metaphysical speculation; and 
without such right any other interpretation that is empirically adequate can be taken as the 
yardstick against which to measure the alternatives. On the other hand, if Bub did not have 
the whole package of the ‗standard theory‘ in mind, but barely the formalism that is 
supposedly shared by (is common to) all the interpretations, then there is a clear reason to 
prefer it to the metaphysical speculations.  
It is a categorical difference between the bare formalism, a mathematical tool, an abstraction, 
and all the other segments of particular interpretations (including the ‗standard‘ one). The 
latter are not formalisms (or parts of the formalism), nor an abstraction, but are metaphysical 
conceptual frameworks built around the bare formalism in order to provide an explanation, or 
at least some sort of visualisation, of the physical processes corresponding to the 
mathematical representation. Fuchs‘ programme above also seems to rest on the assumption 
that there is a common formal mathematical core of all different quantum theories. CBH‘s 
search for a unique mathematical framework that would cover all the classical and quantum 
theories, and yield quantum ones through the introduction of the constraining principles, 
strongly suggests that there is in the background an expectation that a common mathematical 
96 
 
formalism can be found in all quantum theories. Assumptions though do not amount to a 
proof, so it remains an explicitly open question whether principle approach authors recognise 
a common formalism in all quantum theories, whether such formalism can be separated from 
the theories so that the remainder can be compared between different interpretations, and 
whether Bub is relying on this assumption when using his deeper methodological principle.  
Lacking the answer to the above, we can search Bub‘s writing to find whether he takes the 
‗bare formalism‘ or the whole ‗standard theory‘ as the starting point. In the very same section 
that Duwell takes passages for his criticism from, Bub says:  
Note that the argument here is not that it is never 
rational to believe a theory over an empirically 
equivalent rival: the methodological principle I am 
appealing to is weaker than this. (Bub, 2004, p. 260), 
(my emphasis) 
We can take this to be a strong indication, along with perhaps methodological errors
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pointed out by Brown and Timpson (2006) above, that Bub does not imply that ‗standard 
(quantum) theory‘ takes a privileged position as a starting point, but that it is the bare 
theoretical formalism (in itself insufficient to be taken as a theory, even a minimal one) that is 
common to all quantum theories/interpretations and thus worthy of the privileged position. Of 
course, Bub could be mistaken about there being such bare formalism, a distillate available 
from all theories/interpretations, but that, as is indicated above, even Duwell leaves as an 
open question.
68
 However, even supposing that Bub is justified in holding on to agnosticism 
about the metaphysics behind the quantum phenomena, and preferring his own 
metaphysically agnostic theory over those that dare to speculate, there are problems with the 
ontological commitments of his approach.  
                                                             
67 That CBH authors think Einstein starts with the ready made formalism provided by Minkowski, for which his 
special theory provides an interpretation.  
68 Duwell (2007, pp. 186-187) does actually recognise a problem vaguely along these lines, and sets off to 
rectify it by looking for conditions that might make one theory a foundation (or a common core segment) for 
the other, but does not open the discussion over common mathematical formalism. Timpson on the other 
hand is happy to accept the existence of the bare formalism and divides the quantum theories into three 
groups. Those that stick as closely as possible to the bare formalism (instrumentalist and (sic) Everett 
interpretations), those that appeal to non-unitary dynamics as modifications of the formalism (dynamical 
collapse á-la-GRW), and those that add extra metaphysical structure to the bare formalism (Bohm theory, 
hidden variable theories and some modal interpretations).  
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Namely, what is to be made of Bub‘s use of concepts of ‗system‘ (or more precisely, 
‗physical system‘) and black box, in accounting for the troublesome quantum phenomena. On 
the subject of black boxes, Duwell is precise and devastatingly critical: these are not 
metaphysical black boxes, objects that we cannot now, but might be able to one day, take 
apart and come to know better. They are ‗epistemological‘ black boxes, meaning we can 
observe and take them apart, just as physicists have been doing ever since they have been 
constructing the measuring instruments, but that (due to the guiding principle we have 
adopted) we cannot speculate the ultimate nature of (Duwell, 2007, p. 188). On a certain level 
our observation of the measuring instrument itself (not the physical system in the measuring 
process) will hit the ‗quantum wall‘, will run into a constructive speculation, and because 
such speculations are banned, we will simply choose agnosticism about the whole thing full 
stop.  
The metaphysical extent of this ‗whole thing‘ is virtually endless, for there is no incontestable 
barrier between the measuring instrument, the rest of the world and myself, save for the 
implicit assumption of the mind-body dualism that allows me to escape the measuring 
instrument, at least at the level of consciousness. By epistemological black box, Bub seems to 
mean, that we can know what the thing does in terms of input and output, whilst remaining 
completely agnostic about where it is, how big it is, and what it is made of. Strong adherence 
to the methodological aim of dedicating physics to information manipulation and 
‗investigation‘ is all that is supposed to stop us from taking the objects at hand apart, 
nonetheless.
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But it is then only a minute step from accepting such view to committing to the CBH 
metaphysical speculation that the information is the newly discovered physical primitive and 
that quantum theory is our best theory about that. On the other hand, Duwell says that taking 
the environmental decoherence as the only joint segment of different quantum theories and 
thus not susceptible to agnosticism about metaphysics is not a safe road to take. He claims 
that there is evidence that environmental decoherence may not be sufficient to recover our 
experience of the world ( (Duwell, Re-conceiving quantum theories in terms of information-
theoretic constraints, 2007, p. 188); referring to (Bacciagaluppi, 2004)). More recently 
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 This is no trivial matter for such adherence is attainable for those who accept from the start that taking the 
‘black boxes’ apart has nothing to do with explaining the ‘troublesome’ correlation-based phenomena. But if 
the ‘black boxes’ are not to be taken apart, then either there is never to be an overall reduction of the 
information ontology to the ontology of extended matter, or the reduction should be directed towards some 
other segment of material reality (though it is hard to see what that would be).  
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Duwell (2008) suggests a technical account of how information can be analysed as an 
abstract entity, short of awarding it the status of substance, where substance is a general form 
of the material ‗stuff‘. Now that goes some way in helping the principle approach of CBH 
(though Duwell does not explicitly refer to that particular research programme) lay its 
ontological commitments in the open. It is not for us to evaluate the details of this proposal, 
but a few remarks that bear on its potential for provision of information are in order.  
As abstract entity quantum information is not subject to change, or rather it possesses no 
durable changeable properties that would allow it to withstand identity under change. It must 
also not be regarded as a property (an abstract property akin to kinds or universals) of the 
underlying material ontology, as the Duwell analysis (relying on further technical distinctions 
in (Timpson, 2004)) explicitly shows it to fall short of the requirements for a substance or a 
property of material substance. Yet it goes some way to addressing the troublesome 
phenomena, by firstly disentangling them from the problems of separability violations by 
extended matter, and secondly showing that from a purely (and again technically) 
informational aspect their troublesome phenomena dissolve as they are in no way reliant on 
spatial extension or location of the information-entity. The latter in fact has no pretence to 
such grounding. Of course, as soon as we would try to treat the information as the new 
property of material substratum, the worries about separability violation would return. This 
difficulty in tying up (one such) proposed information ontology with material ontology points 
to a feature that is interesting from the perspective of explanation. Due to its resistance to 
alterations of properties, abstract entity information (if that were the paradigm we adopted) 
cannot feature in the explanations of the causal mechanical type. Duwell therefore advocates 
that ―explanations of the quantum phenomena, if provided by the quantum information 
theory‖ (Duwell, 2008, p. 215), feature only in the unification type explanations. The 
unification of course should be provided by the phenomenological status of their constraining 
principles.  
A brief comment, to be elaborated in greater detail in the discussion in the final chapter is in 
order here. Supposing we follow the suggested Duwell route, or a methodologically similar 
one, two objections arise, especially in comparison to the more candid constructive 
explanations of the next chapter. The unification explanations of the type proposed above 
would be extremely blunt about removing the troublesome aspects of the phenomena, not 
really making it clear how we came to see the phenomena as troublesome in the first place 
(except by simply saying we were constantly in error about what the object of physics at this 
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level of reality should be). Tied in with that is the observation that they hardly even point 
towards the connection to objects whose changes in the material world lead to the appearance 
of the troublesome phenomena. And that is the truly interesting question: what is the link to 
the material foundation for the troublesome phenomena.  
 The question remains whether Einstein‘s guideline above: take only what you can be 
confident will not be affected by future metaphysical speculation, can help us out in this 
segment as well. Can we safely assume that whatever constructive explanation we may some 
day come up with for the behaviour of systems and apparatuses in the measuring process, 
they will always behave so as to have some input and some output?  
On the face of it, it is not such a bad assumption, given that we are looking for something - 
anything - that survives the withdrawal from metaphysical speculation. We can never expect 
to ‗see‘ directly into the measuring process at the extension level of the quantum phenomena, 
but there will always be some input and some output of the process. The only problem is, 
there is hardly any physical process that cannot be characterised under input-output principle, 
yet we have tried and have succeeded to find physical theories of greater precision than 
‗rubbish in, rubbish out‘ model. We have to postpone settling this discussion for the final 
chapter.  
There is a further complication even for the assumption that the formalism is a mere 
calculational device, that the formalism is informationally incomplete (Maudlin, 2007a, p. 
3155), as suggested in Fuchs‘s approach. In the troublesome phenomena, such as the EPR 
situation, the calculational device tells us that had things been different on the proximal side 
of the experiment, so they would have been on the other, distant side. If this is further 
coupled with recognition that the proximal outcome is a result of chance, an inherently 
unpredictable outcome of intervention in nature (or even, to strengthen the argument, a 
chancy choice of parameter to be measured), then we know things could have been different 
even with all the causal antecedents the same (i.e. our initial instrumental codification).
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And, so Maudlin (Maudlin, 2002, pp. 146-148) argues, we get a counterfactual-supporting 
causal connection between the material outcomes on two sides of the experiment which 
cannot be explained by a common cause. Thus, even though the material existents are not 
described by the formalism of the theory, they do present a situation which cannot be 
                                                             
70 Of course, this assumes the analysis of causation based on support for the counterfactual situations, which 
there is no room to quarrel with here. Nonetheless, it serves as an indication of the difficulties that the Fuchs 
programme comes across, but that the CBH programme can hope to avoid.  
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explained by a common material cause for the two sides of the experiment. Our 
experimenters‘ guesstimates seem to still rest on the mysterious non-local connection 
between the material existents about which they have been formulated. More generally, it 
seems that any epistemic interpretation of the formalism that presupposes it has some direct 
links to the states of the world (however unpredictable and partial these links may be) will 
have to endow those states with non-local causal connections that violate the separability 
principle. If, on the other hand, holding on to material separability was one of the starting 
points of the particular principle approach (in this case Fuchs‘) that approach would appear to 
fail purely on the grounds of lack of internal consistency.
71
  
More recently, Brown (private correspondence) objects to the notion of the evolution of the 
wavefunction (or state-ascription) in the long intervals between the measurement interactions. 
Why should the conscious agents expect their expectations (guesstimates) about the 
interactions with reality to change of their own accord in the intervals that they are not 
interacting (and not even planning to) with that very reality. Metaphysical commitments in 
Fuchs‘ response (private correspondence) clearly come about here again, strengthening the 
above criticism that separability violations cannot be avoided on this approach after all. In 
simple terms, the issue is why the state ascription, the guesstimate, changes with the formally 
calculated evolution of the wavefunction overnight whilst the experimenters are sleeping and 
are thus not likely to induce any unpredictable reactions into the super-sensitive reality. And 
Fuchs replies that something is, after all, changing about the material system overnight and 
the experimenters commitments are update in the morning to stay true to that commitment. 
He falls back on calling for the treatment of the quantum state as epistemic to be an 
unimpeachable dictum from which the further research programme should proceed, without 
at this stage providing an answer to worries about what in reality compels the experimenters 
to make the necessary overnight updates.  
Explanation  
What is the explanation of the material (or otherwise) foundation for the ‗troublesome‘ 
phenomena to be extracted from the principle approaches, individually and in general? 
Following Einstein‘s model principle theories do have embarrassing features (despite their 
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 It has recently been suggested in Timpson (2008) that Fuchs’ programme makes no explicit (and formal) 
demands for the adherence to the principle of separability. Whilst this is strictly true, the narrative 
argumentation for the development of the new formalism from the principles, especially in the original 
proposals by Fuchs (2001)), relies on the unpalatability of explanations of phenomena that allow for the 
violations of separability.  
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empirical sturdiness), such as Einstein‘s privileged rods and clocks were. They are also only 
an interim step towards a more general constructive explanatory account. But for such an 
account to be possible, there has to be an empirically testable speculation about the limits of 
the principle theory, a constructive account has to provide a situation that needn‘t necessarily 
falsify the principle theory, but can show where to go beyond it. Bub, and Brown and 
Timpson agree that the theory of Brownian motion provided such superior metaphysical 
projection in the case of statistical mechanics: it allowed molecules to be directly counted and 
demonstrated the limits of validity of thermodynamics ((Bub, 2004); (Brown & Timpson, 
2006)).  
Yet Bub seems to claim that there is no road beyond quantum theory, principle derived 
quantum theory that is agnostic about the mechanical structure behind the phenomena, that 
such advance is precluded in principle by all the empirically equivalent quantum theories 
(perhaps even by their common core, quantum formalism). For the case of the CBH 
programme Duwell concludes:  
[Though] no positive claims are made about what 
the quantum otology is, Bub thinks that it is not 
hidden variables, and no matter what it is, it is 
beyond the scope of physics to investigate it. Hence, 
quantum mechanics ought to be regarded as a 
principle theory of information. (Duwell, 2007, p. 
194)  
Yet there seems to be a missing step here: how come that a particular derivation of the bare 
formalism imposes any particular interpretation of that formalism? Given that CBH manage 
to derive what is some core formalism of all quantum theories, we must examine further steps 
that lead them to a particular interpretation. Of course, there is the deep principle of 
withholding judgement on metaphysical issues. And then there is the further claim that 
withholding judgment legitimises the hypothesis that (quantum) information is the new 
physical primitive.  
It is worth reiterating that on the information-theoretic principle derivation of quantum 
theory, the objects of the theory whose behaviour is constrained by the fundamental 
principles are the macroscopic directly observable outcomes supported by the apparatuses 
(preparation and measurement instruments), whereas the apparatuses themselves are treated 
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as unanalysed black boxes (as has been outlined above). The principles provide a derivation 
of relations between various preparations and measurements, and this is supposed to be the 
first-hand explanation of why the preparation and measuring apparatuses display the relations 
(―in terms of relative frequencies of various experimental outcomes‖, (Timpson, 2004, p. 
216)) that they do. At the most basic level of interpretation of the formalism, the elements of 
the formalism are related with the observable physical quantities (the frequencies with which 
various outcomes of experiments may be expected). But in the principles themselves there is 
not much else that can help us go beyond this most basic level of interpretation (Timpson, 
2004). Despite the nature of its derivation, such quantum theory would remain at best very 
similar to the ‗minimal interpretation‘ (perhaps, ‗instrumentalist interpretation‘, with the 
inherent pitfall concerning possible reliance on the metaphysical projections towards 
properties of the material background, summarised from (Maudlin, 2002), above), it would 
link the mathematical abstraction to the statistics of individual measurement outcomes, but it 
would not go much further in providing explanation of the material foundation of the 
phenomena that the outcomes are a part of.  
What is needed to produce an explanation is the Redhead second-sense interpretation of the 
formalism, an account of the nature of the external world and/or our epistemological relation 
to it that serves to explain how it is that the statistical regularities of the formalism-outcomes 
relations come out the way they do (Redhead, 1987). This is not to say that a constructive 
account is necessary, though one such would obviously fit well with the ‗nature of the 
external world and our epistemological link to it‘ requirement, but an extended principle 
account that goes beyond the minimal interpretation and is, preferably, explicit about any of 
its inherent ‗sins‘. Now we can see a further motivation for the employment of the deeper 
methodological principle, and the eventual road to metaphysical projections (the call for new 
physical primitives). But, according to Timpson (2004) the methodological principle involves 
a petitio principii argument and cannot be used against the rival constructive explanations 
(most notably, the Bohmian theory and the GRW dynamics) (Timpson, 2004, p. 220). To 
take the constraints as imposed natural laws is where the petitio lies according to Timpson: 
the constraints rule out the GRW interpretations for the latter can violate one of the 
principles, and the Bohmian interpretations because they cannot show additional empirical 
content over metaphysically more conservative interpretations. To simply state that the 
constraints hold as a matter of natural law (and thus physical necessity), is according to 
Timpson to beg the question against rival explanatory conceptions.  
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It is worth revisiting once more the way the constraints are introduced into the CBH (or, with 
alterations, some other principle approach). At least CBH are explicit about waiting for a 
demonstrable violation of any of the constraints. If such violation is to be found in practice, 
not suggested in principle, then the associated theory would falsify the constraints and the 
theory based on them. And the discussion would be over; the principle approach based on the 
violated constraints would fail. This is why the constraints are carefully chosen to be of the 
sturdy variety, to secure the best possible foundations for the principle theory. But no theory 
today is beyond the possibility of falsification, though we aim to build them to survive at 
least for some time. On the other hand, some of the contending theories, such as Bohmian 
mechanics, claim to be able to predict possible violations of the constraints, but cannot 
demonstrate them because we live in a particular universe in which all such violations are 
impossible (cf. the notion of the quantum equilibrium in Chapter 3).  
Without going into details of this proposal at this stage (cf. Chapter 3), this appears to be a 
weak argument against taking the violations as outright forbidden. It has long been the case in 
the history of science that explanations based on universal conspiracy to conceal empirical 
support for explanatory frameworks have been considered unacceptable. Supposing that the 
CBH and similar programmes are open to empirical demonstrations of the violations of their 
constraining principles, but that no such demonstrations can, at this stage, be proposed, it is 
not circular to argue that the constraints hold in our universe as a rule (a phenomenological 
rule in some sense) and that additional metaphysical structures do not play an explanatory 
role. Of course, the constraints themselves can perhaps be derived (as lawlike, or merely 
approximate), rather than postulated, from the overall theories containing additional 
metaphysical structure, but that is a methodological issue of a different approach to the 
quantum formalism, not one of logical clarity. Given that there are reasons to consider a 
principle approach, adherence to principle methodology has to be respected. With hindsight 
we may correct the inadequacies of the robustness of principle approach (cf. (Bell, How to 
teach special relativity, 1987), concerning Einstein‘s derivation of Special Theory of 
Relativity), we may explicate its sins, but hindsight is not a luxury we have at the early stage 
of development of such theories.  
Let us also briefly consider Timpson‘s objection that according to his grouping of the 
explanatory frameworks, even after the mechanical and dynamic-changing interpretations  of 
the formalism have been discarded by the deep methodological principle, two further possible 
interpretations remain: the bare instrumentalism and the Everett interpretation (Timpson, 
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2004, p. 221). The former carries with it all the problems usually associated with 
instrumentalism in science, and for our purposes can be said to explain very little (and not to 
aspire to explain much more than that), and is therefore not a serious contender. The latter 
would take at least an additional chapter of its own to elaborate and analyse, but its greatest 
weakness in the present context is that it is just not as innocent of the metaphysical burden as 
Timpson portrays it. For present purposes we take it here to be a version of quantum theory 
with a heavy burden of (however fickle) existence of multitude of universes, through which 
the physical processes unfold, but where only the phenomena of one or relatively small group 
of them are epistemically available to us. But Timpson is right in calling for clearer 
explication of just how is it that quantum theory supersedes the bare instrumentalism 
(remember black box instruments) and becomes a theory about representation and 
manipulation of information (Timpson, 2004). For even if there is something special in 
quantum experiments, unlike in the more technically demanding classical ones, to suggest 
seeing the measuring apparatus as a source of signals, it is still sensible to ask what the 
signals signify or codify. In the context of search for explanations it is almost irresistible to 
ask what a particular measurement outcome is a signal of, given that it must not be a signal of 
something about pre-existing hidden variables (or some other details of mechanical structure 
of reality).  
Until the notion of the ‗new physical primitive‘ is further explicated, we can also take as 
strong criticism Timpson‘s complaint that it will not help turn an instrumentalist 
interpretation of quantum formalism into something more meaty by simply ―[concluding] that 
information, or quantum information, is an entity‖ (Timpson, 2004, p. 222). A primitive, of 
course, does not have to be read as entity
72
, in the same way that extension is not an entity 
(before or after Descartes). But we need to be told more about just what it is. It is certainly 
problematic for the CBH account to claim being open to falsification or some future 
clarification through a constructive theory (though not one of the kind available now and 
dismissed by Bub), whilst on the other hand changing the aim of physics in the quantum 
domain and claiming that the best we can achieve is a principle theory of information 
manipulation (where the measuring apparatuses remain essentially black boxes forever). And 
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 There is, in fact, no indication that it should be, and as frustrating as it might be for the title of this thesis, 
Bub does not explicitly commit to an ontological claim in (Bub, 2004). Duwell ascertains as much: “Bub does 
not out and out make an ontological claim” (Duwell, 2007, p. 193). In fact, a more charitable reading and one 
in greater accord with other texts, may be that Bub’s explanatory framework is simply ontologically neutral 
regarding the underlying ontology of quantum physical processes involving interaction with conscious agents 
(i.e. measurement).  
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with the latter claim holding forth, Bub (and CBH in general) veer closer to the neo-Bohrian 
approach of Fuchs, by claiming that the reality is such that we will never be able to know the 
workings behind our measurement outcomes (a metaphysical claim of some sort). The 
principle approaches (that do not see themselves as mere unfortunate intermediate steps to a 
constructive theory) deny the implicit premise that a fundamental theory ought to apply to the 
workings of measurement devices that are constituted out of the very systems that the theory 
is meant to apply to. And yet, they have to think that on their account the measurement (or 
any other physical processes, but always those involving acquisition of new 
knowledge/beliefs) and the behaviour of directly observable devices in it is somehow 
explained (Duwell, 2007, p. 195).  
The only alternative Duwell sees to the hidden variables of the Bohmian mechanics type (to 
be presented in Chapter 3), is to go back to Bohr and state that the elements of reality that are 
represented by the quantum formalism ―are simply not like classical definite valued 
properties‖ (Duwell, 2007, p. 196). This is a constructive approach of sorts, similar to the 
constructive elements in Fuchs, but it is too small a step towards a wholesome (mechanical) 
explanatory framework for the quantum phenomena. It may be linked to the ‗sinful‘ status of 
reference-frame-defining rods and clocks in Special Relativity. Not that such a framework is 
impossible (which would be arguing in line with many who demand an outright constructive 
account for physical explanations, full stop), but we as yet do not seem to have enough of its 
structure to be able to take an explanation of the phenomena off the ground.  
2. 4. Summary of the principle approaches  
The principle approaches provide an explanation of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena, but the 
explanation struggles to provide sufficient features for the transcendental strategy as it 
struggles to connect to what we take to be ontological concepts therein. On the face of it it 
bridges the gap between knowing that a phenomenon occurs and understanding why it 
occurs, as in the conceptual framework of information-entities the occurrence of the 
phenomena is singled out of the sea of all possibilities by the constraining principles. But the 
caveat is that we just don‘t know enough about the information ontology to construct some 
story of how the ‗information-entities‘ get into the state that evinces the observed 
correlations. From the perspective of exposition of pseudo-problems (cf. Kepler above and 
further discussion below), we might say that it achieves what it set out to do, it exposes the 
said gap as something different, a state of new entities rather than just a statistical correlation 
of macroscopic states of the material black-boxes. And it is true that the principle theories 
106 
 
have little worries about the nature of the entities they take up. But this worry is more easily 
ignored only from the perspective of prediction, than the perspective of explanation.  
For example, in thermodynamics we can predict the occurrence of certain observable states of 
properties of a wide range of objects (the ‗black boxes‘) without any concern as to how those 
properties come to hold of those objects. We simply choose what to call an object and track 
the changes of a chosen set of its properties. This is a powerful predictive tool, but in terms of 
explanation it does not go far enough, as we can see different objects (these are macroscopic 
‗black-bodies‘ whose macroscopic constructs we can still see, there is no need to worry about 
unobservables as yet) being constructed in different ways. When certain external conditions 
can be satisfied about them (that they are in a thermal equilibrium with the surroundings – 
which we again do not deconstruct) we can predict a whole lot of their properties.  
Yet, in terms of explanation, we know them not to be the same object. We took different 
objects to put them together. To put it bluntly, this type of explanation does not respect that 
we conceptualise the situations in terms of re-identifiable objects, the latter lose any meaning 
in the erasure of differences between complex objects in thermodynamical situations. We 
again jeopardise the conceptual starting point of the transcendental strategy. For explanation, 
if not for prediction, we would like to see some investigation of the conditions that lead to the 
same observable properties despite the differences in construction of objects. The real devil 
here is in the detail. Similarly, information ontology requires some further philosophical 
justification at the level of connection to the material substratum that is a part of the starting 
point of the transcendental strategy above. We can take the fact that several slightly different 
mathematical models can be used as toy-theory derivations of the formalism attached to the 
information-ontology as an illustration of this point.  
Likewise, on the face of it the principle approach explanations stop the why-regress at the 
level of information ontology, simply by establishing that this is what this segment of reality 
is like. But even in taking the new ontology to be at the first stage of development of the 
Nersessian (1984) advocated route, the analogical stage, there is preciously little hooks to 
anchor the analogy on. For as soon as we start looking for the hooks, we are back at the 
common-sense conceptual scheme and the threat that ontological holism poses for it. This is 
in general how the principle approaches of Chapter 2 struggle with even complying with the 
unification-style explanation paradigm, as they cannot connect to the material ontology 
without threatening to make it non-separable. And the whole problem for the transcendental 
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strategy goes back to the beginning again. Finally, Lipton‘s criterion of self-evidencing is 
easily satisfied in this case, as the occurrence of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena was 
methodologically an important point for the development of the whole new conceptual 
scheme. Yet this on its own does not go far enough.  
Beyond the criteria, if we take the principle approaches‘ explanations as not of the 
ontological type, then they are of not much use for us here, seeking to compare the 
ontological characteristics of explanations. They are of not much use for the transcendental 
strategy either, as it aims to show how the non-problematic everyday ontology can be 
connected to the theoretical ontologies assumed to be fundamental. If we take it to be 
ontological, and trying to develop a novel ontology of its own, then we are back to the 
problems of connecting it to the common-sense conceptual scheme, as has been outlined 
above. A useful pointer to take at this stage, though, would be to look into how dissolving the 
danger of the non-separable (i.e. holistic) ontology can still be achieved, even without having 
to move to wholly novel ontological entities. This would mean taking some of the 
proscriptions of quantum formalism as incomplete, as guesstimates, whilst furnishing a 
sufficient generative mechanism behind such limited epistemology. In the vein of our 
transcendental strategy narrowed down to this special domain of experience we should look 
into what the world ought to be like so that we could know what we come to know about it 
through quantum formalism.
73
  
So given that we are dealing with a unification-type explanation, it remains to show in 
Chapter 4 that it can be taken to fall under the ontological rather than the epistemic variety, 
and that it can stop the why-regress. For according to Lipton (2004, p. 7) this is the biggest 
problem for unification-type explanations in general. In some instances this can be satisfied 
by embedding those explanations into the ―wider‖ pattern, but we will have to investigate in 
greater detail just how this is to be done. We should not forget that the constraining principles 
themselves carry with them some ontological characteristics, along with that carried by 
deeper metaphysical principles behind them. For example, the principle approaches are 
                                                             
73
 One might suggest that this is precisely what the principle approaches tried to achieve with the identification 
of the constraining principles. But as yet they tell us nothing about what the world must be made of for the 
principles to hold as they do, and that is what is required for a deeper explanation: an account of the ontology 
that gives rise to these principles. What it certainly can teach us is to remove some deep conceptual 
expectations we may have had, by exposing them to be the root of our problems, and in this case one such 
expectation seems to be the account of the world whose fundamental structural feature is solely geometrical.  
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deeply committed to preservation of separability, an underlying principle that imports the 
individual existence of macroscopic objects and the like.  
We should also bear in mind that the principle approaches are not aiming to replace the 
existence of material objects with information, but claim that the explanation of the 
‗troublesome phenomena‘ is essentially about information manipulation. Manipulation that is 
still performed with the aid of the material world, so we should be able to ask what the basic 
objects of such explanations (objects whose existence is invariable in counterfactual 
situations) are. This is to ask what is carrying the burden of explanatory work (most notably 
in the CBH programme). This is not a question about detailed nature of systems and 
instruments in the input-output manipulating process, but a request for clearer delineation of 
the existents suffering change at the level of information manipulation.  
In summary, explanation, even of the unification type, will require a physical theory that 
steps away from bare instrumentalism, even if moving the whole debate to the level of 
macroscopic, directly observable, outcome manipulation, i.e. away from the mental 
processes. To set up an explanation of the unification type we need to explicitly state the 
segments that unify it with the rest of our (standard) conceptual framework.  
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3. CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES  
3. 1. A quantum (mechanical) theory: ‘Bohmian Mechanics’  
From epistemic restrictions to mechanical superstructure: historical and conceptual 
background  
In the previous chapter the theories that follow Bohrian interpretation have been presented. 
They hold firm to some expectation of physical ontology, namely that it must be based on the 
familiar notion of macroscopic objects, some of whose properties must be directly perceived, 
whilst others are be derived from those. Directly perceived properties are spatial position and 
‗geometrical‘ extension, with existence independent from the surrounding environment. This 
way a body is conceptualised primarily in Cartesian-like primary qualities, with other 
perceivable properties reduced to further features resulting from primary qualities (such as 
e.g. colour). Of course, in classical physics further ‗primary‘ properties must be attributed to 
such bodies, such as mass and charge, thus the picture is by no means perfect. But, it is 
assumed that such picture, modulo augmentations, is the fundamental conceptualisation of 
the physical world. Given that quantum theory contradicts such picture in certain aspects, it is 
taken not to provide a definite description of the micro-physical reality as this reality is also 
expected to conform to the general feature of the sketched conceptual scheme. It is thus taken 
that there must be some obstruction to acquiring the complete knowledge of the detailed 
nature of the physical objects at the micro-physical level, with the quantum theory providing 
the codification of the best of such knowledge that can be acquired.  
The conclusion thus seems to be (though this will be further investigated in the final chapter) 
that we have to make the best of this limited knowledge, try to explain why we can‘t have it, 
but that we must not abandon this deep-seated expectation of what material reality must 
structurally be like. A parallel reasoning that runs alongside this is that there is not to be a 
hierarchy of physical theories associated with different ‗levels of zooming in on reality‘. That 
is, we should not have one theory describing the objects at one ‗level of zoom‘ and another 
kicking in once we coarse grain the inspection. In fact, more than two such layers may be 
envisioned, and maybe even several entirely separate theories for different aspects of the 
reality at the same level of zoom, and things soon start running out of proportion. Given that 
the ‗zooming‘ view is discarded it is taken that the theories that do not conform to the 
preferred conceptual structure (the one constituent of the preferred ‗level of zoom‘) must be 
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‗epistemic‘ and not ‗ontic‘. Early precursor (though not altogether a prophet) of this view can 
be found in the philosophy behind Heisenberg‘s derivation of matrix version of the quantum 
formalism (Lochak, 2007).  
The theories presented in this chapter to a large degree share the convictions the above sketch 
starts with but take different conclusions. Generally, they agree with the denial of hierarchy 
of theories, i.e. do not accept the ‗level of zoom‘ view, and aim to reduce all the phenomena 
to those of micro-physics as a realistic ontological foundation behind all others. One can note 
a certain agreement with the linearity of spatial zooming; the smaller things are expected to 
make up the bigger things, not the other way round. They take a somewhat diverse view as to 
the nature of objects at the ‗zoom-level‘ of interest, as will be outlined in the below (section 
3.1.2.). But even those give precedence to primary qualities (with some additions) over and 
above elevating traditionally secondary qualities (or inventing new ones) to a higher status. In 
that they seem to share the starting point with the theories of the previous chapter, but reach a 
different conclusion.  
They say that we must do what we can with the primary qualities at this level, and treat the 
results as discoveries about the fundamental nature of matter, rather than project our 
expectations onto this level, and in resulting experimental disappointment give up on the 
project of delineation of quantum ontology altogether. We must, as de Broglie tried, explain 
the correlations and phenomena by reduction to deterministic objects and their standard and 
special properties (Lochak, 2007).  
These theories, thus, reject more strongly than the ones from the previous chapter, the 
possibility of contending with ‗unsharp reality‘ of objects at the level of micro-physics ( 
(Busch, Classical versus quantum ontology, 2002); for exposition of the alternative cf. 
(Busch, Grabowski, & Lahti, 1995)). Whereas the theories of the previous chapter could find 
a route to be reconciled with the ‗unsharp realities‘ (though they did not set out to do so at the 
outset) through accepting ‗unsharp realities‘ to be the ontological foundation behind their 
epistemic interpretations, the theories of this chapter stand firmly against ‗unsharp realities‘ 
by delineating what some of the ‗sharp realities‘ alternatives may be like. (There are, of 
course, other such alternative options that will not be considered here at all.) 
Historical development of Bohmian Mechanics  
According to Lochak‘s (2007) exposition, the historical development of quantum theory 
followed these two lines of reasoning from the outset (with a brief interlude of expecting 
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them to be united through the Schrödinger wavefunction). The Heisenberg, Bohr, Pauli et al. 
camp advocated abandonment of ontological speculation about reality at the microscopic 
level, whilst Einstein, Planck, Schrödinger, de Broglie et al. aimed to supersede the theory as 
it was given at the time with a thorough ontological account. Historically, the Copenhagen 
camp won for some time, most of all, according to Lochak, due to easier formation of a 
unified camp (‗there is nothing more to explain‘). The anti-Copenhagen camp had trouble 
offering an alternative account as the difficulties in reducing the observed phenomena to the 
behaviour of simple ontological primitives were quite substantial and could not, at the time, 
be borne out in formalism. Thus, even de Broglie, the originator of the view that the particle 
like behaviour can be reduced to singularities of spatially extended waves, gave up for a 
while (Lochak, 2007, p. 78). Eventually, David Bohm resurrected (Bohm, A suggested 
interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of hidden variables, I and II, 1952) some of de 
Broglie‘s notions in his pilot-wave theory, which in the end gave rise to contemporary 
versions known as Bohmian Mechanics.  
Even though there are different variants of Bohmian approach today, some of which we shall 
consider in more detail below, they all share a general conceptual dualism of particles and 
waves in existence. The particles (or ‗the particle‘ in some cases) build up the macroscopic 
objects and behave in many ways as we expect from macroscopic objects themselves, i.e. 
they are finitely extended objects in space and time. Yet they are further guided in their 
behaviour by the wavefunction, a special and novel kind of entity that is not spatially 
localised and that provides ‗the information‘ for the particles‘ nonlocal interactions. We thus 
have at the micro-level (this is now true only of one strand of Bohmian mechanics, the one 
that posits the existence of particles in ordinary spacetime, not in high dimensional phase 
space) objects similar to the objects familiar from everyday life and classical physics (i.e. 
characterised by primary qualities). Unlike in classical physics, alongside those objects there 
is/are also a novel and special kind of object: the wavefunction(s).  
It is obvious that the status and the role of the wavefunction will prove to be the most 
contentious issue for our purposes. Again, versions of Bohm-style quantum theory differ on 
this issue and we shall focus on only one of them. The one to be discarded outright is the 
notion of the wavefunction as a physical potential field spread out in physical space or the 
configuration space. On such account the potential literally forces the particles along their 
trajectories. Though this would, at face value, be an appealing view from the perspective of 
search for the explanatory ontology that respects the traditional view of primary qualities, it 
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faces technical and conceptual difficulties especially from the perspective of explanation. 
Namely, it presents the quantum theory as classical mechanics with a special metaphysical 
addition. This addition is responsible for all the non-classical phenomena but is itself highly 
obscure. It cannot be manipulated or investigated directly, but only through its influence on 
the particles. It is extremely nonlocal, but inert to any direct intervention (so can‘t be used for 
superluminal signalling). Philosophically, it can be seen as an ad hoc metaphysical addition 
with no other role but to carry the blame for all non-classical (‗troublesome‘) phenomena 
encountered.  
The other extreme is to make the particles equally unreal as the wavefunction, i.e. to claim 
that fundamentally reality corresponds to a highly abstract formal presentation of the 
observed phenomena in a high-dimensional configuration space. In that case there is a 
physically real universal and unique wavefunction for the entire universe and a single ‗point-
particle‘ in configuration space that is the summary of formal encoding of the position 
coordinates of all the supposedly observed particles in the three-dimensional physical space. 
The three-dimensional space and the multiple particles are not fundamental and must be 
reduced to the ‗universal wavefunction + the marvellous particle‘ construction. This is highly 
speculative in terms of metaphysics and it is difficult to see how an isomorphism between the 
observed phenomena and their ‗true‘ constructive explanation can be satisfactorily 
established (Monton, 2006). In terms of explanation it is a very expensive construct that 
generalises from ‗the nonlocality of troublesome phenomena is an illusion‘ to ‗the whole 
known world is an illusion‘.74   
Thus the approach to be elaborated in the rest of the chapter takes the middle ground. It 
claims that the micro-physical reality is irreducibly non-classical and that we should give up 
on trying to force it into a classical mould (particles moved exclusively by the force field). It 
acknowledges the need for a universal wavefunction (as there is no fundamental divide in the 
formalism between the wavefunctions associated with individual systems), but treads 
carefully in characterising its ontological features. It claims the material world is made out of 
                                                             
74 Monton (2006) specifies two main problems with this extreme view. The first is that such a view goes against 
the pragmatic rule that we should not accept theories which radically revise people’s everyday understanding 
of the world when there are empirically equivalent theories on offer in which such revision is not as radical. In 
our case, the search for a deeper explanation, this pragmatic rule seems quite natural. Monton’s other 
objection is that it is hard to see how our mental states, representationally supervening on some physical 
structure (i.e. relying on some isomorphism between the representational content and the physical structure 
of the world), would have the content that they do. That is, it would be hard to explain why we conceptualise 
the world in terms of three-dimensional objects evolving through time, given that the true reality consists of 
single high dimensional point-particle.  
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particles, classically familiar objects embedded in space-time, but not that all of the 
properties we tend to ascribe to them are ‗really true of them‘. Notoriously, it acknowledges 
some Bohrian-like limits of knowledge through claiming that the world is fundamentally 
deterministic, but the details of this are forever obscured from us so that the best we can have 
is the stochasticity inherent in the quantum formalism. In that, it has to acknowledge the real 
influences of the wavefunction, but its unreality in the ‗quantum potential‘ sense. Finally, it is 
openly nonlocal, allowing the wavefunction to coordinate behaviour (more precisely, motion) 
of the particles in synchrony that disregards the spatial separation.  
As we shall see in the final chapter there are contact points between this approach and the 
principle approaches of the previous chapter. Strangely, the wavefunction encodes important 
information about the world without corresponding to anything ‗tangible‘ in that world. The 
most notable characteristic for our purposes of this approach is that it takes ontology as the 
starting point. It takes as given that the macroscopically observable world is made of 
something sufficiently similar at the microscopic level, namely particles, and then tries to 
reconcile this view with the observed ‗troublesome‘ phenomena. The said particles are not 
classical, but they are endowed precisely with the primary qualities that have since the early 
modern era been so firmly established in our conceptual framework. This way a picture of the 
more complex phenomena is built out of the relatively simple formal scheme, just as Einstein 
(1954) required.
75
 The key problem is that these particles do not enter into causal interactions 
in the way we classically expect them to, thus stretching to the limit the applicability of the 
preferred causal-mechanical model of explanation.  
Particle mechanics and the law-providing wavefunction  
Introductory remarks 
Bohmian mechanics stipulates at the outset that the macroscopic objects familiar from 
classical physics are constructed out of particles. This is expected to hold as at least partially 
true, even if some more fundamental theory of fields or strings or some such eventually 
supersedes Bohmian mechanics. The particles will then be an intermediate stage, but 
conceptually clearly delineated and essentially populating the three-dimensional space. The 
macroscopic objects are reduced to particles, which themselves have to be further reduced to 
                                                             
75
 There are claims that Einstein even expected this very route to be taken for quantum mechanics, i.e. that he 
expected something along the lines of Bohmian mechanics to play the role that statistical mechanics (as 
opposed to that other theory of gases: thermodynamics) does in the classical framework. This would make the 
Bohmian mechanics the constructive extension of the principle-style standard quantum formalism (Goldstein, 
2006).   
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the more fundamental objects. But for the time being there are particles with definite 
positions and trajectories. These parameters are definite even when the formally assigned 
wavefunction is not an eigenstate of the position operator (Maudlin, 2002, p. 117). In general 
Bohmian mechanics takes a rather dim view of the naïve realistic interpretations of operators 
as formal representations of properties of real systems. The wavefunction (ascribed to the 
system, not the universal one mentioned above) itself evolves deterministically in accordance 
with the Schrödinger equation with no collapse occurring in the process of observation or 
measurement. The particles are guided by the wavefunction, but are not identical with it, thus 
there are no macroscopic superpositions (such as supposedly befall the Schrödinger‘s cat) 
even when the wavefunction represents a superposition of possible macroscopic states.  
Alongside the particles as the constructive building blocks of matter, for any given system 
under consideration there is also the wavefunction. Its ontological status is more problematic, 
but let us not get into that yet. Formally the wavefunction provides a link between the 
Schrödinger equation as the fundamental formal encoding of the evolution of the system, and 
the derivative Bohm equation that specifies the temporal evolution of the positions of the 
particles. The Bohm equation is not formally sufficiently fundamental to simply incorporate 
the necessary elements of the Schrödinger equation and disregard any future talk of the 
wavefunction. Thus the Schrödinger equation remains the key element of the formalism, 
shared with other versions of quantum formalism, whilst the Bohm equation is a further step 
specific to the Bohmian Mechanics (as illustrated below).  
i (∂ψ/∂t) = Hψ     (Schrödinger equation) ; ψ: the wavefunction  
dQk/dt = ( /mk) Im [ψ*∂kψ/ ψ*ψ] (Q1,...,QN)  (Bohm equation); Qk: position 
function for the k
th 
particle  
Of course, a question related to the formalism immediately arises: how come we still have to 
deal with probabilities in quantum formalism if this whole evolution is deterministic? Why 
can‘t we just investigate (as in observe, even if indirectly) how the particles behave and 
describe that through the formalism?  
A simple answer to this question is that we don‘t know the exact initial positions of all 
individual particles, so cannot track their evolution formally and deterministically. We have 
to rely on ignorance probabilities, rational guesstimates of the possible overall configurations 
of particle positions. A more complex task is to explain why this is so, and for the moment 
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we shall have to leave the precise exposition aside (cf. section on Quantum Equilibrium 
hypothesis). More importantly for us, Bohmian mechanics also precludes future 
determination of the particle positions to a degree of precision that removes this statistical 
guesstimate (Maudlin, 2002, p. 119). Thus it cannot empirically supersede the other 
interpretations of the bare quantum formalism in this respect. In this particular respect the 
constructive explanation along the Bohmian lines does not empirically offer more than the 
competing principle explanations. If this limitation to increase in precision of knowledge 
acquisition can be explained as a fundamental feature of nature, this can be a pardonable sin.  
But there is another feature of Bohmian mechanics of crucial importance to us. It is 
manifestly nonlocal (Goldstein, 2006). The behaviour of the particles, i.e. their velocity 
(intensity and direction of motion), as codified by the Bohm equation, will typically depend 
upon the positions of other, possibly very distant, particles in situations (which are not at all 
rare) in which the wavefunction formally assigned to the system is entangled (i.e. is not a 
simple product of the single particle wavefunctions).
76
 The wavefunction, whatever it is, is to 
be blamed for possible violations of separability, as we can have situations in which against 
our will (and even possibly against our knowledge, given the irreducible stochasticity) the 
distant objects affect the objects we are trying to investigate. The phenomena we are trying to 
explain can then not be simply reduced to the mechanical interactions of the constituent and 
nearby particles.  
There is a partial escape from this dire situation, but only partial. Namely, in the 
multidimensional configuration space, in the arena for the abstract formal representation of 
the situation investigated, the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena are not nonlocal, the trajectory of the 
abstract representation of the particles in configuration space is affected only by the value of 
the wavefunction around that point ( (Maudlin, 2002, p. 119). But unless we are to be pushed 
to the extreme view of reducing everything in the universe to the single multidimensional 
wavefunction and particle, we have to have a way of knowing when we have included 
enough information in our codification of the situation so that potential influences from 
higher dimension configuration spaces can be ignored. Moreover, though this helps with 
separability violation (by allowing us to sufficiently isolate our systems under observation 
                                                             
76 In fact, in the extreme it can depend on the positions of all the particles in the universe, and we are back to 
the ‘universal wavefunction + the marvellous particle’ picture. But there are formal mechanisms of effectively 
decoupling the relevant systems from the rest of the universe so that we are not always forced to this picture.  
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from the rest of the universe) it does not remove the violation of locality in the three-
dimensional space as observed in the EPR situations.  
It thus remains a task to specify in greater detail how the middle ground between the 
introductions of the unwanted ‗quantum potential‘ situated in ordinary space and the all 
pervading wavefunction with a single multidimensional particle is to be constructed. 
Furthermore, this path has to offer viable models of explanation of the troublesome 
phenomena that violate locality and separability.  
Methodology and metaphysics resting on explanatory constructs  
It is worth repeating once again the central methodological and metaphysical tenets of the 
Bohmian Mechanics constructive approach, those held by all versions. Methodology and 
metaphysics of this approach are straightforwardly linked, in that the proponents of Bohmian 
mechanics claim that one of the staring points for any theory must be to say what it is about. 
In this respect, the Bohmian approach starts with the metaphysical claim: quantum theory (or 
in this case its Bohmian alternative) must be about particles that build up the macroscopic 
objects. The secondary question is to determine what governs the particle behaviour, i.e. how 
their spatial positions evolve with time. It is at this step that the troubles begin, as the status 
of the wavefunction must then be elucidated.  
Most of the criticism of the Bohmian approach is directed against the ‗physical quantum 
potential pushes the well-defined particles about‘ view. As we shall not be focusing on that 
view, we can skim that issue here. What we have to assume (as there is no room to enter into 
the related debate here) is that the view that we shall focus on can overcome the problems 
generally levied against the Bohmian approach. Thus we shall assume that Bohmian 
Mechanics is indeed empirically equivalent to the bare quantum formalism. This is to simply 
disregard the criticism summarised in e.g. (Streater, 2007), most of which is directed more 
specifically against the ‗quantum potential‘ view. The most potent criticism included in the 
given summary, that along the lines of Aharonov & Vaidman (1996), is primarily effective 
against the ‗quantum potential‘ view. Modulo the discussion on the quantum equilibrium, 
below, we shall assume that the empirical equivalence between the bare formalism and its 
modification along the Bohmian lines stands, and that, therefore, Bohmian mechanics is a 
justified contender in providing explanation of the phenomena we are concerned with here.  
Be that as it may, the ‗quantum potential‘ view still gives us the most direct visualisation of 
the processes behind the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena. In its absence we have to skim the 
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technically demanding issue of the introduction of the quantum equilibrium and a 
philosophically more complex interpretation of the wavefunction as the fundamental 
dynamical law, which methodologically brings us closer to the principle approach. We shall 
elaborate on that further in the following section, but this early warning suffices to point 
towards the complexity of the problems addressed by our two approaches. When even the 
candidly constructive approach, the one that places the constructive methodology at the heart 
of its research programme, is forced to retort to principle-style steps, the initial unease 
(summarised in Chapter 1) about the general principle approach (of Chapter 2) is reduced.  
Moreover, even the ‗quantum potential‘ view, that is easy on visualisation, is forced to 
introduce some ontological oddities (beyond the unobservable potential) in dealing with the 
phenomenon of teleportation (cf. Chapter 1). In the explicit analysis of (Maroney & Hiley, 
1999); and the subsequent criticism in (Timpson, 2006), strange information ontology is 
pasted on to the potential view. Namely, in the Bohmian case it is clear that no teleportation 
of the particle itself takes place, but that in fact some properties of a distant particle get 
(informationally-for-humans) assigned to the proximal one. In the Bohmian ontology the 
particles are the foundational existents and their trajectories through space are, at least in 
principle, traceable (they do not instantaneously jump from place to place).  
What is supposed to happen is that some ways the quantum potential affects the particles get 
transferred through the classical communication channel (the telephone line) between distant 
and proximal locations (i.e. locations of experimenters Alice and Bob). When this 
‗information‘ is subsequently lodged into the quantum potential (through the operations Bob 
performs on his particle conditional on the message he receives from Alice) it enables the 
particle to behave in subsequent measurements as the distant particle would have (or at least 
it enables the experimenter to expect it to behave in that way, by relying on the formalism). 
The difficulty lies in explaining just what gets transferred between the separated locations, 
and how. In attempting to explain what goes on Maroney & Hiley (1999) edge ever closer to 
the law-like view of the quantum potential that will be developed in greater detail below. 
They take the potential to be holding ‗information‘, alongside standard mechanical effect on 
the particles, but information in a special sense. The sense of ―action of forming or bringing 
order into something‖ (Maroney & Hiley, 1999, p. 1408). This information is moved 
nonlocally through the potential, and is somehow available to the particle, but not to the 
experimenters.  
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That is, the experimenters can only work with what the formalism gives them, i.e. the 
probabilistic predictions of some future behaviour (position change) of the particles. In other 
words they deal with the 2bits of information exchanged classically, whilst the much larger 
quantity of information required to deterministically guide the particle is stored in the 
potential, and available to the particle only.
77
 But, due to some other technical difficulties 
with the ‗quantum potential‘ view, the authors are forced to introduce a further distinction 
into the ‗information‘ inherent in the quantum potential, namely they distinguish between the 
active, passive and inactive forms of that information. These forms can be changed by action 
of the particles or their interaction with the measuring apparatus, and the picture becomes 
even more complicated.  
Because of the non-classical nature of the potential itself we do not get a clear picture of what 
exactly is transferred and how, in the teleportation protocol. We are told by Maroney & Hiley 
(1999) that active information is moved through the potential, and coupled with further action 
of the experimenter Bob based on the message he receives from Alice, this information 
serves to make the particle at his possession behave just as desired. But how this ‗active 
information transfer‘ process proceeds is left as a mystery.  
What we see clearly emerging here is that it is active 
information that has been transferred from particle 1 
[Alice‘s particle, where teleportation originates] to 
particle 3 [Bob‘s particle, destination of 
teleportation] and that this transfer has been 
mediated by the nonlocal quantum potential. 
(Maroney & Hiley, 1999, p. 1413) 
Timpson (2006, p. 609) objects to this understanding of information, as instead of making 
matters clearer (by supposedly defining a ‗physical‘ rather than ‗information-theoretic‘ sense 
of ‗information‘) it requires ontology of ‗action‘ such that it can be moved about as an object. 
That is, if active information is some property of the ‗quantum potential‘ such that it performs 
an action on the proximal particle at the end of the protocol, as it did on the distant particle at 
the beginning, then the transferral of ‗active information‘ in the protocol requires action to be 
moved about in space. For our purposes there is no need to claim, along with Timpson (2006, 
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 Available as guidance in future evolution of the trajectory, no one is attributing consciousness to the 
particles here.  
119 
 
p. 610) that this cannot be done, but suffices to say that this is not as straightforward as might 
initially have been expected of the constructive approach.  
However, if the potential is not regarded as a physical field, then such difficulties need not 
arise. A more straightforward explanation of the teleportation process might involve the 
outright abandonment of any physical exchange in the protocol. The particle is not 
‗teleported‘ (in the sense of transported) nor are its properties transferred from one particle to 
another, as there were no properties (other than position; cf. objections to naïve realism about 
operators in (Goldstein, 2006)) to transport in the first place. What happens is that the 
wavefunction exhibits the nonlocal characteristics and based on the distant operations guides 
the local particle towards novel unexpected experimental outcomes. Yet an important 
question remains: how do the situations in which the protocol is enacted and those in which it 
is not differ; i.e. how is the proximal outcome ‗based‘ on the distant  one and not just 
contingently conveniently correlated ? Namely, how are the characteristics of the 
wavefunction based on the distant operations?
78
 At this stage we have to postpone addressing 
this question (until Chapter 4), but I hope sufficient introduction is provided to take a closer 
look at the explanatory potential of the ‗wavefunction as the universal law‘ view.  
Other problems and objections to Bohmian ontology  
A powerful objection to the above solution-sketch turns the situation on its head. What if 
what is unreal, or less real, is not the wavefunction, but the particles? For however the 
particle ontology may seem appealing in terms of explanation of what is ‗going on‘ in the 
‗troublesome phenomena‘, the whole picture rests on somewhat shaky legs empirically. In 
general we are barred from ever knowing the exact particle positions for any large enough 
collection of particles, and must work from some assumptions about the general 
characteristics of the entire collections of particles that we can never verify directly.  
                                                             
78 Of course, one possible and rather simple (but for many non-physical reasons abhorrent) solution is that the 
wavefunction simply behaves universally as a prerecording of events, guiding all the particles through definite 
trajectories with no regard for their spatial location (in fact, in the ‘marvellous particle + goo’ view this is to be 
expected) or interaction. The particles simply dance according to the tune set from the beginning of time, and 
teleportation protocols are not enacted by the experimenters, but were simple coincidences of particle 
behaviour set out from the beginning to look like experimental outcomes. Though some of the major 
problematic consequences of such a solution (such as the question of free will) are outside the scope of this 
thesis, it does not score well as an explanation of what happens in the ‘troublesome phenomena’, as the latter 
presuppose a voluntary action on behalf of the experimenters, and this solution is simply a denial of these 
phenomena (as ‘troublesome’) altogether. It also disregards Bohmian Mechanics’ respect for causal non-
locality in the ‘troublesome’ phenomena.  
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That is, given that we don‘t know the exact values of all the parameters in the universal 
wavefunction, we have to work under the assumption that we are able to formulate effective 
wavefunctions, which help us describe the situation at hand whilst ignoring any effects the 
rest of the universe has on it. But to be able to form such effective wavefunctions in the first 
place, we must assume that (i) the universal wavefunction can be satisfactorily 
mathematically split into the ‗relevant‘ and ‗irrelevant‘ parts, and (ii) the actual particles of 
interest (those of the object system and those of the ‗relevant‘ parts of the environment – even 
if distant) are guided by the ‗relevant‘ parts of the wavefunction  (for more precise technical 
exposition, cf. (Maudlin, 1995, pp. 480-482). So in describing the individual phenomena 
formally we are relying on the calculational, but really nonexistent, effective wavefunction 
and some assumptions about the particles that that can only be tested by the very occurrence 
of the phenomena themselves. In itself this is not a sin in terms of explanation, as laid out in 
Lipton‘s ( (2004, p. 3); Lipton further refers to (Hempel, 1965, pp. 370-374)) exposition of 
self-evidencing features of explanation. These account for situations in which what is 
explained provides an essential part of our reason for believing that the explanation itself is 
correct. They also are a part of Lipton‘s preference for both unification and causation types of 
explanation, over less popular reason and familiarity
79
 types.  
However, it seems that in trying to explain what goes on in the troublesome phenomena the 
wavefunction does most of the work, whilst the particles are there just because of their good 
relationship with the visualizable reality demand: they simply do a good job of playing the 
building blocks of material reality. In their survey of hypothetical and real neutron-
interferometry experiments Brown, Dewdney and Horton (1995) show how many of the 
traditionally intrinsic properties of the neutron-particles, such as mass, spin and charge must 
be carried, in part, by the wavefunction-field rather than a particle with definite position. 
They are thus not purely intrinsic to the particles. Furthermore, it appears that in some 
situations such particles can even fool the specific detectors as to their position, again 
suggesting in reconstruction of the definite-path-for-the particles situation that even features 
of the phenomena related to the particle should more properly be attributed to the spread-out 
field and not the precisely localised position of the particle. This difficulty is more immediate 
for the view, not pursued here, that the wavefunctions correspond to real fields in space-time, 
as then we might be more tempted to pursue the general reduction of the re-identifiable 
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 Neither of the latter two will be considered in greater depth in this thesis due to their theoretical weakness 
relative to unification and causation types.  
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objects of the common sense conceptual scheme to them,
80
 than in the case where the 
wavefunction is taken to be more immaterial. From the perspective of competing 
interpretations of the quantum formalism, interpretations that we cannot go into here, this is 
simply not a good enough reason to admit them into the explanatory framework.
81
  
Brown and Wallace (2005) stress other important features of the wavefunction that argue in 
favour of making it more than a mere law for the motion of particles. They see the 
wavefunction as a dynamical, as having degrees of freedom independent of the particles, and 
as being structurally very rich
82
 (Brown & Wallace, 2005, p. 531). In other words, it may not 
be so straightforward to simply eliminate the wavefunction from the theory altogether, and 
formally recover it as ―an effective, phenomenological object‖ (Brown & Wallace, 2005, p. 
532). We shall devote the second part of this Chapter to grappling more closely with these 
issues, but it suffices to say at this stage that following this route Bohmian Mechanics is 
losing ever more of its explanatory head-start (gained initially by notionally subscribing to 
hardcore realism and the causal-mechanical type of explanation) over the principle 
approaches of Chapter 2.  
In dealing with the effective wavefunction in the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena we seem to be 
engaged in no more than knowledge updating (even when formally describing the situation, 
as the effective wavefunction has no direct real counterpart with particles being an indirect 
support). There are axiomatic conditions that have to be met for the formalism to be 
applicable to the phenomena in the first place, and (as we shall see in the section on quantum 
                                                             
80 We might interpret Holland’s (1993) warnings that without assigning energy, angular momentum etc. to the 
particles themselves serious problems arise in the classical limit, as arguing in this direction.  
81
 It is simply too time consuming for us to go into a detailed elaboration of a further interpretation, the so-
called Everett interpretation in this case. With its heavy ontological reliance on the wavefunction it 
complicates matters for the simple constructive-principle dichotomy, whilst at the same time introducing 
technical problems of its own. This is not a value judgement of its worth compared to the two case-study 
interpretational instances chosen, but a mere expression of limitations of this text. Nonetheless, the 
contemporary versions of the Everett-style quantum theory that take the single universal wavefunction to be 
the fundamental existing thing out of which the appearance of everything else arises, is a good starting point 
from which to address the wavefunction ontological denigration one senses in Bohmian Mechanics. In that we 
have to bear in mind that we have, above, been moving ever closer to the wavefunction-as-the-universal-law 
view of Goldstein and colleagues (Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1996), and away from the wavefunction-as-the-
potential-field-in-three-dimensional-space (e.g. (Holland, 1993); (Bohm & Hiley, 1993); (Maroney & Hiley, 
1999)). In their criticism of the above view Brown and Wallace (2005) stress that it is at present a research 
programme and not a complete solution. From the perspective of the comparison to the Everett-style 
solutions this indeed is a valid point, but as the alternative approach we are considering here (cf. Chapter 2) is 
itself only a research programme, we needn’t take that as a weakness.  
82 In fact, relatively richer than the mathematical field structures that can normally be ‘argued-out’ of physics 
by being shown to be functions on configurations space that are ontologically reduced to features of a more 
fundamental ontological elements (for example, point particles).  
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equilibrium) we have to postulate some general principles about the nature of reality and 
limits of knowledge acquisition for the whole approach to even get off the ground (Reutsche, 
2002). From such perspective, treating the wavefunction as the only real and existing thing, 
out of which everything else arises, including the experimenters‘ consciousnesses, may not 
seem so strange.  
The greatest worry for the Bohmian Mechanics approach, from the perspective of 
constructing the simple transcendental argument (as in section 1. 4 above) is that what was 
taken to be fundamental material ontology almost entirely fails to feature in the causal 
explanatory account of the phenomena, except as a decoration added in by hand. As Brown, 
Elby and Weingard (1996) argue, there are situations where most interactions can be reduced 
to the quantum potential field, so as to lose even a mechanical account of how the 
corresponding field gets to distinguish the supposedly re-identifiable particles. That is, in 
some situations it is impossible to see how the interaction of the field and the particles takes 
place at all. As the particles were initially expected to perform the role of the re-identifiable 
objects in space and time, out of which the observable features of the phenomena are 
constructed, the tenability of the whole approach becomes questionable if the formal accounts 
of the phenomena need no reference (even in explanatory reconstructions, not just 
experimental predictions) of the particles‘ causal role. It appears they only stand in the place 
of ‗space-fillers‘ for the geometrical construction of the macroscopically observable objects.  
The reduction of properties to the wavefunction raises worries from a heuristic perspective as 
we have seen an increasing number of particles‘ intrinsic properties slipping away to the 
other entity of this dualist-ontology account (cf. (Brown, Elby, & Weingard, 1996) for this 
terminology), fearing for what eventually remains. But if the leakage of properties can be 
stopped so that the bare bones of the structural geometric isomorphism can be preserved, our 
initial aim for the transcendental argument will still be satisfied. From the perspective of 
everyday utilisation of the formalism, this may seem like decorative addition, large part of 
what we really need to predict and manipulate outcomes is in the wavefunction, so why as for 
more. From the perspective of construction of realist explanatory accounts that little more 
may still be needed, but even so must be seen to be very, very bare. By reducing the 
wavefunction (in either effective or the universal form) to a non-material law, a proscription 
for how the particles ought to behave without itself occupying space nor bearing properties, 
we appear to artificially recover some of the ontological explanatory justification for the 
particles‘ introduction.  
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The quantum equilibrium and the absolute uncertainty   
Adherents of the Bohmian mechanics view of the quantum theory repeatedly stress their 
commitment to constructive theories by putting the notions of ontology first in the 
construction and manipulation of theories. This, of course, suits the expectations of the 
research instrument, which aims to compare the principle and constructive approaches to the 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena. But it also asks of the Bohmian mechanics to account for the 
empirical equivalence with the competing extensions of the bare quantum formalism. Taking 
particles as primary existents should provide for alternative explanations of the ‗troublesome‘ 
phenomena, but if those explanations are not to be of the classical kind (which they can‘t be, 
for the phenomena are indeed troublesome; cf. Sections 1. 5. 2 and 3. 1. 2 above ) we need to 
know the specifications of the difference between the classical particles and the quantum 
particles in Bohmian mechanics.  
For the purpose of explanation-provision as set out in this thesis, we will first and foremost 
want to know what exactly happens to the particles in the troublesome phenomena. Yet, 
given empirical equivalence, Bohmian mechanics cannot help us with that, for even here 
there is a (neo-Bohrian) element of limits of knowability of the exact states of nature (Dürr, 
Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1996)). The exact exposition of notions summarised here is lengthy 
(Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992) and complex, and the brief sketch should suffice for the 
subsequent discussions concerning explanation and the comparison with the principle 
approaches in Chapter 4.  The Bohmian approach we are to follow in the remainder of this 
chapter thus gives up on treating the system wavefunction as a real spatially extended object 
that (almost classically) guides the particles in their trajectories, with a caveat that it has no 
strong enough answer to the challenge that the wavefunction, the unreal calculational device 
is much more rich and descriptively complete than the bare particles ontology.
83
  
So wherefrom the wavefunction for a system then? Let us not forget that whatever the 
ultimate speculation about the nature of reality turns out to be, if it is to be supported by 
science (even if it is not arrived at directly through empirical observation, but is a product of 
some delayed philosophical speculation) it has to agree with and explain the predictions made 
by the currently successful theory. That is, even extensions of the bare quantum formalism, 
such as Bohmian Mechanics is, must be able to tell us why the formalism works in the cases 
                                                             
83 Another reason to expect such abandonment is the expectation, also mentioned above, that through 
interactions the wavefunctions of larger chunks of matter, and eventually the whole universe should get 
entangled into an overall universal wavefunction. The nonlocality of wavefunctions also precludes the long-
term isolation of the system wavefunctions.  
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in which it does. If the whole universe is entangled in the single wavefunction how come we 
can get the non-local correlations and have them confirmed by experiment from a simple 
system wavefunction that does not explicitly include the formal description of particles in the 
Andromeda constellation? What is more, Bohmian mechanics itself is unable to go beyond 
the predictions for empirically observable phenomena made by the bare quantum formalism.  
How do restrictions of knowability come about from a theory that is decidedly deterministic, 
a theory in which the particles move along the trajectories that are set in stone for all eternity? 
Can we not, given enough effort, come to know at least some of these fixed trajectories, 
hopefully those of most significance for our everyday life? Bohmian mechanics is forced to 
explain wherefrom comes this limit on what can be learnt about the universe in a theory so 
precise, with precise motion of spatially located, almost tangible, particles. This is, so it 
seems, where the constructive approach leans close to the principle one, though the exact 
comparison will be left for the next chapter.  
The proponents of the limited constructive approach have to postulate a universal 
constraining principle based on the simple phenomenological observation that the bare 
quantum formalism is the most we can know about the physical systems we are dealing with. 
They claim (cf. (Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992)) that we must assume that the set of initial 
distributions of the universe capable of yielding wavefunctions for individual systems that we 
in fact observe, out of the total set of all possible initial distributions, is itself very large. That 
is, given some universal wavefunction for the whole universe (the great universal ‗goo‘) there 
are relatively many particular distributions of particle positions that accord with the given 
wavefunction and the ascription of individual system wavefunctions to many systems today ( 
(Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992), cf. also (Goldstein & Struyve, 2007)). So we can‘t know 
which particular particle distribution the universe started off in and has been evolving 
deterministically from ever since.  
Further technical argument is then developed to show that we cannot in fact know more than 
the individual systems‘ wavefunctions tell us (and, remember those are stochastic and give 
rise to entanglement etc.) even for isolated systems today. The technical argument states that 
the individual system wavefunction can be thought of as a hypothetical part of the universal 
wavefunction. Hypothetical in that it does not represent a real object, but is an encoding of 
the best of human knowledge about what is going on. In order to work with systems at hand 
we can rely on such hypothetical separation of the world into the ‗system at hand‘ and the 
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‗rest of the universe‘ because, mathematically, such separation is complete modulo the 
wavefunction. Our best knowledge of the dynamical evolution of the configurations of 
interest will be given only by the individual system wavefunction. For that wavefunction 
provides the mathematical link between the abstract representations of the configurations of 
the system of interest and the rest of the universe. The configuration of the system of interest 
and the configuration of the environment are conditionally independent given the 
wavefunction ψ of the system of interest (Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992)).  
To summarise the above in even simpler terms. We can‘t know the exact distribution of all 
the particles in the universe at some given point in time. Take that point to be the starting 
point. In order to derive the formalism that we use for the limited sets of particles today, we 
must assume that at the starting point the exact distribution of those particles was typical, i.e. 
that overall it was standard (that the particles, or the particle in many dimensional 
configuration space, were ‗randomly‘ strewn about). That assumption then provides us with 
the mathematical tools to derive the individual system ‗hypothetical‘ wavefunctions from the 
universal wavefunction (whose exact state is also unknown to us). Given that assumption we 
can relate our ordinary quantum formalism for the systems we play with in the lab and the 
universal wavefunction for the entire universe. The latter is unknown to us, but as long as the 
universe started in some typical state, we don‘t even need to know it for we will be able to 
extract our ‗mini-wavefunctions‘ for the systems of interest from the general outlines (the 
‗typical‘ features) of the ‗supreme global goo‘.  
But we, nonetheless, have to bear in mind the extreme nonlocality of the Bohmian Mechanics 
in which all the systems of interest are inextricably causally (though not mechanically) linked 
to all other particles in the universe through the universal wavefunction. So even when we 
extract our hypothetical wavefunction for the systems of interest, the predictions it is able to 
give us about the behaviour of the system are at best probabilistic, we only get a probability 
distribution of possible outcomes. So the world is made of particles that move in a unique 
manner through spacetime, but the exact manner of their movement (even their exact 
positions) is forever unknown to us. Unknown, because it is linked to all the other matter in 
the universe in a highly non-classical way (i.e. not linked through the causal mechanical 
interactions we are familiar with).  
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Troublesome phenomena as products of a global law  
So we end up with a strange world. The individual wavefunctions are not fields that spread 
through classical  spacetime. The only such field is the universal wavefunction. But that 
wavefunction does not exist in the three-dimensional space with us and our everyday objects, 
it exists in the multidimensional configuration space and guides the universal particle, a 
queen bee of all the fundamental ontological entities in the universe. Somehow, through the 
universal particle (which itself is not real or fundamental, on this interpretation) the 
wavefunction affects all the universe‘s three-dimensional particles in a highly choreographed, 
nonlocal and deterministic ‗dance‘. Our troublesome phenomena are a product of the 
behaviour of the three-dimensional ontological primitives mysteriously instructed by 
something that is itself immaterial (by not being a part of the three-dimensional space of 
matter). Moreover, we have to postulate a constraining principle, namely the hypothesis of 
the (initial) quantum equilibrium, in order to reproduce the phenomenology of the bare 
quantum formalism and its role in the lives of the physicists. This principle is not 
unreasonable, it is more than a bare statement of the existing constraint, it aims to provide a 
rational justification for the constraint on the acquisition of knowledge about the precise 
current state of the particles in the reality, but it is nonetheless postulated as an a priori 
hypothesis in order to save appearances.  
Another look at the situation described above opens up a perspective that we are dealing, 
unexpectedly for the constructive approach, with the in-principle limits of knowability 
situation again (just as in the neo-Bohrian approaches of the previous chapter). Yet following 
the historical precursor it is worth asking how it differs from the explanation of entropy 
through statistical mechanics rather than thermodynamics. Are the limits of knowability 
themselves explained or just posited as a theorem of the conceptual framework? Whatever 
the answer might be, the crucial difference for us is that statistical mechanics fitted well with 
the conceptual framework based on spatially extended particles in interaction, whilst 
Bohmian Mechanics has an extreme demand for separability violation. The saving grace lies 
in exploring the potentials for a conceptual framework without separability as its implicit 
foundational principle.  
An account from Albert (1992 ) (and further modifications in (Maudlin, 2008) can help 
illustrate this problem visually. We consider a device that provides some ‗measurement‘ of 
the particle, depending on the trajectory the particle takes through the device. More precisely, 
the particle can exit the ‗measuring‘ device through an exit facing the ceiling, and in that case 
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we say the particle has the value of some property ‗up‘; whilst if the particle exits the device 
through the floor-facing exit, we say its value of the given property is ‗down‘.84 It can be 
shown that when a single particle is fed through this device (and because the trajectories in 
configuration space cannot cross) the initial details of the location of the particle affect its 
behaviour following the measurement. That is, the particle that entered the device via a route 
that is closer to the ceiling, ended up exiting it through the ceiling hole, and the one that 
enters closer to the floor ends up veering towards the floor-facing exit. In such case, even if it 
cannot be demonstrated experimentally because of the knowledge-gathering limitations of the 
quantum equilibrium, we would have a perfectly visualizable account of the physical 
phenomena formalised by quantum theory.  
But in the entanglement situations things become more complicated. It turns out that if we set 
up two devices to ‗measure‘ two such particles that are initially taken to be in the entangled 
anti-correlated state, then the outcomes of measurements of individual particles must be 
‗opposite‘ (i.e. one exits through the ceiling-facing exit and the other through the floor-facing 
exit) regardless of what their initial positions were. Or rather, the outcome of the second 
measurement to be performed must be opposite of that of the first, regardless of what the 
particle‘s position in the entrance hole of its measuring device was. Whether an individual 
particle exhibits a particular result cannot be determined simply by the initial location (in the 
range of positions allowed by the entrance hole), for if it could then there would be a 
completely local account of the EPR-style correlations, and those correlations would not be 
exhibited the way they are.  
Suppose the two particles were both in the initial location ranges that would, had they not 
been in the entangled state, see them exit the device through the ceiling facing exit, and the 
devices are sufficiently separated in space. Albert (1992 ) shows that if the left-hand particle 
is ‗measured‘ first, it will be found to exit the device through the ceiling-facing exit and the 
right-hand particle will be found to exit its device through the floor-facing exit. If the 
situation is reversed, and the right-hand particle is measured first then it will be found to exit 
through the ceiling-facing exit, and the left-hand particle through the floor-facing exit of its 
device.  
                                                             
84 The original formulations of the example contain properties (such as spin) that make the situation more 
physical, but as the point is to demonstrate the importance of the location of the particle, and its dependence 
on the locations of other particles, I prefer not to introduce unnecessary technicalities here.  
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―And this holds no matter how far apart the two 
[particles] are, and it holds without the action of any 
intermediary particles or fields traveling between the 
two sides of the experiment. So the behavior of the 
right-hand [particle] at some moment depends on 
what has happened (arbitrarily far away) to the left-
hand [particle]. The dynamical non-locality of 
Bohm‘s theory is thereby manifest.‖ (Maudlin, 2008, 
p. 162) 
All of this is achieved, according to Maudlin (2008) by the way the wavefunction 
choreographs particle behaviour. We are not given a mechanism of how the effects of what 
happens to one particle can influence what happens to another (there are no particles or fields 
travelling between them), but rest on the simple summation that what one particle exhibits (in 
a ‗measuring‘ interaction, for example) may depend on how a very distant particle is treated. 
In fact, when the real universal wavefunction is taken into account, instead of the conditional 
wavefunction for individual systems, then it may depend on how (indefinitely) many distant 
particles are treated.  
What kind of explanation does this leave us with? Correlations in measurement outcomes on 
our separated particles cannot be attributed to a common cause (cf. the (Maudlin, 2007b) 
exposition of separability violation in the section 3. 2 below), but neither can they be 
attributed to the transmission of physical signals between the particles. They are taken to 
simply come about without a causal mechanism, but through a previously (prior to 
measurement) unknown nomic prescription (encoded in the universal law) that they should. 
A serious question arises: how does this explain them?  
In Bohmian Mechanics the troublesome non-local phenomena are arrived at bluntly, even if 
the full justification of their ‗explanation‘ is rather convoluted. The events whose ‗outcomes‘ 
are mysteriously correlated over large distances in fact share a connection mediated by the 
wavefunction, rather than by some spatially localised physical conditions or particles that 
propagate faster than light (Maudlin, 2008). The distant correlations are thus explained by the 
dynamics that governs the total configuration of particle positions (the global wavefunction) 
by a global law rather than an effect of a local law on each individual particle. Of course, one 
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problem with this notion is that it seems to require the absolute simultaneity, something that 
seems to be prohibited by Special and General Theories of Relativity.  
The universal wavefunction, as some form of a universal dynamical (and causal) law must 
rely on some notion of absolute flow of time, in order to determine the instants of absolute 
simultaneity, and thus determine which particles enter their ‗measuring‘ devices universe-
wide. Though the latter is an interesting technical issue, it need not concern us here, as we are 
not arguing for locality from the technical position of conflict with Relativity, but from a 
more general position of universal application of the principle of separability. As far as our 
explanatory viewpoint is concerned, and especially its concurrence with the classical 
everyday conceptual framework, we can easily, taken at face value, accommodate the 
absolute simultaneity and the notion of flow of time.  
What pushes us to consider the wavefunction in general, and most importantly the universal 
wavefunction, as the physical law rather than an element of the physical reality described by 
laws of nature? Two primary reasons are (1) the fact that although the wavefunction affects 
the behaviour of the particles, there is no formal account of particles affecting the 
wavefunction; and (2) for a system of many particles the formal expression of the 
wavefunction is not a field in physical space (such as, for example, electromagnetic field is) 
but on an abstract high-dimensional configuration space. However, formally, this is not a 
unique case as there are objects of formalism in classical physics which exhibit similar 
prediction-usefulness combined with abstraction, but are not considered to correspond to 
anything special in the real world. They are recognised as shortcuts in human descriptions of 
the real world, without accompanying ontological projections. They, though, are not 
dynamical.  
The universal wavefunction does not itself change with time (though precise formulations are 
as yet insufficiently explored, according to (Goldstein, Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum 
Information, 2007)), but is just a nomological encoding of the changes of particles (which is 
what we observe in the end). In that case the derivative or system-wavefunction is just a 
phenomenological law, an instrumental ease of calculation device (similar ontologically to 
the suggestion of the principle approach from the previous chapter), whilst the (unknown) 
universal wavefunction is in fact the fundamental dynamical law governing the behaviour of 
all the particles in the universe.  
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What is more interesting for us, and is related to the discussion about simultaneity in 
Bohmian mechanics in literature (cf. (Albert, 1992 ); (Maudlin, 2008)), is the empirical 
inaccessibility of the planes of absolute simultaneity, i.e. the precise global dynamics of the 
particles as governed by the wavefunction. That is, we cannot, for reasons sketched above, 
experimentally determine the exact position of the particles in Bohmian Mechanics (Maudlin, 
2008). With each attempt to physically determine the exact positions of the particles we 
disturb the wavefunction and thus those very positions of the particles.
85
 History of science 
notes a strong dislike (in part due to the tradition of logical empiricism, but only in part) for 
the explanations based on the postulation of empirically indeterminable facts. In this case we 
have the perfect determinism of the distantly correlated events, precise constructions of 
macroscopic objects out of unique positions of constituent particles, and the unique temporal 
evolution of the wavefunction governing them; but all of them forever inaccessible to 
empirical observation. The best we can contend with are the probabilistic ‗guesstimates‘ as 
encoded in the standard quantum formalism.  
Maudlin (2008) offers two lines of reasoning in defence of such obscurantism. Firstly, the 
posited structure is not physically superfluous, it does some explanatory work and is not 
merely introduced into the theory as a decoration. He sees the Newtonian Absolute Space as 
such a decoration, because not only can it not be physically detected (or rather the position 
within it cannot be physically ascertained) but also its postulation has no physical 
consequence (unlike that of the Neo-Newtonian, or Galilean, space). But all the ontological 
elements of the Bohmian scheme are not physically superfluous; they cannot be subtracted 
from the conceptual framework without physical consequence.  
The second line of reasoning aims to show that there is no extra work being done to cover-up 
the existence of the empirically inaccessible structure. That is, we do not add new elements in 
the Bohmian theory that do no other work but obscure some elements of its ontology from 
empirical observation.
86
 Maudlin claims that the inaccessibility of some of the ontological 
elements is an involuntary (maybe even unwanted) consequence of the simplest dynamical 
solutions to the explanatory problems we are facing. Take the world made of particles, take 
                                                             
85 Notice the functional similarity here, that is at the moment only to be noted and taken at face value, 
between the Bohmian inaccessibly of the exact particle positions, Bohrian and neo-Bohrian sensitivity of the 
real systems to observer-intervention and the structural ‘black boxes’ of the CBH programme. Yet, we can still 
expect to get different explanations of the troublesome phenomena from these varying theoretical 
programmes based on the role the empirical inaccessibility plays within each account.  
86
 One might argue, though, that postulating the quantum equilibrium hypothesis achieves exactly this, but as 
has been argued above there are additional reasons for its introduction.  
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the information about its behaviour as given by the formalism (or its important element, the 
wavefunction) and you get a mechanism (supposedly) explaining how the troublesome 
phenomena arise, but not permitting the direct accessibility of the ontological elements the 
said explanation depends on. This does not have to be direct observation, it can be some form 
of empirical testing designed to tease out the precise characteristics of the ontological 
element. Though such explanatory mechanism may not be popular, Maudlin claims it is not 
devastating for the viability of the Bohmian conceptual framework, as the empirical 
inaccessibility of the said ontology is a consequence of the physics, but not of the physics 
designed or motivated to produce that inaccessibly. Though the latter line of reasoning seems 
shakier than the former, we can temporarily accept both as defence of the viability of the 
Bohmian framework. They will both prove to be a relative weakness of that framework, 
though, if the explanatory models it is compared against can do without them.  
Perhaps unnecessarily repeating what has been stated above, it turns out on this account that 
explaining the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena rests on an instance of knowledge-updating so it 
would accord with the pre-determined universal ‗choreography‘. On such view even the 
separability loss is not so crucial as the supposed fundamental principle behind our ordinary 
conceptual framework was just an illusion arising from ignorance, anyway. So on extreme 
reading even influences can be sent to achieve change from proximal to distant measurement 
(and vice versa), only we are in-principle not in a position to learn about them directly. The 
following half of this chapter examines once more, from various philosophical angles, how 
we could learn to live being forced with such a predicament.  
3. 2. Laws as part of fundamental explanatory ontology  
Metaphysical problems related to realism about unobservable microstructural concepts  
Leaving aside, for the moment, quibbles over the role of fundamental laws it is worth briefly 
considering the philosophical problem of resting scientific explanations on properties of 
entities that are not directly observable, such as the Bohmian particles are. Unlike the 
principle approaches of the previous chapter, the constructive approach of Bohmian 
mechanics must be able to account for the classical criticism, most notable from the extreme 
empiricist camp, against relying on speculations about the properties of unobservable entit ies 
in producing scientific explanations.  
Most philosophers of physics would agree that novel predictions in science provide a good 
reason to believe the theoretical constituents they rely on. A simplified version of the 
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‗miracle‘ argument (Putnam, 1979) could say that it would be a miracle for a novel prediction 
to come out right and the theoretical construction preceding it to be wrong (or at least wrong 
in more than inessential details). Were we to be given such a prediction, which resulted in 
confirmation, and for which one of our approaches above had a ready made explanatory 
account whilst the other struggled to even incorporate it into its world-view, the case would 
be next to decided. This is in fact what the traditional accounts in philosophy of science 
expect from the competing theories. However, to the best of my knowledge our 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena still lack such predictions, not to mention their confirmations.87 
Thus novel predictions remain excluded as the deciding factor between the explanatory 
successes of our two approaches. As has been sketched in the introduction most of our 
preferred, successful explanations rely on the mechanisms that contain unobservable entities. 
We might even say that the preferred explanations in contemporary science consist of 
reductions to unobservable entities. Add to those the causation and laws, the possibility of 
manipulation as exemplified in the counterfactual situations and the predictive success 
evidenced in contemporary science, and we see that alternative models should only be sought 
for in situations which make the causal mechanism utterly unpalatable. But there are more 
general arguments that work against resting explanatory success on unobservables whose 
essential function is to produce the observed phenomena.  
For example, van Fraassen (1980) argues against using the explanatory virtues (in this case 
the adherence to a widely popular model of explanation) as reasons for believing a given 
theory. He distinguishes between epistemic and pragmatic virtues of theories. A pragmatic 
virtue might be the property of a given theoretical framework to make quick and easy 
calculations. Though this would count in favour of using the framework when dealing with 
the phenomena covered by the theory, it cannot be the reason for considering the given 
framework to be closer to truth than its alternatives.  
Thus, van Fraassen claims that the only epistemic virtues of theories are the empirical virtues 
of getting more observable consequences right and fewer of them wrong.
88
 On such a view 
                                                             
87 This is not strictly true. The constructive approach is able to offer some predictions, but they deal with much 
deeper theoretical generalizations than the narrow group of phenomena under consideration (separability 
violations). The principle approach also has some theoretical expectations closer to the ‘zone of observation’ 
but currently out of reach of verification. The caveat is that the theoretical constructions characterised by the 
two approaches prevent the empirical verification of the said predictions, i.e. they have built-in a priori 
constraints to empirical verifications of the differentiating predictions, cf. (Albert, 1992 , pp. 183-189).   
88
 We shall not enter the discussion of the pros and cons of empiricism, nor whether van Fraassen’s view 
sketched here is an instance of excessively strong empiricism. Let us just assume that empirical adequacy is 
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explanatory virtues of our two approaches constitute a pragmatic virtue, and as such cannot 
decide between them, given that both are empirically adequate. But this objection is ignorant 
of the special situation we are in given the ever increasing closeness among our two opposing 
approaches, as well as the admitted reaching for purely philosophical tools outside the realm 
of good empirical scientific practice.  We are, thus, choosing to simply overstep van 
Fraassen‘s concerns in order to move out of the stalemate of empirical adequacy of both 
approaches, even if van Fraassen were to declare the choice a purely aesthetic one. An upshot 
of further and more detailed criticism of using explanatory power as virtue in defending 
mechanistic accounts (cf. (Boyd, 2002)), or similar realist accounts, is the requirement that 
the findings of the relevant background sciences should be relevantly approximately accurate. 
Now, such justifications can indeed be provided, but not a priori as the reliance on the 
explanatory virtue requires. Furthermore, it will not be an easy task to provide them in the 
light of alterations to the conceptual scheme required by the failure of separability. This 
seems to be another respect in which the mechanistic approach of this chapter is comparable 
to the speculative elements of the previous one.  
Properties  
Yet in the troublesome phenomena it is not just correlations within the entangled states that 
are the problem, but the actual swapping of properties in the phenomena such as 
teleportation. Is it at all possible to explain such processes by the ‗action‘ of a law? What 
form would a law of regulated property swap need to adopt and how would it fit with the 
wider worldview?   
The fundamental ontological tradeoff reflects the 
perennial tension between explanatory power and 
epistemic risk, between a rich, lavish ontology that 
promises to explain a great deal and a more modest 
ontology that promises epistemological security. The 
more machinery we postulate, the more we might 
hope to explain – but the harder it is to believe in the 
existence of all the machinery. (Swoyer, 2000)  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
guaranteed for both of our approaches and that it constitutes the bedrock below which neither of them can 
go.  
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We are here interested in determining properties (in the traditional sense) that withstand the 
loss of separability and are affected by the laws imposed on the world as fundamental. A 
most pressing issue is to survey the choice of properties traditionally (in classical physics) 
assumed fundamental and investigate any possible changes to them by acceptance of the 
Bohmian strategy for addressing the troublesome phenomena.  
Swoyer (2000) claims that properties are usually introduced into ontology in order to help 
―explain or account for phenomena of philosophical interest.‖ They are usually taken to be 
the ground of phenomena in a manner that some phenomenon holds in virtue of some 
properties. We can then play the game of investigating the conditions imposed on the 
property by its explanatory role: investigate what properties would have to be like in order to 
play the roles of explaining the phenomena. It is, of course, possible to claim that this is a 
vacuous game, that properties have no explanatory power and are a mere fig leaf to cover our 
lack of understanding of what a given phenomenon is. In our case, if that were really so, a 
strife to settle for any sort of explanation of the troublesome phenomena should help us 
decide how much, if at all, we really need to rely on the properties proposed.  
The philosophical topics surrounding properties are wide in scope and not always empirically 
grounded. What we are concerned with specifically is how the classical properties 
characteristic of physical objects fare in the physical interactions of a novel kind, such as 
those presented as the troublesome phenomena. These phenomena themselves do not directly 
dispute that the objects participating in them have a position is space or even some discrete 
extension, but it is the nature of changes of those properties that is troublesome from the 
viewpoint of classical physics, the physics that introduced those properties to explain its own 
phenomena of interest. We are thus more concerned with how a property of a particle can 
change or be undetermined (metaphysically, as well as epistemically) without observable 
physical interaction with other particles or fields, rather than whether a given property, a 
universal, can simultaneously exist in more than one place (which is a popular problem 
related to properties). Moreover, what kind of a world is inhabited by objects that seem to 
interchange properties as if they were coats without us being able to keep a precise record of 
the details of those exchanges and what governs them.
89
 Finally, what can we hold fixed in 
such a world, so as to recognise a change as a different state against a background of things 
that do not change?  
                                                             
89
 Of course, even coats are exchanged along some traceable spacetime route, so we are really stuck for 
analogies here.  
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Such firm foundation was provided by primary properties, made most famous by Locke, 
though the notion goes back to the Greek atomists. The primary properties are the directly 
recognisable objective features of the world, the most straightforward exemplifications of the 
isomorphism between the structure of reality and the formal elements of our physical theories 
(and accompanying conceptual frameworks) describing that reality. They are often so 
fundamental that they are used to explain why things have the other properties that that they 
do. Traditionally these have most famously included shape, size (features of extension) and 
some variants of mass and charge/force field. The secondary properties, on the other hand, 
are the reflections of powers inherent in objects to produce certain responses in humans, but 
are primarily rooted in primary properties (cf. Descartes‘ rules for understanding complex 
phenomena in terms of primitives, in Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule XII, 
(Descartes, 1931)).  
What kind of properties can we expect the constructive approach of this chapter to rely on? 
With the particles moving in the physical space, extension remains a fundamental property. 
But what other properties are there and what role does extension play if it is not 
sufficiently/significantly contributing to the changes in those other properties given that they 
can change instantaneously at a distance? If we cannot account for the systematic attainment 
and alteration of properties by the token objects (in this case particles) what sort of realism 
can we cling to with regard to the physical reality described by quantum theory? Abandoning 
realism, even if of some weaker kind, would put this approach to the troublesome phenomena 
in the same metaphysical boat (if not even worse) as the principle approaches of the previous 
chapter, at least when it comes to accounting for the real changes in the world that stand 
behind the observation of the troublesome phenomena.  
In Devitt‘s (2006) account (relying on his detailed exposition in (Devitt, 1997)) realism 
assents to existence of the most common-sense and scientific physical types as objective and 
independent of the mental. Opposed to it is the view that the independent reality cannot be 
epistemically accessed and correctly conceptually described and that the phenomena we are 
concerned with are partly constructed by our forced imposition of concepts onto the manifold 
of the bare perception. In Devitt‘s view one of the appeals of realism, other than its intuitive 
acceptance outside the intellectual circles (2006, p. 6) is the rational rejection of the 
alternatives as unsatisfactory. From our perspective, the downside of the alternatives to 
realism is Devitt‘s claim that they are explanatorily useless. That is, accepting that there 
might be some kind of world out there that is behind all the phenomena we are struggling 
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with, but that that world cannot be known for what it is, leaves us with very little else to turn 
to in order to provide the sought for explanations. If constructive approaches of this chapter 
were characterised as such their stake in provision of explanation sought would 
instantaneously vanish.  
Although particles would still have an extension, it seems it would no longer be fundamental 
in their interactions, as they can alter their properties (to the extreme point represented in 
teleportation phenomena) without respect for the constraints spatial extension imposes on 
physical interaction. In the causal accounts relying on the primacy of the physical state, such 
as Harré (1996) advocates in the next section, laws of temporal evolution take a back seat. If 
the laws of temporal evolution are to be made primary, with the property possession and 
exchange depending entirely on them, are we threatened with a slide into anti-realism with 
respect to how we come to explain the phenomena we observe?  
Suppose concepts such as ‗redness‘ (a colour concept) do not have a direct ‗isomorphic‘ 
connection to some real feature of the world, but designate ―a disposition to produce a certain 
sort of response in normal humans under normal conditions‖ (Devitt, 2006, p. 11).  
Globalising the argument to all properties runs as follows: all property concepts, not just 
those of secondary properties, are response-dependent. So all that we take to be properties in 
the real world are in fact response-dependent dispositions to produce certain sort of responses 
in normal humans under normal conditions. The abhorrence of world-making along these 
lines lies, according to Devitt, in the need to posit something even more wildly speculative 
than the realist metaphysics: the noumenal things-in-themselves which are really behind the 
observable phenomena painted by concepts. This way, of course, antirealists (world-makers) 
expect to limit irrational speculation, put some material constraints on what we can actually 
do with words and concepts. But, as Devitt points out, these noumenal things only present an 
illusion of a constraint, we can ex hypothesi know nothing of the ‗mechanisms‘ by which they 
exercise their constraint, we can not explain or predict any of the constraints, nor can ever 
hope to be able to do so. For if latter was the case we would be overstepping the bounds of 
world-making and venturing into speculative scientific metaphysics proper. Furthermore, 
causality is part of the existing scheme of concepts and cannot be extended to the link 
between the noumenal world and the conceptual scheme, thus we don‘t even have a notion 
through which to connect the world-in-itself and our supposedly constrained view of it.  
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To slide into world-making is to subscribe to the view that our concepts make up the world, 
that the structure of the world is dependent on our classificatory activity and not vice versa. 
Then the conceptual requirements of the theories would not be a discovery of what there is in 
the world (however primitive and coarse a discovery), but an act of literally recreating the 
world. The only way to avoid this is to say that somehow, by blunt fact, the facts of the world 
impose constraints on how our concepts are created and interlinked but that nothing more can 
in-principle be said about that. But even here, if there had been no conceptualizers, us, there 
just would have been no macroscopic material objects as well as the microscopic speculative 
metaphysics. That must be a claim that the anti-realist of the world-making camp must be 
committed to (Devitt, 2006, p. 8). Whatever the outcome of this debate in philosophy and 
linguistics in general, it is clear that world-making explanations will not fare well in our case, 
even if confronted on the other side by mere agnosticism about entities and structures at the 
micro-level.  
As the laws governing the temporal evolution are primary existents, whilst the observable 
properties of objects are just a temporary product of their operation, those properties are not 
in the traditional sense fundamental and in the objects. We are just disposed to observe them 
as such under the influence of the laws, whilst they are not really there in the world, in the 
same way that redness as experienced by us is not in-the-world. In this way, through the 
abandonment of separability (to be argued for below), among other things, the undulating-
high-dimensional-goo view and the laws-are-primary view of quantum theory become two 
sides of the same coin.  
The objects that we either directly observe, or geometrically project as isomorphic sustainers 
of what we observe (cf. (Sellars, 1963) and section 4. 1), the atomistic construction of the 
observable world out of the unobservable fundamental particles, are to a great extent our 
projections arising from the dispositions of the true elements of reality behind them (the goo 
or the bare particles choreographed by the fundamental laws of temporal evolutions) to 
produce a certain response in us under normal conditions. This is because even the primary 
properties, such as extension, or consequently physical separation, are not metaphysically 
fundamental, existing in their own right and in direct isomorphism to how we conceptualise 
them.  
Of course, it is the issue of what is fundamental that is important here. It is not that we have 
not had response-dependent concepts in the explanatory schemes before, such as the colour 
138 
 
concepts introduced above might be. But that did not pose any problems because there have 
always been some fundamental property concepts that these could be drawn from, such as 
surface texture or microphysical interaction with surface particles. The latter were 
fundamental concepts rooted in the conceptual and theoretical isomorphism with material 
reality based on the primacy of the concept of extension.
90
 With denying such fundamental 
status to all properties or to all formally describable physical interactions (which depended on 
the participating objects having certain fundamental properties that further predisposed them 
for a certain interaction) we lose the firm footing for a realist explanation of the observed 
phenomena.  
Causation  
If the troublesome phenomena are better explained by the reliance on operation of laws and 
causal processes than on unification of the phenomena into a wider world-picture held 
together by shared properties across phenomena and degrees of magnitude of extension, then 
we can regard momentary properties employed in descriptions of the phenomena as fleeting 
shadows of a classically constructed language. The onus is then to show how the non-
unifying account will work and also that it will not rely on the classically introduced 
properties, at least not in crucial instances. Of course, properties have been known to feature 
in causal accounts, especially where reduction of causation to causal powers is introduced (cf. 
(Harre, 1996), but in that case we must lay them on a more firm account that does not slide 
into anti-realism proper (‗worldmaking‘ in (Devitt, 2006)).  
Though causation per se is outside the scope of this thesis, it is inextricably linked with issues 
of ontology in physics, both in historical development of the mechanical explanations (cf. 
section 1.2.), and in conceptual characteristics of contemporary desirable forms of 
explanations (cf. introductory sections of Chapter 4). Essentially there are two conflicting 
overarching accounts of causation: one affirming the key role it plays in explanatory 
conceptualisation of reality and the other denying a fundamental role for the notion of 
causation in explanation (reducing it to either a psychological error or a merely heuristically 
useful device). In a nutshell, we expect the real ontology to account for causal processes, but 
can never strictly observe anything other than a concurrent regularity of physical phenomena 
                                                             
90 And isomorphism should be taken seriously here; it designates an easy or natural correspondence with a 
basic everyday conceptual scheme. Something a multidimensional configuration space may not be able to 
achieve.  
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with no inherent mark of what makes them causal. We get a pro- and anti- realism views of 
causation.  
The segment of history of the role of causation in science relevant here starts in the 
seventeenth century with the abandonment of the Aristotelian final causes and focus on the 
search for efficient causes through mechanical philosophy. Yet the problems immediately 
arose with those segments of reality that could not be modelled by strict mechanical contact, 
such as gravity. And it is here that divine will was often invoked in place of the mechanical 
essence: ―Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws‖ 
(Newton, 1957).
91
 Even though such mystical explanations had to be grudgingly accepted, 
the majority of science was expected to move towards the ideal of a Laplacian demon where 
causation and the deterministic nature of laws of physics provided an exact mechanical 
description/explanation of all physical processes, past, present and future. This attempt for 
overall regularity in science, and physics in particular lost its general appeal with the advent 
of non-deterministic theories early in the twentieth century.
92
  
But, of course, philosophy was not to be swayed by such scientific strivings and we thus have 
the great Humean analysis of the fictional nature of causation as a mere psychological 
erroneous projection of human expectations onto the physical processes. Hume argues from 
the epistemic atomism of individual (perceptible) states of physical reality to the conclusion 
that all that can be learnt from observation alone is the concurrence of certain types of states 
(e.g. stone hitting, glass breaking), but not their necessary or physical connection through 
some causal process. Causes and effects are held to be absolutely independent in reality, and 
consequently must be held to be so in concept too (Harre, 1996, p. 311). We thus have the 
Humean Mosaic.  
The reliance of the Humean doctrine on ‗epistemic atomism‘ is of importance for our 
purposes. Atoms of experience are held to be the experienced sensory elements that are both 
the ultimate components of perception as well as of the world-as-experienced (the 
                                                             
91 Of course, this historical problem can be resolved in the same sweep as our current ones by taking the 
fundamental laws of temporal evolutions as ontologically primitive and simply attributing all gravitational 
interaction to obedience of gravitational laws regardless of the media and details of interaction.  
92
 This is not just a case of quantum theory, the popular champion of indeterminism, but even in  
Relativity theory processes on a larger scale cannot be uniquely specified through a single causal process. In 
fact, Harré (1996, pp. 304-307) charts attempts parallel with development of mechanical philosophy that 
either argue for or against dynamism, a view that sensibly inaccessible forces (similar to contemporary field 
theory) produce and sustain causal processes across the universe, and even replace material ontology of 
spatially extended entities (in a Cartesian sense).  
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phenomenal world). As opposed to the explicit denial of the Humean Mosaic later in this 
chapter, if the approaches of the previous chapter are shown to rely on just such experiential 
atoms in their analysis of the troublesome phenomena, then they can straightforwardly be 
expected to be deniers of the reality of causation, and with it, of the causal explanations. 
Narrowing this down solely to their chosen field, namely information manipulation, could 
help them escape explanatory zeal for causal accounts. The theories presented in the two 
central chapters could be viewed as either affirming or denying what Norton (Norton, 2007) 
terms the ‗causal fundamentalism‘: nature is governed by cause and effect (in the case of this 
chapter: a primitive law) and the burden of individual theories is to find the particular 
expressions of the general notion in the realm of their specialised subject matter.  
Harré, on the other hand, proposes arguments from psychology and epistemology to show 
that the sensory invariant in the experience of phenomena (though, material not informational 
phenomena) is not the wholeness of the phenomenon itself, but the general things, the 
fundamental units of realist ontology out of which the experience is constructed. This opens a 
way for him to argue for the reality of causal processes at least in some cases, and our two 
approaches can then be compared on the types of causal processes they propose. Harré (1996, 
p. 321) sees the fundamental ontology of science as constructed out of entities whose 
essential natures are given by their causal powers, and whose causal agency
93
 is well 
delineated. This chides well with general preference for causal explanations. In this case the 
constructive ontology and the account of causal processes are inextricably linked, as is 
suggested by the nature of causal explanation and the adherence to the primitive role of laws 
of temporal evolution. This does require, however, that the constructive approach recognises 
the equally fundamental role played by the general things, the token-type objects, alongside 
the law of temporal evolution. If such material ontological components of the ‗troublesome‘ 
phenomena can be found, or if the ‗information ontology‘ (of Chapter 2) can successfully 
replace them, then we might be able to compare the outlines of causal pictures suggested by 
either approach.  
Functionally, then, we want causation to be understood through knowing what would happen 
to the object central to our phenomenon to be explained had the relevant surrounding 
circumstances been different. The ontology that takes laws as primary and yet epistemically 
                                                             
93 This is a more detailed aspect of Harré’s exposition that need not concern us here. He distinguishes agents 
and patients in causal interactions, where patients must be stimulated to produce actions, whilst agents need 
only be released to act (Harre, 1996, p. 322).    
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inaccessible might struggle to give a workable solution along these lines, as it would lack the 
details of the manipulable mechanism that leads to observable changes in objects. Yet 
quantum theory overcomes this obstacle surprisingly well, with the effective wavefunctions 
(though, necessarily statistical in nature), thus providing a workable manipulable mechanism. 
The problem is that our notion of object and its durability through changes is slightly altered, 
and we shall have to bear that in mind in the next chapter (sections 4.4. and 4.5.).  
Chanciness  
Our everyday (non-technical) conceptual framework views causation as part of regulated (i.e. 
not completely chaotic) behaviour of ordinary objects. This behaviour is determined by a 
small set of conditions: the object‘s dispositions to respond to various sorts of interference 
and the listing of the sorts of interference the objects of that kind in fact encounters. Speaking 
plainly, we know for most everyday objects when they will break and when they will fly, and 
what local situations will arouse either behaviour. But in non-local physical theories, no small 
set of conditions suffices to determine an ordinary object‘s behaviour. We need to specify the 
entire state of the world at one time in order to determine the state of even a small region at 
some future time (Elga, 2007). This is the nightmare of non-local theories, such as quantum 
theories examined here are.  
To wake up out of the nightmare, we might suggest, as Norton (2007) does, that the 
specification of the entire state of the universe is a task only extreme pedants ever need 
fulfilled. He sees the everyday view of causality as the approximately correct model in 
certain limited domains, and that the physicists need not ever venture into something more 
except when extreme precision of prediction or description is required. This would mean that 
the pedantically formalised laws are such that in certain domains they can make the everyday 
view true, this must be their formal feature. But Elga (2007) argues that some laws (and these 
are our ‗troublesome‘ ones), whilst formally perfectly respectable, are nonetheless such that 
they do not make the everyday view even approximately true in any domains at all.  
In the case of some of such laws Elga claims we are warranted by appropriate statistical 
assumptions to treat the law-following behaviour as intrinsically chancy. This allows us to 
treat the objects susceptible to such laws as mostly isolated and feign to hand over their 
supersensitive causal connectedness to the intrinsic indeterminacy of the physical reality. Of 
course, as sketched above, this not a very prudent position to take, and neither of the 
approaches presented in this thesis will ever fully embrace it. That would mean secretly 
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committing to the super-connected ontology, one that utterly removes separability as real 
constraining principle, and yet develop a formal theoretical approach that chooses never to 
tackle this characteristic of reality formally. We would then have to claim instead that the 
indeterminacy predicted is not epistemic (i.e. is not an ignorance interpretation) but is a 
formal expression of the deep chanciness of nature. It is hard to imagine an extreme 
abstraction where the two extremes are one and the same thing: where chanciness just is the 
supersensitive connection of everything in the world.  
Furthermore, quantum theory makes probabilistic predictions about the chances of different 
phenomenal experiences, which are extremely well confirmed on the aggregate level. But at 
the individual level, when each phenomenon or macroscopic event is viewed in isolation, we 
must also make sense of the probabilities that the formalism assigns to each particular event 
(or, to be precise, to a set of possible events). Formally, our explanations must also account 
for the completeness of Schrödinger dynamics, as well as the quantum state. That is, we have 
to say whether the probabilities ascribed by the formalism are real chances in nature, or are a 
product of our ignorance about the true laws of nature (and then also explain how that 
ignorance comes about and what is to be done about removing it).  
And this seems to be the point where the roles of our two approaches are reversed. It is 
Bohmian Mechanics that takes the probabilities as merely epistemic, and states that the laws 
of nature are actually deterministic. It is only a calculational opportunism that leads to 
describing the processes as chancy (Maudlin, 2002, p. 146). The principle approaches that 
take the non-realist route to the quantum state ascription, are now pressed against a wall of 
taking an even stronger non-realist stance (claiming that the formal evolution of states is also 
a result of human ignorance) or accepting that something in reality, whatever it may be like, 
justifies the ascription of probabilities for each individual phenomenon. The latter requires 
taking the stochastic laws seriously at the ontological level, and thus taking the probability 
ascription equally seriously. This in turn means that the result of admitting a basic 
indeterminism in reality is the acceptance of probability ascription for particular event as a 
basic physical fact (Maudlin, 2002, p. 147). One that then must somehow be a part of the 
explanatory ontology.  
Abandon separability in favour of a radical causal mechanism  
The radical proposal of Bohmian Mechanics is worth recapitulating once again through a 
slightly different formulation of the EPR situation. The quantum formalism differentiates 
143 
 
between the m=0 triplet state and the singlet state (just technical terms for formally different 
states of particle pairs). But the statistics for the outcomes of measurement on the separated 
components are the same, which in combination with the separability principle suggests that 
these formally different states are in fact one and the same physical state of the particles (and 
the wavefunction or some such accompanying item). The problem once again stems from the 
troublesome correlations we are pressing to explain. Although no local measurements on the 
individual parts of the composite states (either the triplet or the singlet) can yield differences 
between the two, a global measurement on the overall pair can. Namely, if we decide to 
measure a property closely formally related to the property originally used to describe the 
state of the composite system, the formal differences between the states take on a more 
important role empirically. What we in fact get is quite different expectation statistics for the 
two composite states, statistics that is empirically confirmed upon measurement. More 
precisely, if the original composite state was the singlet state, upon separation the 
measurement of the related property on each of the particles will yield directly opposite 
results (say ‗up‘ and ‗down‘) with a 50% chance of either combination (i.e. first ‗up‘ – 
second ‗down‘, and vice versa). In the triplet composite state though, the results will also 
have a 50% chance to come out either way, but this time with identical outcomes for distant 
separated particles, i.e. either both ‗up‘ or both ‗down‘.  
The conclusion is that we cannot identify the singlet and the triplet states. But in that case we 
cannot have a sensible definition of separability either, for separability requires that either the 
states be identified or that we can tell what the difference between them is.
94
 But neither 
composite state can be expressed as a combination of individual particle states and the 
spatiotemporal relations between, for we cannot specify the individual states of the particles 
with certainty, except as a part of a composite system. And separability required, in 
summation, that the whole is no more than the sum of the parts (including spatiotemporal 
relations). Maudlin (2007b, p. 61) concludes that no physical theory that takes the 
wavefunction seriously (i.e. that considers the formalism to be a complete veristic description 
of the physical system) can be a separable theory. In the language used in the paragraphs 
above we may say that considering the formalism (with the Bohmian additions included) to 
                                                             
94
 A brief recap why this is so, in the current terminology. As no detectable signals are passed between the 
states, nor are they formally expected to, we expect the differences to be borne out of the initial formally 
indistinguishable states. This is because separability permits differences to be observed experimentally only if 
there is some detectable (or at least predictable) interaction (or signaling) between them. As there is no such 
distinguishable difference between the initial states, yet the global difference is distinguishable upon locally 
performed measurements, separability is violated.   
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provide a complete description of the composite systems requires that we do not see the 
systems as separable entities that can be described by the momentary state of the component 
particles and the spatiotemporal relations between them alone, at any given instant of time. 
The wavefunction seems to be doing serious work that violates the separability of the states 
involved in the troublesome phenomena. Of course, and Maudlin refers to a similar proposal 
in (Loewer, 1996) here, the state may be considered separable in the configuration space 
rather than the three-dimensional physical space, but that is a further metaphysical step we 
have chosen not to follow in this thesis (cf. the initial parts of Ch3).   
The central tenet of the constructive approach states that there is no other way out but to 
abandon separability.
95
 Everything else is deemed instrumentalist (the quantum formalism is 
incomplete and needs more work), or idealist (the states change under the conscious 
intervention or do not correspond to real physical changes), or demanding the alteration of 
logic (quantum logic) to accommodate a metaphysical principle (separability). The Bohmian 
approach is, of course, not the only viable such constructive solution and not the only one to 
abandon separability, though the only one with initial interest in mechanical structure as 
required by our two explanatory models. Given that one of the approaches that does respect 
separability is presented in the previous chapter, what we would like to know here is what the 
world without separability is like. But an interesting caveat opens in the preceding 
paragraphs, and even Maudlin (2007b) points to it: separability has something to do with 
‗knowability‘, more so than with necessity. What leads to the conclusion that it must be 
abandoned, as presented above, is not so much that the physical reality as described by the 
identification of the singlet and the triplet states would be a priori impossible, but that it 
would be strangely closed to epistemic access.  
That is, something, and we can‘t say exactly what, would preclude us from ever determining 
what state the particles in the composite states are really in. We would assume that they are in 
some definite state, that the state of the composite overall is a combination of their states and 
the spatiotemporal relations between them, but we could never tell what the initial definite 
states are.
96
 We seem to be forced to choose between two evils: limiting how much we can 
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 Maudlin (2007b, p. 62) warns that abandonment of separability is not the same as the abandonment of 
locality, for separability can be maintained by non-local theories with superluminal or temporally reversed 
causal connections.  
96 And thus we are almost pushed into neo-Bohrian conclusions that the meaning of state of the particles can 
only be given in their relation of the system as a whole, i.e. the system and the measuring apparatus and the 
measurement required to determine the states afterwards. All of these include the operation of the irrational 
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learn (empirically) about the material world, or abandoning the comfortable epistemological 
and causal apparatus we relied upon to hitherto successfully gather the knowledge about that 
same world. If this dogmatic issue can be at all deconstructed and evaluated, that will not be 
attempted in this chapter. Let us first turn our attention to what else separability 
abandonment, and with it the supposed impossibility of ―the postulation of laws which can be 
checked empirically in the accepted sense‖ (Einstein, 1948, p. 322) requires.97  
What Maudlin (2007b, pp. 61-62) alludes to is that separability is an important ingredient in 
the Humean Supervenience (Lewis, 1986), and that when forced to abandon separability we 
might also be forced to abandon the Humean Supervenience. This means abandoning the 
position that ―all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of fact, just one little 
thing and then another (Lewis, 1986, p. x) 
(But it is no part of the thesis that these local matters 
of fact are mental.) […] we have local qualities: 
perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need 
nothing bigger than a point at which to be 
instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of 
qualities. And that is all. All else supervenes on 
that.‖ (Lewis, 1986, p. x) 
That makes the physical state of every space/time point independent of the laws that 
supposedly govern the evolution of phenomena, and thus suggests that laws are unreal, a 
mere human projection on the sequence of total factual states. All our explanations of the 
observed phenomena had an implicit reliance on the supervenience, the completeness of the 
description in the state of material existents. Of course, in explaining a process we had to 
include some projections of the causal relations between existents, but the description of an 
outcome was contained in the momentary physical state (primarily). And sufficiently distant 
states could not be essentially connected. With the supervenience abandoned as well, we have 
cleared the way for the introduction of laws as primary ontological entities alongside material 
existents.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
element and thus prevent us from inferring more than momentary outcomes of measurement and global 
relative states (cf. Chapter 2 sections on Bohr).  
97 Of course, Maudlin (2007b) leaves some room for the middle ground as well, interpreting Einstein as 
demanding that theories be built on some minimum set of separable states, but not that all properties that are 
empirically ascertainable must be separable or depend on separable states. Presumably, Bohmian particles 
would provide such separable entities, whilst the wavefunction provides the inseparable ingredients.  
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What would a law as a primary ontological existent be like? Conceptually, this means that 
―the idea of a law of nature is not logically defined from, and cannot be derived in terms of 
other notions‖ (Maudlin, 2007b, p. 15). This is to say that laws are the patterns that reality 
necessarily exhibits, an essential part of an overall structure (whether we can observe them or 
not).
98
 Thus, what is physically possible is what is constrained within those patterns. But such 
a status, in Maudlin‘s analysis still gets us no further to determining which of the regularities 
(such as the correlations between distant events) that we observe are fundamental laws. We 
may be, he says, living in an unlucky universe, or part of one, in which random stochastic 
processes produce perfect correlation between distant measurements without any underlying 
fundamental law (Maudlin, 2007b, p. 17). This would be a stroke of extremely bad luck, but 
it is a possibility we shouldn‘t lose sight of when fitting the explanation of the troublesome 
phenomena into the overall world-view.  
But supposing our luck serves us, we may take the Schrödinger equation as a fundamental 
law of temporal evolution of the universe, and thus the mysterious ‗activities‘ of the 
wavefunction are just a consequence of the operation of that fundamental law on the primary 
existents, the particles. As shorthand, we may then call this fundamental law (mathematically 
formalised in the Schrödinger equation) the action of the wavefunction, but have no need for 
the wavefunction as the actual existent that somehow ‗pushes the particles about‘ (akin to a 
potential field or some such). Of course, logically, conceptually and formally the law and the 
wavefunction cannot be identified, but we might (in admitted sloppiness) call this underlying 
law: the wavefunction.  
Maudlin (2007b, p. 49) admits that this still does not provide an easy (or straightforward) 
explanation of all the troublesome phenomena in quantum theory. The entangled states of 
multiple particles cannot be understood as the sum of local physical states of each particle, 
with fundamental laws governing only the epistemically accessible interactions between 
particles. Moreover, as has been indicated previously, the evolution governed by the 
supposedly fundamental law behind the Schrödinger equation proceeds in Hilbert space, and 
not the ordinary physical space in which the particles sit. But he is more prone to revise our 
concepts of counterfactuals, locality and causality based on classical physics, than the 
empirically confirmed quantum theory. As the concepts of law, possibility, counterfactual, 
                                                             
98 Maudlin (2007b) also requires that the passage of time be considered as an ontological primitive, accounting 
for the basic distinction between the past and the future of an event. There is no space to enter that aspect of 
the problem here, but it neither detracts from nor adds to the problems of explanation we have considered in 
this and the preceding chapter.  
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causality and explanation are deeply connected we could infer from quantum theory the 
direction the revision should take in providing the desired explanation.  
To begin with, it is intuitively clear that laws (if correctly identified) carry more explanatory 
power than mere truth-statements (be they accidental generalisations or not). In the first 
instance it is not difficult to provide explanations of individual instances of a phenomenon by 
subsumption under a law, but such explanation cannot be achieved by subsumption under an 
admittedly accidental generalisation. But we might, and often do, seek a further explanation 
for the law, or at least some further differentiation between a law and an accidental 
generalisation, other than claim that it just is a fundamental law. Note that a request to 
provide explanation places a serious requirement before a law (and a theory it forms a 
conceptual and formal part of). An ‗anything goes‘ law would logically satisfy the 
subsumption of all the observed phenomena, but could hardly be said to explain any of them. 
Thus, Maudlin (2007b) concludes in criticism of van Fraassen (1989a), that science has to 
aim at true theories (in his view construed round true fundamental laws) rather than just 
empirically adequate ones that need not bother with the ontological (and hierarchical) status 
of their formal statements.  
Supposing that we seek theories with greater explanatory power, what should we be looking 
for? Metaphysically adequate theories, claims Maudlin. Theories whose model constructs 
stand in one-to-one correspondence with the physically possible states of affairs. And the 
limitations of this physical possibility will be provided by the laws of nature. And, the 
stronger the limitations the more explanatory the theory will be, i.e. it will have fewer model 
constructs that correspond to possible states of affairs and be close to the list of 
observed/actual states of affairs. But there is a hidden danger here of multiplying restrictions 
until we get a simple description of the current state of affairs, which would be 
metaphysically adequate on the above account, but would not really be explanatory (‗the 
world just is as it is in every detail and it is the only way it could have been‘). Our 
troublesome phenomena then need no more explanation than any other phenomenon, or 
indeed any fact, in the world.  
But, as Maudlin correctly points out, this does not describe the scientific practice. Scientists, 
even quantum physicists, do not work on producing an unchangeable and minutely detailed 
description of the current state of affairs, but a shorthand way of understanding what states of 
affairs are possible and where the current/observed one fits in. Thus, Maudlin claims, the 
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contents of the model constructs are determined by three factors: ―the laws, the boundary 
values, and the results of stochastic processes‖ (2007, p. 50); where the boundary values 
presumably allow for some determination of participating objects and states of their 
properties. The regularities we observe as patterns in model constructs can be entirely 
explained by subsumption under laws, whilst the regularities stemming from the other two 
factors may just not have an explanation at all within a given model (and the ‗final‘ ones 
among them may not have any explanation at all if we admit fundamental chanciness in the 
physical reality).  
Adding laws as ontologically primitive allows us to better select for the theories with greater 
explanatory power, than mere objects-only-are-primitive theories can allow for. To borrow 
Lewis‘ terminology, theories with fewer world-models give better explanations. By 
specifying laws as ontological existents we narrow down the availability of the world-models 
compared to the multitude available in the only-objects-are-primitive situation. On the other 
hand, in the Humean Mosaic, laws cannot be used to explain its particular features because 
they are nothing more than generic features of the very same mosaic themselves. What they 
can do is contribute towards a unification type explanation by showing commonalities of 
structure among various distinct regions of space-time (Loewer, 1996, p. 113). In this way 
they can provide explanations of some phenomena (isolated segments of the mosaic) through 
unification with a larger class of the phenomena based on multiple snapshots of the mosaic, 
but there is certainly no explanation of the entire state of the mosaic at any given time. 
Primitive as it is, in its entirety the mosaic just is. Through their connection with the mosaic, 
from this perspective at least, adherence to separability and unification model of explanation 
go hand in hand.  
What those types of explanations cannot do, on the other hand, is provide an account of how 
some phenomenon was produced for they lack the causal mechanisms between different 
mosaic snapshots. But with the laws as primitive existents we can connect a structure in one 
snapshot with causally related structures in further snapshots. In this way we could provide 
an explanation of the occurrence of some structure in those further snapshots. In our case-
study instances, the ‗production‘ of the later-state structures (the narrowing down of the class 
of possible world-models) is achieved by the introduction of a fundamental law as an in-
itself-unexplainable primitive behind the troublesome phenomena. The correlations between 
the object-existents cannot be further explained than be specifying the law that governs the 
correlations regardless of how far in physical space the objects are and what further barriers 
149 
 
may separate them. This strategy shares some similarities with the principle approaches of the 
previous chapter in seeking to functionally reify the boundaries on behaviour of objects or 
updating of knowledge about those objects. Maudlin does not provide a recipe to decide 
between the two types of explanation available, other than to argue that neither Ockham‘s 
razor nor the standard Inference to the Best Explanation can be used as arbiters in this case 
(Maudlin, 2007b, p. 181).
99
  
3. 3. Summary of the constructive approaches  
The constructive approaches of Chapter 3 fare better according to the Lipton criteria. They 
bridge the gap between knowing that a phenomenon occurs and understanding the 
circumstances that lead to its occurrence through relying on the concepts of generative 
mechanism consisting of the particle-objects and the law governing their behaviour that is 
capable of inducing changes in the objects non-locally. The problem is that the details of the 
actions of the law are in-principle inaccessible, so the best we can have is again the 
guesstimate encoded in the quantum formalism. The details are inaccessible due to a peculiar 
state the whole universe is in, the quantum equilibrium. So when the phenomena are 
considered globally a radical cut in the generative story must be accepted so that the effects 
of the law on the particles is not uncovered through piecing together local states of the 
particles only, but considering the holistic elements that arise from the glimpses of the global 
law, as well. This is not damaging for the separable conceptualisation of the world as the 
holistic elements are relegated wholly to the non-spatial law, and the deterministically 
incomplete predictions of the local behaviour of objects cannot be improved on due to 
epistemic limitations of the quantum equilibrium state.  
The why regress is successfully blocked by providing a description of what the material 
world is like, including the acceptance of the universal law that plays a part in its changes. 
The problem is that we have no genuine explanation of why the quantum equilibrium 
constrictions hold, except for formal statistical considerations, it must be entered as a 
postulate that blocks the why-regress bluntly. This exposes the weaknesses of the 
constructive approach that do not allow it to escape much further than the principle approach 
gets. Finally the explanations have a self-evidencing characteristic in that the introduction of 
the universal law was motivated by the problems caused on purely separable view of 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena. It is also clearly an ontological explanation, though we are 
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 In fact, he says that in this case the two amount to the same principle, and again one type of explanation is 
preferred over the other on individual aesthetic grounds.  
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justified in wondering what the ontology of laws, once they are taken as primitive existents 
and not supervening on the states of the material ontology, is like in greater detail.  
The explanation also has characteristics of a deeper explanation, at least notionally if not in 
practice, as we can construct a story of how we can change the relevant aspects of the 
phenomena by manipulating the particles, given their subjection to the law (which is 
unknown, but some aspects of its action can be derived formally, as given in the effective 
wavefunction). Providing we have an independent account of how the interactions of the 
particles select which distant particles they create effects on (and we can assume a further 
technical notion of decoherence provides us with this), we can claim the knowledge of the 
law we have through the effective wavefunctions allows us to alleviate worries about 
unexpected effects on the state of the material ontology globally, i.e. that we can hone in on 
the ‗troublesome‘ effects when they arise in reality.  
This allows the transcendental strategy to be given through reliance on the concepts of 
enduring objects and non-local laws. Yet, this seems to require that in the transcendental 
strategy we change the starting point from objects being defined in terms of primary qualities 
alone into objects conceptualised as enduring individuals subject to the universal law. This 
way we would be ‗cutting nature at its joints‘ not through the selection of structure across 
space, but in selection of structure across law-permitted changes across space and time. The 
laws would enter our initial concept of objects essentially. The final problem to address 
though, remains in justifying the fundamental role of the material ontology at all, given such 
a structurally essential role for the universal law (or more of them). In terms of quantum 
formalism, we may ask ourselves why we need to shy away from the (epistemically) 
inaccessible universal wavefunction, if the essential properties of the objects are going to be 
dispositional on it. Are we not merely enslaved by the expectations of realist structure 
imposed by the transcendental strategy and depth-of-explanation as we know them (but 
which are both somehow anthropocentric)? The real challenge might be to reconstruct the 
transcendental strategy and deeper explanations in terms of the law alone. The latter though, 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
As for the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena specifically, they arise out of the changes that directly 
observable objects (measurement instruments in this case) undergo. These, in turn, are 
reducible in their structure to the microscopically fundamental ontology of the particles 
continuously enduring in space and time. This structural link directly connects the continuous 
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endurance of the macroscopic objects and their observable parts with the extension-based 
segment of the fundamental ontology. Yet, not all of the properties of the fundamental 
ontology are in this way reducible to their positions and space-time relations, though some 
sufficient segment of them is. As for the rest, and those are interesting properties in our 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena, they are dispositional on the nomological local proscriptions of 
the epistemically inaccessible fundamental universal law of temporal evolution. That is to 
say, some properties (those not reducible to position and spatial relations between particles) 
do not continuously hold of the particles at every instant.  
To us, with our limited epistemic access to the universal law governing the particles, it 
appears as if they do not have the particular property at the time (making at least some 
aspects of them seeming dispositional and subject to world-making hypotheses of the 
antirealists). But on the retrodictive explanatory account all we have to permit to 
accommodate the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena is that the properties can change as dictated by 
the law, without the change being induced by a spatially continuous signal as the cause of 
change. Though the causes can in explanatory accounts be traced back to the activities of the 
agents and their particular interactions with other particles, they are locally induced in the 
‗distant‘ particle by the nomic proscription of the universal law. Upon gathering more 
information concerning the global aspects of the situation we come to form conclusions about 
general correlations between the distant and proximal aspects of the phenomena. It is 
important to stress, though, that the constructive approaches do not permit doubts about the 
chaotic and haphazard ‗jumps‘ in the intrinsic non-relational properties of the fundamental 
ontology. But this is where our problems arise: many of the traditionally intrinsic properties 
of particle ontology turn out to be dispositional in relation to the universal law, and not truly 
intrinsic to the ontological constituents themselves. As one of the hypothetical cases 
examined above even the position of the fundamental material existents is dependent on the 
proscriptions of the wavefunction-law, making them vulnerable to charges of ultimate 
dispositionalism. Of course, these charges need not be accepted and can be carefully 
defended against: the position of the particles and their spatial extension (their ‗being‘ in 
space) is not unreal nor explicitly denied by the theory. It is, in fact merely taken to be less 
permanent and less informative on its own. To give an account of the world (even its local 
segment such as the constitution of some directly observable macroscopic instrument) it is 
not sufficient to specify solely the arrangement of the fundamental material existents and the 
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physically significant relations between them. We have to also specify the instantaneous local 
proscriptions of the universal law.  
The ‗troublesome‘ phenomena then consist of special situations in which the non-local action 
of the universal law becomes acutely visible even from the macroscopic perspective. This is 
where the law orders the fundamental existents to behave in way unexpected in the 
macroscopic realm. But, crucially, their identity and potential for independent re-
identification are not denied, once the proscriptions of the primitive and universal law are 
taken into account. Without those proscriptions the situations seemed paradoxical, but the 
paradoxes arose from our erroneous expectation to reduce all physical accounts to the 
intrinsic and relational properties of material (extended) ontology only, disregarding the 
fundamental role laws play in the understanding of the world. The ‗transcendental‘ argument 
can then rest on the irreducible role of the extension in the construction of objects constitutive 
of the phenomena, provided that fundamental role played by laws is duly appreciated.  
Methodologically this is a constructive account, as it shows the constructive mechanism 
behind the phenomena. But it is a radical constructive account that requires that we revise 
some deep-seated expectations of physical theories and explanatory generalisations, so as to 
abandon the fundamental status of the Humean Mosaic, and admit extension to be structurally 
important though not wholly sufficient for the explanatory connection between the standardly 
and regularly experienced and physically foundational. This is not an impossible move to 
make and one that still does not permit the antirealist to claim that simple realist strategies are 
bogus nor that objects in lawfully constrained interaction cannot be identified in the 
experience. Only what will identify the objects will no longer be their shape and spatial 
position, along with some other aspects of geometrical structure, such as texture, but also the 
relation the objects hold to the fundamental law of temporal evolution. Immediately we must 
ask though: what use are the objects we cannot directly observe in explaining the phenomena 
when all their identifying features are dependent on the proscriptions of this fundamental 
law? May we not explain the phenomena as consequence of the fundamental law at directly 
observable level, without having to construct the narrative of objects? These are important 
objections to be addressed in the final chapter. Finally, metaphysically it is clear that 
constructive approaches of this chapter argue for a dichotomy of the fundamental role of 
extended material ontology (just as preferred by the ‗transcendental‘ argument) and 
fundamental though non-material laws of temporal evolution. But it is also clear that they 
place ontology on a high position methodologically, and a particular type of primary-
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qualities-come-first ontology at that. Here is what Albert says of chances of uniting Bohmian 
Mechanics with more general field theories:  
―Bohm‘s theory (as it presently stands) is quite 
deeply bound up with a very particular sort of 
ontology; the trouble [is that this sort of theory is not 
a replacement for the bare formalism in general, like 
the Everett –style theories, but only for those 
interpretations of the formalism] which happen to be 
theories of persistent particles;‖. (Albert, 1992 , p. 
161) 
We come to wonder whether this staunch adherence to persistent particle-objects is too high a 
price to pay in order to save the simple transcendental strategy of the section 1. 4.  
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4. COMMON-SENSE CONCEPTS AND EXPLANATION   
4. 1 In search of the structure of a deeper explanation  
[...] explanation is not a logical structure, [...] it 
cannot be characterised in syntactic terms, but it is 
rather an epistemological structure, and, more 
specifically, a structure organising conceptual 
content.‖ (Hansson, 2007, p. 3)  
Setting the issues of realism and deeper attitudes to the methodologies in sciences aside (or 
laying them to rest having discussed them in the previous chapters), in this chapter we turn to 
precisely the selected problematic concepts introduced in each of the approaches and assess 
how well they can be organised into the overall conceptual scheme of our language, so as to 
achieve the goals of explanation as Hansson (2007) lies them down. Hansson shows that 
some degree of complexity is required in order to make the explanations better, and thus the 
critics of the scientific endeavour cannot rely solely on the fact that some of the introduced 
concepts are hard and not straightforward as the ‗tables‘ and ‗chairs‘ seem. The most general 
structure of the explanation will contain, in the most general Hempelian style a list of 
properties an ‗object‘ before us has, and the laws connecting those properties to the 
environment/context. But when choosing the level of depth and the complexity of 
interconnection of these concepts within an explanation, we must bear in mind that the 
essential function of explanation (both unification- and causal-style) is to gain understanding 
by connecting the previously disjointed knowledge of ‗facts‘ into a unified whole of a world-
view.  
Usually this is achieved by connecting the observation, an experienced phenomenon to be 
explained (though this need not prejudice the choice of language or be limited solely to 
supposed bare ‗observation statements‘), with the highly general law known to be directing 
the acceptable variations covered by the concepts appearing in the phenomenon. The number 
of steps required will depend on the previous knowledge and understanding the explainee 
has, whereas the link between the steps is provided by the conceptual framework inherent in 
language. As at least one of our approaches to the explanation of the ‗troublesome‘ 
phenomena contains limits to overall unification of knowledge (at least temporarily), does it  
follow that it is immediately precluded from providing an explanation on these grounds? The 
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answer is yes only for staunch Bohrians, who insist on not modifying the conceptual scheme 
in any way, whilst showing it to be insufficient to provide a full unification of the phenomena 
with the well-understood theoretical terms.  
In the cases where we have to introduce new concepts in explanation, as will be further 
discussed below (Nersessian, 1984) the new concepts have to fit with the exiting conceptual 
framework so as to help ‗cut nature at its joints‘ (Hansson, 2007, p. 9), i.e. allow a better 
empirical (and manipulative) access to the phenomena they cover. This is a precursor to a 
more detailed debate on depth of explanation, but the main idea is that the new conceptual 
framework, consisting of the insertion of new concepts into the old framework, should 
provide explanations of the phenomena that allow more variability (even if all of it is not 
empirically confirmed) as part of the understanding of particular occurrence of the 
phenomena. In other words, they should allow wider spectrum of counterfactual situations 
involving the said concepts, but differing in the relevant way from the phenomena actually 
observed.  
Even before we look in more detail into the requirements of depth of explanation (Hitchcock 
& Woodward, 2003), it is easy to see that the explanations in terms of objects, their 
properties and causal processes they are subjected to generally fit this requirement well. 
Explanations of the causal–mechanical type are then just a more extreme example such 
general scheme, providing detailed specifications of the nature of objects and the relevant 
interactions they can undergo. And yet, Hansson warns, following exclusively this 
prescription, and not falling back on the idea of conceptual unification and organisation, 
would lead to us to extreme and absurd lengths in providing explanations of even the simplest 
phenomena. Where the operations of nature are complex, and they more often are than aren‘t, 
conceptual economy goes a long way in providing explanation and thus allowing meaningful 
interaction with the world without having to adopt a God‘s eye view. Variable depth is 
required of every explanation, and ―concepts are more flexible than properties‖ for this 
purpose (Hansson, 2007, p. 10).  
Thus, Hansson concludes, good explanation is like an exercise of proof in mathematics, an 
epistemological exercise of linking concepts under objective constraints. Of course, such 
internally consistent, but somehow irrelevant conceptual networks can be created ad lib (cf.  
for example the works of Duhem, Quine and Feyerabend) and accepting such a strong 
linguistic turn will play well into the hands of the critics of the explanatory potential of 
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science. In order to avoid that it is advisable to rely on the conceptual networks that already 
exist, that form the well connected global system of orientation in the material environment 
and function well in a variety of contexts. But in this position, which is a kind of 
unificationism, unification should not be sought for in and of itself, but as a consequence of 
other goals on the conceptual level. ―While the classical unificationist is right in asking for 
intellectual and epistemological economy, she is wrong if she identifies this with having as 
few premises or beliefs as possible. Rather, global economy concerning what concepts are 
needed to make the world intelligible is more basic than either global or local economy of 
assumptions or premises‖ (Hansson, 2007, pp. 10-11). From the perspective of provision of 
explanation this seems to agree with the starting point of the transcendental strategy of 
section 1. 4, as much as possible rely on the readily available concepts.  
In the troublesome cases under consideration here appearance of some properties of objects 
or general characteristics of situations are seen as at first glance improbable, or are at least 
unexpected on the straightforward account of the phenomenon. We thus have to do extra 
work to connect them to what is ‗expected‘ in the conceptual scheme that we start with. 
Weber and Van Bouwel (2007) argue that explanatory depth has intrinsic value in such 
instances and those explanations that can provide the required depth will be considered better 
explanations in such cases. Explicitly, the contexts in which explanatory depth is seen as 
useful are those in which we ask whether the occurrence of some property or event is a 
predictable consequence of some other, more familiar or more widely expected events. More 
generally, Weber and  Van Bouwel (2007) argue that contexts of asking explanatory 
questions have to be taken into account in assessing explanatory worth. What is important for 
us is that on their analysis, given that the troublesome phenomena we are concerned with fall 
under the right context, explanatory depth (to be explicated in the following section) will be 
of intrinsic value. Troublesome phenomena are seen as anomalies from the perspective of the 
plausibility of the transcendental strategy of section 1. 4 and explanatory depth will prove as 
a useful heuristic in comparing the explanatory potential (i.e. their potential for deeper 
explanations) of our two approaches.  
Sellars (1963) reminds us how we needn‘t view the claim that behind the perceptible 
appearances of objects and phenomena there lie fundamental explanatory physical ontology, 
as a claim that ‗everyday objects‘ don‘t exist. He claims that by reducing the perceptible to 
the physical explanatory ontology we are not challenging the claims about tables and chairs 
within a framework, but are trying to replace the whole framework with one that can support 
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and explain it, but goes further in providing understanding of the wide range of perceived 
phenomena (Sellars, 1963, p. 27). This is in line with the strategy traced back to Descartes in 
section 1. 4, the ontological projection should not only provide an explanation of how the 
phenomena arise but also how our appearance of them has the peculiar features (including 
those that lead to prima faciae erroneous ontological projections) that it does. This was his 
famed replacement of the manifest image by the scientific image which both supports and 
explains our use of the conceptual framework of the manifest image (as it was ideally posited 
by Sellars).
100
 Swoyer elucidates that we are using the analogy of length measurement 
formalisation, where ―an isomorphism of an appropriate sort explains the applicability of 
mathematics [i.e. mathematical formalism] to reality‖ (1987, p. 284) to outline the way that 
conceptual frameworks (though not nearly as formally coherent as Swoyer‘s formalised 
measurement theory) when seen as somehow isomorphic or homeomorphic to relevant 
aspects of the world can provide an explanation of the applicability of thought to reality 
(which is just what we needed in section 1. 4 of the introductory chapter).  
But for the said replacement to go through the manifest image must already possess ‗the germ 
of the solution‘ of how the two images are linked and can conceptually coexist. It is 
suggested here (with special reference to Descartes in section 1. 2) that the wanted germ is 
given by the geometrical regularities based on the foundational role of extension. If our 
‗scientific‘ image, i.e. the explanatory frameworks stemming from our two approaches, are 
forced to somehow deny that foundation, i.e. if the replacement of the images goes so far as 
to deny the very link of the replacement-route can we still use Sellars‘ programme?  This is a 
question we come to pose in light of the conclusions of Chapter 3, where the details of the 
law seem to be more informative than the bare positioning of the particles. Alternatively we 
may ask whether the notion of laws contains enough conceptual stability to be the sole new 
provider of the link with the geometric isomorphism of primary qualities taking a back seat. 
Addressing these problems will have to await some further stage-setting.  
                                                             
100 Immediately this might invite the question of replacing one paradigm with another (cf. Chapter 1), however 
the two supposed paradigms here do not compete but rather one encompasses the other. For this to present 
an effective criticism a further charge of incommensurability of the two supposed paradigms would have to be 
levied. Sadly, Sellars is difficult to pinpoint on this matter (DeVries & Triplett, 2000), and for the sake of brevity 
we will have to work on intuitive understanding of the proposal here. The scientific image grows out of and 
replaces (though this is not strict reductionism) the manifest image, and has to be able to “deal with the 
questions raised in the manifest image and the phenomena familiar to it” (DeVries & Triplett, 2000, p. 114). 
What is clear though is the permanent request in Sellars for the continuation of postulational reasoning with 
ordinary modes of explaining and understanding our world.  
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One route left open is to criticise Sellars‘ view in the context of this thesis as simply 
presupposing the predominance of the mechanistic views (in fact we might accuse Sellars 
himself of helping establish such a dominance in the philosophy of science), and thus trying 
to show that the approaches which are aware of a link between preference for causal 
mechanical explanations and the conceptual primacy of the geometrical isomorphism will not 
be threatened by the consequences of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena for the passage from 
manifest to scientific images. They might either claim that the separability violation is an 
illusion, an error, in the case of ‗troublesome phenomena‘, or might claim that for the route 
from the manifest to the scientific that they are building separability violations do not present 
as much of a threat as is portrayed above.  
Metaphysics of deeper explanations  
Hitchcock and Woodward (2003) note the paucity of literature on systematic account of this 
notion. In such a context it is worth merely surveying their own cited attempt for the 
ontological features that might provide pointers in the desired direction, with the proviso that 
the previous chapters were supposed to point towards the depth-providing characteristics of 
the specific case-study instances. On their account (Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003) greater 
depth is achieved by explanations which depend on more variables changes of which lead to 
more significant interventions in the phenomenal outcome. But they have to be those 
variables interventions on which can produce variation in the observable effects within the 
explanandum, and not some related concepts. Thus, deeper explanations depend on (not just 
contain) more elements which can observably alter the key segments of the observed 
phenomena, that can pander to the greater range of the relevant what-if questions. But, and 
this is the key point Hitchcock and Woodward are trying to make, this does not mean taking 
the most general account of the situation to be explained, inclusion of the widest possible set 
of background conditions, but selecting those features of the situation that can be identified 
as possible properties of the very object or system that is the focus of explanation. To avoid 
going round in circles here as to what really carves nature at joints, and how to recognise, it is 
worth reminding ourselves of the purpose of the transcendental strategy connecting the 
everyday conceptual scheme with the specific one employed in the explanatory account. To 
avoid the dangers of general syntactical game-playing that wreaked havoc of the general 
deductive-nomological explanatory account, clear conceptual unification with the wider 
conceptual scheme is required. As Psillos (2007) warns the counterfactual variations can be 
superficially achieved by any law abiding account, and the real mettle of some explanatory 
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construction is proven through the unification with the wider conceptual scheme. We must 
thus aim to identify the object that is the focus of explanation and see how its properties 
relate to what is more directly experienced.  
This may seem an obvious point, but one that is not readily adopted in great many scientific 
explanations, for it is precisely the difficulty of identifying those possible properties of the 
system which make the focus of explanation that proves most difficult. It also reintroduces 
the chicken and egg problem of what is to guide our selection of those properties, i.e. is the 
explanation the prerequisite or the consequence of the featured ontological entities. And it is 
here that we can see firmer foundation for preference for the causal-mechanical model of 
explanation over unificatory and other models.
101
 That is, the ontological primitives, 
explicitly named as such, of the causal-mechanical model are postulated as the very objects 
whose properties (or their changes) lead to the desirable observable variations in the 
phenomena that are the focus of explanation. Namely, according to Hitchcock and Woodward 
(2003) generalizations (which is what all explanations based on theoretical framework come 
to be) provide deeper explanations than others if they provide the resources for answering a 
greater range of what-if-things-had-been-different questions, i.e. are invariant under a wider 
range of interventions. But, crucially, the interventions must be of the kind that focus on the 
hypothetical changes in the ―system at hand‖ (Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003, p. 198), and 
not the changes in the systems adjacent to the one whose features are to be explained. This, 
again, stresses the importance of appropriately hypothesising the ontology in advance.  
Though this confirms the popular preference for the causal mechanical explanations, it does 
not preclude further investigations in our case-study instances, as there are considerations of 
conceptual unity and efficacy to be taken into account also (cf. (Hansson, 2007) above). But 
it does point towards what the minimal ontological requirement for greater explanatory depth 
is, namely the identification of variant properties of the system/object that is identified as the 
element of reality under investigation, the subject of explanation. What we must bear in mind 
then is that our case-study instances of explanation must be able to at least name the elements 
                                                             
101 It is worth bearing in mind here that Woodward and Hitchcock present their account as part of a wider 
scheme to provide a model of explanation that is nether the standard causal nor unificatory model, and that 
can satisfy the requirements of explanatory depth better than the two traditional rivals. This need not concern 
us here, though, as their account of explanatory depth still provides criteria of evaluation (that need to be 
further explicated when we encounter individual instances of attempted explanation), without necessitating 
adoption of their model in particular instances. In other words, they are searching for a general model of 
explanation in science, which may be insensitive to the particular difficulties we are trying to respect here.  
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of reality (objects or systems) that are the focus of explanation
102
, and attain explanatory 
depth through explication of interventions on those that produce effects that can be 
conceptually accounted for (i.e. described or predicted).  
Psillos (2007) criticises the above account of depth of explanation for failing to provide 
clearer guidelines about the truth-conditions of the counterfactual situations, whilst 
distinguishing them from the relevant evidence-conditions. The latter distinction is important 
for the counterfactual musings to be explanatory, i.e. to be able to tell how phenomena would 
have turned out differently due to counterfactual interventions on them. Of course, the 
interventions can be, and in the interesting cases are, hypothetical, i.e. we can provide 
explanations of this sort even in the situations in which the direct evidence conditions for the 
counterfactuals are empirically inaccessible. This is the weakness of the depth-of-explanation 
account of Woodward and Hitchcock (2003b) in the situations that are far removed from the 
simple past events or simple accounts involving unobservables. As Psillos (2007, p. 99) notes 
in the latter situations there are well-known stories to be told as to what the difference 
between truth- and evidence-conditions in counterfactual situations is. This taps into the 
important psychological underpinning of the satisfaction with deeper explanation: we want to 
know what it is that makes the explanatory account true, not just how we verify its truth; what 
the conceptual structure that generates truth of the explanatory account is. The safest route to 
provision (at least notional) of the required truth-conditions is, in Psillos‘ (2007) view, to rely 
on the laws of nature. That is to include the laws of nature in the truth-conditions for the 
relevant counterfactuals. Laws have to be in place before we construct, by relying on 
counterfactual interventions, an account of what is and what is not invariant under relevant 
interventions on the objects.  
―Without independent account of what laws are, 
there is no clear way in which we can deem some 
(interventionist) counterfactual assertions true or 
false. Which interventions are physically possible 
and which interventions leave certain relations 
invariant depends on what laws there are. The latter 
cannot be fully understood as relations that remain 
                                                             
102 Though, crucially, not necessarily the primary existents, the fundamental ontological entities.  
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invariant under interventions since they specify what 
interventions are possible.‖ (Psillos, 2007, p. 105) 
This is important for us in two ways. Firstly, it suggests that our ‗transcendental strategy‘, 
coupled with desire for deeper explanations from the two case-study instances, will not go far 
enough in providing the conceptual link through the selection of ontological elements and the 
‗geometrical‘ structural isomorphism between the fundamental ontology and the everyday 
material objects. What it needs to have added is the minimum set of laws of nature that are 
expected to hold between the fundamental and everyday account of the phenomena. In most 
cases this is not a problem, and largely the minimum set consists of the fundamental logical 
connections, and in many other cases we have enough uncontroversial information about the 
conceptually supportive causal structure. Thus, Psillos (2007, p. 106) says that when we are 
dealing with stable causal or nomological structures interventionist counterfactuals are 
meaningful and have truth values. The problem is that our ‗troublesome‘ phenomena may not 
be supported by enough of such structure to let us construct a convincingly deeper 
explanation, and thus provide for the comparison of our two case-study approaches. In any 
case, it calls for an explicit justification of the stability of whatever nomological (if not 
always causal) structure the approaches can rely on, alongside the material ontology they 
employ, in order to provide them with sufficient grounds for the construction of the 
‗transcendental‘ argument ( (Luntley, 1995); cf. section 1. 4 above).  
Secondly, the account which provides a separate account of laws relevant to the situation will 
be better prepared for the task of providing a deeper explanation. Psillos worries, though, that 
the depth-of-explanation account as constructed by Woodward and Hitchcock (2003b) above 
highlights and employs the symptoms of good explanations (in particular of good causal 
explanations) without being able to provide a fully fledged theory of what an (causal) 
explanation consists in. ―Invariance-under-interventions is a symptom of causal relations and 
laws. It is not what causation and lawhood consists in‖ (Psillos, 2007, p. 106). In our case 
both accounts can use the pragmatic virtues of the depth-of-explanation account provided 
they are explicit about how they will overcome the problem Psillos raises. The principle 
approaches can claim not to aim for a causal account at all, and search for deeper 
explanations through supplying the relevant laws as directly observable empirical 
generalisations not justified, nor accounted for, through their role in the ‗troublesome‘ 
phenomena themselves. Due to their supposed simplicity these can then be easily linked with 
the wider unchallenged set of laws governing the behaviour of material reality. The problems 
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arise, though, when the phenomena are interpreted as constitutive of ontology that is not 
easily linked with the material ontology of the everyday conceptual scheme. The constructive 
approaches, on the other hand, have (cf. Chapter 3) provided an independent account of 
relevant laws, most notably the universal law governing the behaviour of the ontology, 
through abolishing the Humean Mosaic and making laws primitive existents alongside the 
ontology. Each of the accounts then has to show that this general model can be applied to the 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena and the potential consequences they can have for the 
‗transcendental‘ argument.    
Yet, one might object that on this reading preference is given to the causal-mechanical model 
of explanation right from the start. How could a unification model satisfy the requirements 
for hypothetical manipulations on system at hand, accompanied by a network of stable laws 
that provide the truth-conditions for the counterfactual situations? The answer is simple, if 
not directly applicable to our principle approaches: take the uncontroversial objects that 
feature in the phenomena and show the limits of manipulations possible (the hypothetical 
situations where only the relevant aspects of the central objects are changed or affected). In 
the troublesome phenomena this would involve showing how the objects central to the 
phenomena would have been different had relevant changes in them been instigated, whilst 
the remainder of the context (this includes the laws and the other objects) had been kept 
unchanged. It is hoped that the principle approaches can in this way provide sufficiently deep 
explanations (though not expose the ‗mechanism‘ that gives rise to the phenomena) without 
having to construct awkward connections between the central tenets of the explanatory 
account and the everyday conceptual scheme. They would gain the upper hand over the 
causal mechanical accounts if the latter were forced to do just that, to add entities and change 
qualities of the core conceptual scheme in order to satisfy the construction of the explanatory 
account.  But we must bear in mind the impermanence of objects on principle approaches, 
where precedence is given to universal applicability of generalised principles to all and any 
‗thing‘ featured in the phenomena.  
4. 2 Principle approaches and the depth of explanation  
It remains an open methodological problem for the principle approaches, one that ties in well 
with the overall overview of the role of physics and the requirements of arguments for simple 
realism, whether all the possible formal models that the principle approaches can derive (and 
that agree with the constraining principles) should be excluded from considerations by further 
modifications of the choice of the suitable mathematical framework for quantum theory 
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(along with the implicit metaphysical assumptions that might come along with them), or 
whether we should find reasonable general methodological constraints (these are not our 
constraining principles) for the formulations of the physical theories and rule them out on the 
grounds of those. We shall proceed in the following sections on the latter assumption, i.e. that 
the provision of deeper explanation suitable for the ‗transcendental‘ argument is a reasonable 
criterion to adopt. We are no longer worried about the details of possible common formalism 
inherent in all quantum theories as those with deeper explanations will be preferred overall. It 
is another issue whether this equivalence is the very assumption that Bub is relying on when 
using his deep methodological principle.  
In light of the above it remains to be seen how Bub‘s ‗deep methodological principle‘ ( (Bub, 
2004); cf. Chapter 2 as well) aligns with the requirements of provision of deeper explanation 
and upholding of the ‗transcendental‘ argument. Following Bub‘s principle we must refuse to 
venture further than macroscopic ‘records’ of the inputs and outputs of the measuring 
processes, effectively making their conceptual framework reliant on the epistemic atomism of 
the momentary states of the input and output status of the macroscopic apparatuses. Even 
when given in terms of the information concepts this remains a Humean Mosaic view of the 
phenomena as causally independent sequences. But, though all physical processes can be 
given in such terms, in the past we have been able to move beyond this timid generalisation 
of the world.  
It seems historically heuristic to view the principle explanations as a step towards novel, as 
hitherto unexpected constructive explanations. Explanations from principle approaches 
(principle explanations) are primarily concerned with exposing the competing explanatory 
approaches as focusing on a pseudo-problem, striving to explain something that essentially 
does not require an explanation over and above that it stems from an erroneous perspective 
on the phenomenon to be explained. In that they have to stay away from the thin line of slide 
into a full blown instrumentalism, whereby no steps towards a future new explanation are 
offered but every route to explanation through ontology is effectively closed. Fine (1989) 
suggests as much in denying that we are forced to accept ―the explanationist challenge‖ 
(Fine, 1989, p. 191) and speculate about the hidden hands and propensities that guide the 
‗troublesome‘ correlations. Fine claims that the demands of explanatory adequacy come a 
priori from the outside the quantum theory, and are a remnant of a different kind of physical 
thinking. As much as this would rid us of the struggle to provide an explanation from the 
principle approaches, it lands us squarely in the neo-Bohrian (but what is worse neo-Bohrian 
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with an extreme slant that even Bohr is likely to shy away from) camp characterised by 
abandoning all hope of understanding the processes that give rise to the troublesome 
correlations in material terms, as well as all hope for the unified knowledge of the macro- and 
the micro-physical realm.  
Fine shies away from constructive steps and advocates firm adherence to the establishment of 
principles that expose what is prohibited in the correlations, whilst quoting a statistician 
Moses when accounting for the non-local influences, mysterious background guidance, 
mutual dependencies and passions: ―Much less is true‖ (Fine, 1989, p. 194). Hughes (1989), 
in the same volume, is supportive of this view. It is his argument that if the elements of our 
standard conceptual scheme cannot find a suitable home in the explanations of the 
troublesome phenomena, and yet the phenomena are taken as real, empirically verified, then 
we must abandon the use of the conceptual scheme or seriously modify the key elements of 
the conceptual framework. Hughes wants the elements of the new conceptual framework to 
be clearly identified within the mathematical structures used by the theory. An obvious 
problem for our principle approaches is to show how the new conceptual scheme unifies 
conceptually with the standard one of extended matter, so as to achieve our goal of avoiding 
anti-realist criticism of the possibility of scientific explanation in general. This would in fact 
be a route of making the entire material conceptual framework dispositional, emergent from 
the new ontology (such as information-ontology might be). Though Hughes argues that the 
new metaphysics would have stronger resistance from refutation by emerging ‗naturally‘ 
from quantum theory itself rather than being artificially tacked onto it by metaphysical 
demands external to construction of physical theories, he admits that may not be able to do 
any useful explanatory work. ―However, it is not clear what useful explanatory work this 
interpretation would perform over and above that provided by a full articulation of the models 
the theory presents‖ (Hughes, 1989, p. 207).  
The CBH programme (of Chapter 2) can then shift the explanatory focus to a different realm, 
that of information manipulation. This is admittedly a risky route to take in provision of 
explanation, as it explicitly shies away from providing the explanatory account in terms of 
the conceptual framework that we initially required for the transcendental strategy.
103
 Though 
risky, here is how the route might proceed nonetheless. When asked to provide an 
                                                             
103 As Timpson (private correspondence, but cf. also (Timpson, 2008)) puts it, we want to know what the 
physical processes behind the phenomena are, not what the experimenters can know about them or in what 
ways we can interpret the supposedly correlated signals from the ‘epistemological black boxes’.  
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explanation of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena, the principle approach advocates might proceed 
by pointing out that nothing is neither exchanged nor travels, and no explicit mysterious 
connection is established between the material existents characterised by the primary 
qualities. We have come to have an erroneous view of the situation and have thus entangled 
ourselves in a pseudo-problem. We must, fully and truthfully, suspend all speculative 
expectations and return to the conceptual scheme of material existents at hand in the 
situation. Alongside, we must dissolve the troublesome characterisation of the phenomena 
and relieve any worries that the ontological separability of material objects is threatened. The 
principle approaches are asking us to take a step back: leave the material existents as they are 
in the standard conceptual scheme, connected only by the physical interactions that respect 
the space-time extension and separation. That part of the conceptual framework remains 
intact. And that part of the conceptual framework plays no role in the establishment of the 
phenomena. What does then? Here we have to be presented with the phenomena in the new 
light. Bear in mind though, that a small but important constructive step has implicitly been 
made: separability has materially been upheld, i.e. whatever the appearances nothing is 
expected to characterise the macroscopic material existents over and above what 
characterises them locally in their space-time region. Likewise, all the changes they can be 
expected to endure must be understood as local phenomena, requiring no knowledge of 
distant states or some global set-up.  
According to Sklar (1990) the greatest contribution of the principle approach in physics is to 
remove the need to adjudicate between the equally empirically adequate, but metaphysically 
divergent, explanatory constructions. When the difference between such constructions cannot 
be adjudicated empirically, it has sometimes been useful to present the difference as a 
pseudo-problem, to show us how we could account for the phenomena (again, without the 
explicit constructive mechanism) by ignoring the constructive conflict and looking elsewhere 
whilst holding on to what is phenomenologically unalterable: the constraining principles. 
Again, drawing on Einstein‘s derivation of Special Theory of Relativity, Sklar claims that the 
latter exposes what were considered rival but empirically equivalent descriptions of the 
universe as equivalent descriptions of the same state of affairs (as the search for absolute 
motion is abandoned). Again, we must bear in mind the warning of the sinful constructive 
step Einstein makes (cf. Chapter 2 above), but also that it is not damaging for the kinematical 
considerations of the theory. But what are the explicit advantages of the principle approach 
over the rival constructive approaches? According to Sklar they are supposed to be 
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speculatively more cautious through abandoning the metaphysical expectations that cannot be 
directly verified. They are also supposed to unify a greater range of phenomena under one 
explanation, rather than requiring a range of respective different explanations (i.e. not just 
instances of one basic explanatory conceptualisation tailored to individual situations). Finally, 
the explanatory power of the principle approaches is supposed to be greater by avoiding what 
would otherwise be mere coincidences in agreement of different explanatory constructions.  
In other words, the greatest power of the principle approach should come from telling us how 
come the phenomena consist of the same appearances even when we approach them along 
different constructive schemes. This goes further than strictly explaining the phenomena, but 
aims to explain the occurrence of the illusion. Of course this can immediately be charged 
with criticism of pragmatic shiftiness in the choice of observables. We open up to the 
possibility of re-examination of the fundamental concepts we implicitly take for granted in 
the transcendental strategy. Everything is suddenly thrown into doubt, and the principle 
approach takes liberty in choosing what to call observable and non-speculative. And Sklar 
says as much in his analysis. He says that our theory, however conservative on speculation, 
must carry with it some metaphysical baggage that does the explanatory work. Rather than 
being per se simple, the supposedly sturdy conceptual structure must do extra work to explain 
how it fits with that which can still be held as well-understood and free from illusion. He sees 
the spacetime structure of Special Relativity to be such minimal baggage, a replacement for 
the aether and the absolute velocity. ―[A mere set of observational consequences taken as a 
theory], unlike the special theory with its theoretical space-time structure, fails to offer 
genuine explanations of the observable phenomena.‖ (Sklar, 1990, p. 155) Principle theories 
have to supply that extra weight that distinguishes them from bare phenomenalism and 
instrumentalism, so as to provide explanations. That is the most important lesson for our 
principle approaches of Chapter 2. But a serious caveat is immediately put forth by Sklar: this 
is increasingly difficult to follow in the cases where the considerations strike at the very 
foundation of our conceptual schemes.
104
 Again, Einstein‘s sinful constructive step can be 
seen as just the required avoidance of the tinkering with the foundations of the conceptual 
                                                             
104 In Duhem’s (1991) insightful criticism of the declarations of methodological superiority of the principle-like 
approaches advocated by Ampere, we see that even in the less conceptually troubled domains, researchers 
are forced to make implicit (and in a way operational) constructive hypotheses by borrowing analogies from 
existing constructive disciplines and operationally objectifying hypothetical entities. This is a declaration even 
before Einstein’s qualms about the structures behind Special Theory of Relativity of the implicit constructive 
theorizing in the declaratively simple principle approaches. I am grateful to Simon Saunders for pointing out 
this case.  
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scheme. Though principle approaches drag with them a constant risk of sliding into excessive 
instrumentalism or phenomenalism by their adherence to almost primitive empiricism, the 
risk is worth taking when our pragmatist (explanatorily too weak) and realist (conceptually 
threatening and observationally underdetermined) accounts strike at the very heart of our 
well-entrenched conceptual scheme.  
On the metaphysical side there is no clear suggestion in the literature as to how the 
‗information-stuff‘ (provided we can argue there is such a thing) and the extended material 
stuff can coexist at the fundamental level of reality. The notion of depth-of-explanation above 
stresses the importance of the detailed account of the controllable variations in objects that 
the changes to be explained happen to. This is the most serious of weaknesses attributed to 
the principle approaches and one that can only be avoided if we can somehow show that the 
‗transcendental strategy‘ can be more effectively constructed with principle approach 
concepts even without the prima faciae concerns for the depth of explanation. This is to show 
either that:  
1. the ‗extended stuff‘ can be modified or replaced in the explanatory conceptualisation 
required for the ‗transcendental‘ argument (perhaps by presenting the ‗extended stuff‘ 
as an illusion reducible to something else); or  
2. there are ways to reduce the properties of the new stuff (presumably, information 
entities) to those of the primary qualities of the ‗extended stuff‘ making the former a 
dispositional illusion to be removed from the conceptualisation of the ‗transcendental‘ 
argument that respects the occurrence of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena.105  
But if the latter strategy was adopted we might ask ourselves what the contribution of the 
principle approaches is, other than providing an alternative way of looking at things, i.e. we 
would be at loss to identify the exact pseudo-problem that principle approaches have helped 
us out of. We must constantly be asking ourselves what it is that the principle approaches can 
hope to achieve (other than satisfy Bub‘s methodological principle) given that we already 
have empirically adequate constructive attempts. If we are to go beyond all of them, what is 
the direction that the principle approaches are suggesting? On such reading the preferred 
direction seems to be to establish the novel ontology that does not threaten separability 
                                                             
105 The latter seems to be exactly the strategy that the constructive approaches follow. In this way the principle 
approaches would in the end be reduced to the constructive ones in terms of explanatory ontology, and would 
thus be making that step towards the more explanatory constructive theories, as Einstein required (cf. Chapter 
2, above).  
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violations, but the question is then how to combine it with the material ontology of the 
‗transcendental‘ argument.  
The principle approaches then can rely on diffusing the threat of teleportation phenomena, 
along the lines advocated in Timpson (2004), where it is claimed that the conceptual puzzles 
arise when information is mistakenly taken to be a substantive, rather than an abstract term.
106
 
What is in fact phenomenologically the case, is that Bob can extract only one bit of 
information from his black-box, upon the successful run of the protocol in which Alice has 
sent him 2 classical bits. If there is no material substratum to the phenomenon assumed, or at 
least none is speculated about, then there is no great quantity of information (which was 
physically meant to be stored in the material referent of the quantum state) transmitted in the 
protocol. For if things had been otherwise the no-signalling theorem would be violated. What 
remains puzzling is the role of the quantum formalism in the whole situation. It seems to 
allow for some counterfactual situations involving the distant experimenter, Bob, which 
would not be possible in the pure-black-boxes case.  
What role do the general constraining principles play then, in an overall understanding of 
reality as required by starting point of the simple transcendental strategy? The principles must 
stand for something explanatorily, even if just to say that Bob cannot in reality obtain more 
than 1bit of information from his black box. To be a constraining principle, no-signalling 
theorem tells us that things could have been different and that the fact that they are not is 
significant for our situation. But unless we assume that the situation is characterised by the 
potential for a larger information extraction, the 1bit (without the constraining principle) is 
not the least surprising nor ‗troublesome‘. As soon as we bring the principles in, we are 
assuming something more about the ontology behind them, an ontology that does refer to the 
potential for large quantities of information to become available to Bob conditional on the 
distant actions Alice takes.  
The constraining principles must constrain something, and the interesting question 
immediately becomes what it is. One option is to follow Timpson‘s suggestion (2004, p. 72) 
and to rephrase the question in terms of the material ontology behind the phenomenon (thus 
abandoning the black boxes, and falling prey to the traps of non-separability). The other is to 
simply admit that when manipulating the black boxes we are constrained by the general 
                                                             
106 Timpson (2004) is adamant that information cannot be understood as any kind of entity (even an abstract 
one) at all, and that this is where the error of the principle approaches lies. They should instead turn to the 
material foundations of the concept of information.  
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principles, and then seek an explanation of those principles in terms of the structural 
familiarisation with the new entity. Of course, that is just moving the game to a different 
playing field, but it still remains a hot task to link the information ontology to the material 
ontology that is the major supplier of our experience. Now this needn‘t be an entirely 
obsolete route, as the investigation of new entities, even if abstract and non-material can still 
tell us something about the world we inhabit. For if we were to take information to be an 
abstract entity, such as a mathematical triangle might be taken to be (cf. suggestions in 
(Duwell, 2008)), we can still learn something about the ‗geometry‘ of our world even if we 
do not talk directly about the material objects affected by that geometry. Suppose information 
should not be understood in either of the Timpson (2004) senses
107
, but as an entirely new 
entity. Nersessian‘s (1984) analysis investigates a precursor for such an approach from 
history of physics. 
In (Faraday to Einstein: Constructing Meaning in Scientific Theories , 1984) Nersessian aims 
to present how a new concept of a ‗field‘ was introduced into scientific parlance (with respect 
to theory and observation) (Nersessian, 1984, p. 27). She suggests that new concepts change 
from being a heuristic guide to other ends, through a stage of elaboration, into being full-
blown philosophically justifiable concepts capable of sustaining rigorous analysis. This does 
not mean we can form a clear definition through a set of sufficient and necessary conditions 
for some phenomena to be characterised by our chosen concepts, but that they feature a set of 
family resemblances where each instance varies in the degree of qualitative conformity to the 
lot. First a primitive qualitative concept is introduced, with no clear mathematical structural 
unification into formalism, as an operational alternative to the existing explanatory view. 
Further development through a series of analogies to furnish additional detail to the new 
concepts, with analogies serving as explanations (or in the Hansson view above: conceptual 
links into the wider explanation) of the newly discovered details. Nersessian‘s ‗analogies‘ 
provide a function similar to Cao‘s metaphors (cf. Chapter 1) of carrying over understanding 
from a familiar domain (most notably that covered by the everyday conceptual scheme) to the 
‗troublesome‘ one containing the explicit descriptions of the phenomena under consideration. 
In other words, they carry the transcendental step, through sufficient structural isomorphism.  
                                                             
107 The two sense of the term information, supposedly confounded in the principle approaches are the 
common-sense ‘type information’ sense and the technical (in terms of Shannon’s (1949)) communication 
theory) ‘quantity information’ sense.  
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Finally the new concept can adopt the role of substance (the practice Nersessian bases her 
analysis carries over more easily to the case of principle approach‘s information, than the 
constructive approach‘s fundamental laws in this case, but that needn‘t concern us at this 
stage) in the conceptual scheme. At this stage it is possible to consider a wide range of 
problems and objections, to address them and to clarify the links of the new concept to the 
existing conceptual scheme (which may have been partially changing alongside it, or even 
with it). Now a clear understanding of the new concept is achieved and it is successfully 
unified with the prevailing conceptual scheme.  
Signs of that understanding are provided precisely by the ease with which it plays the 
explanatory role and addresses the questions such as: ―What does it do? How does it do it? 
What is its function? What effects does it produce? What kind of ‗stuff‘ is it? How can it be 
[(sic)] located?‖ (Nersessian, 1984, p. 156). Some of these questions our candidates will have 
to start grappling with, other may not be applicable to them. What is important is that we can 
start building explanations from them, and comparing them to each other and existing 
explanations even at the early stage, working all the way to complete the steps towards the 
next stage or opening up new questions. Thus we do not have to have a demonstrable 
reference bearer at the outset for each concept we introduce, nor do we need to be clear about 
all aspects of its connection into the conceptual scheme in order to work on an explanation of 
the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena.  
But the principle approaches of Chapter 2 are a long way away from understanding the new 
concept in this way. Moreover, Nersessian‘s paradigm concept of a ‗field‘ relies on the same 
essential qualities of extension as does the common-sense concept of an extended object 
(though there are important differences as well) and interaction ‗by contact‘, unlike the 
entities of information ontology. Other elements of our ordinary conceptual scheme are also 
present in the defining questions that Nersessian poses: such as ―What does it do?‖, ―What 
effects does it produce?‖ Those causation-related elements are not even hinted at in 
metaphysical extensions of the principle approaches of Chapter 2.  Thus such alternation of 
conceptual framework has a long way to go, and as yet there are no clear indications that it is 
going in the right direction.  
Duwell (2008) attempts to construct a starting point for the novel ontology behind the 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena. To a degree it relies on partially dissolving the ‗troublesome‘ 
nature of the phenomena, but also strongly argues for the existence of information not as 
171 
 
substance (which must be spatially located, and then subjected to generation of ‗troublesome‘ 
aspects of the phenomena), but an abstract entity outside the constrictions of the material 
ontology. The details of this account need not concern us, but the general potential for 
explanation, and most importantly for the ‗transcendental‘ argument, will be of interest. 
Duwell (2008, p. 215) advocates seeing the explanations resultant from this metaphysical 
extension of the principle approaches as those of a specific unification type: the deductive-
nomological explanations. That the latter have been severely criticised in the philosophy of 
science, and often in the end amended through addition of causal aspects, should be a 
sufficient pointer of their explanatory worth for our purposes. Yet the criticism often centred 
on their overly syntactic aspects, and what we are primarily concerned with is the conceptual 
explanatory potential Duwell can generate from their content.  
Unfortunately, Duwell‘s account is abruptly cut short here, and beyond advocating the 
―unificatory view of explanation‖ (Duwell, 2008, p. 215), he fails to tell us how the 
experienced phenomena will be explained in terms of lawful behaviour of quantum-type 
information distribution. There is a legitimate suspicion that two plains of being will be 
introduced, one of material ontology and one of quantum-information ontology, with all the 
supposed ‗troublesome‘ aspects of the phenomena relegated to the latter. If this allowed 
adherence to the principle of separability at the level of material ontology then our 
‗transcendental‘ argument may still be able to survive the antirealist charge, but there is no 
indication that this is so. The original ‗troublesome‘ aspects will be generated in the 
conceptual scheme of the quantum-information ontology, but we are told nothing about how 
they connect to the material ontology. The issue is simply swept under the carpet. The 
legitimate worry then remains that to produce the phenomena, wherever we consigned their 
‗troublesome‘ aspects to, violations of separability must be accepted at the level of material 
ontology (not that material ontology is dispositionally reliant on the quantum-information 
ontology, the two simply exist side-by-side). Yet the transcendental strategy, that aims to 
include the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena too, needs the account in terms of material ontology 
also, as it forms the grounds of our epistemic access to the quantum-information realm.  
So what happens when direct consequences are drawn from the principle level generalisations 
to the material ontology? The first of our principle approaches (tentatively abandoned even in 
Chapter 2) does not fare well in this respect. As Timpson (2008) shows, Fuchs‘ approach 
faces a severe explanatory deficit: ―it is unclear how what is explanatory could be so‖ (2008, 
p. 607). This poses problems for our transcendental strategy of section 1. 4, also. The extreme 
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sensitivity of the fundamental ontological realm delineated in Fuchs‘ principle approach 
denies that there are any ―facts about the world, prior to the measurement outcome actually 
obtaining, which determine what the outcome would be, or even provide a probability 
distribution over different possible outcomes‖ (Timpson, 2008, p. 595). In that we lose the 
structural connection providing for re-identification of objects at the fundamental ontological 
level (this is not an epistemic, but a metaphysical deficiency now). When constructing the 
full-blown dispositional account of the fundamental ontology, we cannot provide a stable 
foundation for the repeatable, regular behaviour of objects in interaction, ―the rules of 
composition of the powers are too loose (or are non-existent) [...], giving rise to the lawless 
pattern of events‖ (Timpson, 2008, p. 597). Our transcendental account of section 1.4 not 
only loses the ground of separable ontology, but an altogether greater one of anything that 
can be said about how things are ―occurrently‖ (Timpson, ibid.). This plays into the hands of 
the postmodern critic, when Timpson (2008) recalls Wittgenstein‘s claim that nothing would 
do as well as something about which nothing could be said. Any hope of the depth of 
explanation is likewise lost.  
However, even Bub, as one of the proponents of the CBH programme, seems intent to follow 
some way down Fuchs‘ route in suggesting the possible metaphysical glimpses beyond the 
principle approach. In Bub and Pitowsky‘s (2008) exposition a principle theory is the best 
epistemic account of a metaphysically fundamentally indeterministic universe. In that they 
block the route to any deeper explanation beyond what can be given by the acceptance of the 
constraining principles of information manipulation. This we take to be the meaning of their 
claim that there is no explanation of the series of observed events through real change in the 
correlations between separated events at the micro-level, as opposed to other possible 
observed events in a quantum measurement process – the occurrence is constrained by the 
generalised principles of information manipulation, and only by those. Even if this does not 
directly damage neither the separability expectations for the fundamental ontology nor the 
structure that is meant to connect it to the observable ontology, it nonetheless denies any 
possibility of a deeper explanation by making senseless any truth-conditions for conceivable 
counterfactual situations.  The consequences for our transcendental strategy are simply that 
even if the supposed damaging separability violations are an illusion, we await to be told 
what the connection is between that which is constrained by the generalised principles and 
the fundamental ontology of the world. In historical terms we must have at least a possibility 
of finding the Lorentz-style constructive explanation of length contraction, for it is the 
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conceptual prerequisite of a framework (of Special Theory of Relativity) in which the rods 
demonstrably contract and clocks slow down.  
4. 3. Non-separability and the derivation of fundamental physical laws  
One possible route to be taken as a lesson from the principle approaches to enlighten us any 
deeper on the potential separability-violation issues is to try and find the ways of holding on 
to the transcendental strategy whilst admitting non-separability as an explanatorily benign 
feature of the material world. This marries the principle approaches‘ attempts to dismiss 
threatening separability violation as an illusion with the (hard-core) realist approach of the 
constructive approaches in assigning the essential characteristics of the ‗troublesome‘ 
phenomena to material ontology. That is to argue against Howard‘s contention (1989) 
presented in section 1. 4., that separability violations threaten the very core of our 
foundational conceptual scheme, the isomorphic connection between the physically 
fundamental ontology and the objects of everyday experience, through the primary qualities 
of material existents. In fact, if Newtonian physics could (albeit uneasily) live with the non-
local laws and yet account for the everyday experience, maybe quantum theory can find 
ontological elements to bear the brunt of the separability-violation without denying the realist 
firmament of the stable extended material existents.  
This is precisely the position Dickson (1998) advocates, arguing against the problems put 
forth by Howard (1994) in section 1. 4. Dickson claims that it is ontological holism that is 
threatening to our core conceptual scheme (the latter featuring in Luntley‘s transcendental 
strategy) and not simple action at a distance. He proposes to align (if not identify) what 
Howard calls separability-violation with holism (i.e. to claim that holism implies violations of 
separability and vice versa), and what Howard calls locality-violation with action at a 
distance (again: violations of locality imply action at a distance and vice versa). His 
conclusion is then that quantum formalism in the troublesome phenomena requires accepting 
action at a distance (i.e. violations of locality), and that that in itself is not damaging to our 
conceptual scheme as it can be accommodated in a way similar to accommodating existence 
of gravitational influences in the conceptual scheme of Newtonian physics. Maudlin (2007a) 
was also presented above as arguing for a similar point, by requiring the ontology of beables 
to be local whilst the laws (also a part of ontology, or at least the physical world-view) could 
be non-local. Yet the initially plausible analogy has to be further addressed before the end of 
this chapter.   
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So here is a possible middle ground to be extracted from the multiple presentations of the 
problem above, and cast in the light of our second case-study instance: the constructive 
approach of Bohmian Mechanics (below, cf. also Chapter 3 above). We are in fact looking 
for a way to show that though notionally separability is violated, the violation is not such as 
to threaten our entire conceptual scheme based on the extended matter (as suggested in 
section 1. 4 above). This is effectively arguing for the violation of locality, i.e. showing that 
separability as a deeper principle can be conserved if we allow only some aspects of our 
foundational ontology, and not those central to the suggested transcendental strategy (of 
(Luntley, 1995) and section 1. 4 above), to display action-at-a-distance and thus violate a 
weaker principle of locality. 
In their analysis of the issue Timpson and Brown (2003) claim that separability in Einstein‘s 
works takes the form of a transcendental strategy, with somewhat different purpose of the one 
we had been considering above, argument for the possibility of framing empirical laws. This 
can be seen as part of the Luntley‘s transcendental strategy sketched above, as along with the 
stable ontology the argument implicitly requires a possibility of grasping the laws that govern 
the changes of the material ontology. Again the primary qualities of ontology can be said to 
give the laws their understandable form, i.e. when referred to those features the laws can be 
seen as contributing to the isomorphism between the ‗real‘ processes and the experienced 
phenomena. But Timpson and Brown (2003, p. 7) go on to push for a distinction within 
Einstein‘s ‗original invocation of separability‘ in (Einstein, 1948) into separability-proper 
(―requirement that separated objects have their own independent real states (in order that 
physics can have a subject matter, the world be divided up into pieces about which statements 
can be made)‖ (Timpson & Brown, 2003, p. 7)) and locality (―requirement that the real state 
of one system remain unaffected by changes to a distant system‖ (Timpson and Brown, 
ibid.)). The transcendental strategy can then go through, and not have to adopt empirical 
adequacy of the quantum formalism as its scientifically derived counter-example, if we take 
the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena to be violating locality, but not violating separability.  
For as quantum formalism (with its generalising principle of no-signalling) shows we can 
formulate empirically adequate  laws governing the locally observed phenomena without 
having to take into account the state of affairs at a set of unspecified distant locations. This 
does imply that the formalism of the theory will not be as precise as we might have wished it 
to be (though this need not imply that it is formally incomplete), but it does not imply that in 
order to make it more precise we must take into account the state of affairs at various distant 
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locations. When we use the laws to predict the occurrence of phenomena the general 
prohibition of superluminal signalling (respected in both our principle and constructive 
approaches) guarantees that whatever phenomena occur at distant locations, our predictions 
concerning our local phenomena cannot be improved. Of course, if we include the classical 
signal improvements can be achieved, but that very signal is not even a locality violating 
process. Thus if we take the empirical testing of laws to be achieved through correct 
predictions of the phenomena, then ―[it] is established by the no-signalling theorem [that] the 
probabilities for the outcomes of any measurement on a given sub-system, as opposed to the 
state of that system, cannot be affected by operations performed on a distant system, even in 
the presence of entanglement. Thus the no-signalling theorem entails that quantum theory 
would remain empirically testable, despite violating locality‖ (Timpson & Brown, 2003, p. 
8).  
Due to no-signalling we can then not predict locally the changes our system is supposed to 
have undergone on the subsequent explanatory account, but that also allows us to rest all 
local explanatory accounts on what we can predict without fear that they will be falsified by 
such changes. In other words we need not open the possibility of ontological holism. We do 
import from the principle methodology the acceptance of the generalised no-signalling 
prohibition (modified so as not to be expressed in terms of information-ontology) which of 
necessity skips over the contentious issue Einstein raised: how come we can reliably 
formulate laws when we cannot satisfactorily conceptually isolate our objects of experiment 
from the rest of the universe. And admittedly this element remains mysterious, though the 
constructive approaches‘ notion of quantum equilibrium aims to give some account of it. If 
we consider Einstein‘s stronger version of separability as an epistemic condition on 
formulation of laws then blunt acceptance of the no-signalling theorem (regardless of its 
subsequent constructive account through the complex notion of quantum equilibrium) 
provides us with effective epistemic separability as required. Bub‘s deep methodological 
principle suggests we should not go further than that, but in search of the explanation that can 
be united with the transcendental strategy we have already forgone that prohibition. Now we 
view one of the CBH generalising principles as an epistemic, not metaphysical limitation. 
This certainly weakens the ideal account that the realism of the transcendental strategy would 
want, but as we shall aim to illustrate below it does not prohibit all possibility of ontological 
explanatory connection between everyday experience and the troublesome phenomena.  
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Prediction should not be directly equated with explanation, and in fact some of the grounds 
for Luntley‘s transcendental strategy against the antirealist criticism is provided precisely by 
that asymmetry (this is in the cases where the prediction is imprecise). So one might object 
that when giving an explanatory account of the micro-physical phenomena violations of 
locality will still provide difficulties for provision of a complete and precise account. But 
Timpson and Brown (2003) claim that this is a problem of a different kind, a problem that 
may be resolved by appeal to different measures, from the objections that empirical laws 
cannot be determined due to doubts about underlying ontological holism. In our case, a 
defender of Luntley‘s transcendental strategy would claim that though troublesome 
phenomena require additions to the conceptual scheme that encompasses the common sense 
core and classical physics, the very conceptual scheme is not throwing up inconsistencies 
between requirement of primitive individuation of the segments of material reality (the basic 
ontology of objects) and the ontological holism of the same material substratum. It is the 
empirical generalisation of no-signalling, or its deeper constructive explanations in terms of 
quantum equilibrium, that secure the viability of the quantum formalism alongside our 
common-sense understanding of the world. In other words, we can argue that neither the 
formalism itself, nor the constructive renderings of it, force us to a view of ontological holism 
(and it is worth bearing in mind that this is a stronger threat than the notion of an all 
permeating field, for the latter still allows for a local individuation of characteristics of the 
foundational ‗element‘ of reality) that forbids the individuation of objects in local regions of 
space-time.
108
  
But it does impose some demands on the explanatory conceptual framework of our case-
study constructive approach. Most notably, though predictively this was not required if we 
stay at the level of quantum formalism and its statistical character, in terms of explanation it 
must account for the violation of locality (i.e. account for the no-signal action-at-a-distance), 
whilst showing how ontologically separability is maintained in the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena. 
We can permit that separability to be of the weaker form (out of several possible forms 
considered in (Healey, 2004)): physical processes behind phenomena in a spacetime region R 
supervene on an assignment of intrinsic physical properties to extended objects (again this 
can include fields as well) and the local proscriptions of the universal law governing the 
                                                             
108 It is worth bearing in mind here, and this is also further explored in Timpson and Brown (2003), that Everett 
interpretation, missing from this analysis, is not forced to adopt ontological holism either as it outright 
excludes the notion of collapse which Einstein used alongside that of entanglement in exposing the tension 
between the completeness of quantum theory and principle of separability.  
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changes of the intrinsic properties at points of R and/or in arbitrarily small neighbourhoods of 
those points. But we must give some account of how changes to the overall entangled system 
(as implied in what Maudlin (2007b), in Chapter 3 above, termed abandonment of 
separability) are communicated into changes (even if locally unpredictable and imperceptible, 
as in the case of symmetric and anti-symmetric triplet and singlet states) of the local 
separated extended material ontology. In essence we have to show whether, and if yes how, 
Luntley‘s transcendental strategy can survive the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena on constructive 
account. Though separability is not violated in a sense that we can‘t formulate any laws 
governing the behaviour of a localised group of objects, that law itself cannot be taken to 
supervene at all times solely on the structured arrangement of the intrinsic state of those 
objects alone. Our empirical equivalence then results in alternative views of the problem of 
whether a primitive thisness of objects or supervening generalisations should be maintained.  
Constructive approaches in the light of non-separable laws  
How does the universal law ‗transmit‘ (or even record) the local mechanical interactions that 
the proximal particle undergoes to the distant one? Correlations in measurement outcomes on 
our separated particles cannot be attributed to a common cause (cf. the (Maudlin, 2007b) 
exposition of separability violation in 3. 2. 2 above), but neither can they be attributed to the 
transmission of directly detectable signals between the particles. They are taken to simply 
come about without a contact-interaction causal mechanism, through an unknowable nomic 
prescription (encoded in the universal law) that they should. A serious question arises: how 
does this explain them? Is this not simply hiding the lack of separability-respecting 
explanation under a carpet, a carpet imprinted with a neo-Bohrian pattern similar to the 
epistemic limitations of principle explanations?  
In terms of comparison with the principle approaches of Chapter 2, we have to ask whether 
allocating the occurrence of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena to the universal law capable of 
affecting locally the distant particle, based on changes the proximal particle undergoes at a 
separated location, is not just a return to the ‗black box‘ explanatory agnosticism about 
material processes as given by the principle approaches. Bohmian mechanics is forced to 
explain wherefrom comes this limit on what can be learnt about the universe in a theory so 
precise, with precise motion of spatially located, almost tangible, particles. This is, so it 
seems, where the constructive approach leans close to the principle one.  
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Finally, when explanation of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena is offered by the constructive 
approaches how well does it tie in with the requirements for durability of individuation of 
spatial entities seemingly behind the ‗transcendental‘ argument? Most notably, if all the 
relevant information for dissolving the ‗troublesome‘ aspect of the said phenomena as 
required by the transcendental strategy comes from the universal law (wavefunction) alone, 
how fundamental is the extended material ontology?  
The constructive approaches of the previous chapter, most notably the ultimate suggestion to 
treat the wavefunction in Bohmian Mechanics as the universal law of temporal evolution 
governing the behaviour of the fundamental primitive ontological entities, the particles, aim 
to outdo the principle approaches in the provision of explanation compatible with the 
‗transcendental‘ argument by specifying how empirical adequacy of the theoretical formalism 
is achieved in terms of the material existents, the very same entities that physically construct 
the objects that our everyday concepts refer to (Goldstein, 2007). They specify what 
ontological elements of the real world make the quantum formalism empirically successful. 
They aim to not only uphold the same constraining principles that the principle approaches 
put accent on, but to show how those principles arise in the world of ontology that is 
supposed to support explanations required by the ‗transcendental‘ argument. In that they 
encounter problems of their own, most of which we shall try to address in the following 
sections, but more importantly they shed light on the nature of explanation required to 
accommodate the ‗transcendental‘ argument and the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena.  
With the postulation of the primitive ontology of particles and the kinematic guidance they 
receive from the wavefunction, elaborate arithmetical proofs are employed (as surveyed in 
the previous chapter) to show that the slightly modified formalism of Bohmian Mechanics is 
empirically equivalent to the bare quantum formalism. Now if the latter is capable of 
generating empirically testable situations, as suggested in the previous section, despite not 
being able to guarantee ontological separability of all elements of nature, then we have a way 
of dissolving the worries about potential consequences of the implications of violations of 
separability for the ‗transcendental‘ argument. Bohmian Mechanics, just like the minimal 
versions of quantum theory focused on the predictive manipulations of the formalism alone, 
can support enough stable empirical structure for the postulation of existence (and tentative 
guesstimates of) laws of nature.  
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The problem is, though, that it must treat the fundamental element of the bare formalism, the 
‗system‘ wavefunction featured in the Schrödinger equation, in the same way as principle 
approaches do: as a rational guesstimate of the state that the particles of interest are in 
conditional on the state of the remaining particles in the universe and the universal 
wavefunction. Great deal of mathematical derivation is employed to show that this can be 
done (cf. references in Chapter 3), but even more is required to show why this must be so: i.e. 
why we cannot simply directly read off the state of the universal law and its effects on the 
local particles (the ‗objects at hand‘ required for the depth-of-explanation). The latter is 
enshrined in the assumption of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, a constructive version of 
the constraining principles. Given this hypothesis which limits in principle what we can 
epistemically access concerning the fundamental ontological elements, the ordinary system 
wavefunction is the best information
109
 we can have about the system at hand (Goldstein, 
2007, p. 13). Though this seems to play into the hands of the principle approaches of Chapter 
2, it needn‘t be seen as such. The further step is provided by allowing us to draw inferences 
about the nature of reality that operates in a regulated and understandable manner even with 
this epistemic limitation.  
Goldstein (2007) claims that this is by no means putting the cart before the horse, because the 
analyses cited in Chapter 3 (most notably (Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992)) show that we 
are justified in treating these rational guesstimates from the postulations of fundamental 
ontology as genuine probability statements about real-world events, statements that are 
relevant to characterisation of what phenomena we actually expect to experience (and can 
experientially verify). Our survey of the issue above should also convince us of the 
conceivability of this claim. Moreover, Goldstein draws on formal analyses that show that no 
more detailed information can be available about the changes in the fundamental material 
ontology than is given by the system wavefunction which respects the constraint of the 
quantum equilibrium hypothesis.  
                                                             
109 It is important to note here, though, that the marriage between the principle approaches and this particular 
constructive approach is not as straightforward as suggested by Goldstein (2007) in the light of the lengthy 
discussion above. Most notably, what Goldstein and our answer to questions posed above are referring to is 
the qualitative sense of information (‘type information’ along the lines suggested by Timpson (2004) above), 
and it remains to be seen what its relationship to the quantitative sense that the principle approaches employ 
is. It is a further task for the constructive approach along these lines to show how the principle approaches can 
methodologically arise, given the nature of reality as suggested by this particular constructive approach. This is 
not necessarily an impossible task, but is one requiring further elaboration than is given in simple equating of 
the effective system wavefunction with as-complete-as-possible information about the state of the particles of 
interest.  
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Thus the gap between the knowledge of the occurrence of the phenomena and its 
understanding is bridged by claiming that the phenomena arise (through a structural 
isomorphism) out of the spatial configurations of the fundamental ontological elements, when 
governed by the universal law of temporal evolution. As the law itself is not directly 
epistemically accessible to display this governing, we rely on the informationally as-
complete-as-possible guesstimate of its proscriptions given by the system wavefunction that 
is formally conditional on the state of all the particles in the universe and the universal law 
governing them. The further why regress, as to why the universal law proscribes what it does, 
is stopped by its fundamental ontological status: the (epistemically unattainable) universal 
wavefunction just is the formal expression of the universal law governing the spatiotemporal 
changes of all fundamental building blocks of material objects.  
Despite the objections of the anti-realist critic we peacefully accept a certain form of 
ontological holism when we employ the equilibrium-conditioned guesstimation of the 
‗universal law plus particles‘ mechanism (i.e. information codified in the universal 
wavefunction) in our experimental situations. But the said holism is not threatening as it still 
allows us to formulate empirically adequate rules (though not themselves the fundamental 
laws of nature but conditional on them) regulating the occurrence of the phenomena. 
Goldstein claims that there are further mathematical guarantees that ―the observed 
deterministic regularities would be classical‖ (Goldstein, 2007, p. 16). That is to say, formally 
we can expect all the observed regularities to be obeyed, just as our core conceptual 
framework requires. Through the notion of ―local beables‖, the fundamental extended entities 
of the material reality, we have a direct structural and conceptual isomorphism with the core 
concepts of the everyday conceptual framework, such as are given by the primary qualities of 
directly identifiable objects. But, our explanation of the troublesome phenomena, requires 
that we admit into the ontology another essential element: the universal law that allows (in 
fact instigates) the elements of the material ontology to behave in a non-separable way the 
macroscopic effects of which we observe in the troublesome phenomena. Nonetheless, given 
the constraining principles (and the constructive account of their origin) the foundation of the 
conceptual framework is not jeopardised as its elements are not shown to be illusory: we can 
use it as the starting point of the transcendental strategy. Moreover, the beables give us a 
straightforward way to identify the object that undergoes real and counterfactual changes in 
the situations that we aim to explain. Still we will have to say more below about how exactly 
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this proceeds, i.e. what kind of explanation is required to marry the partially non-separable 
ontology with the seeming expectations of separability from the everyday conceptual scheme.  
Yet, does this legitimise us saying that we understand the interactions between separated 
formally entangled objects, any more than the establishment of limiting principles for 
information manipulation does? We have to be careful not to use this question to slide back 
into the view of universal wavefunction as the all-permeating field that takes on to itself the 
mechanical influences from the local particles and transmits them in a non-separable way to 
the distant set of particles (and vice versa). This was shown to be an erroneous view from the 
beginning as even the formalism does not encode any influences from the particles to be 
‗recorded‘ in the effective wavefunction. We might, though, expect them to be recorded in 
the fundamental one, only not expressed in its derivative – the manipulable effective 
wavefunction. Goldstein is adamant that we must never confuse the effective with the 
universal wavefunction, although the former is dynamical and manipulable, the latter is not 
even expected to be.  
―But for Bohmian mechanics, that the [universal] 
wave function does not change is, far from being a 
problem, just what the doctor ordered for a law, one 
that governs the changes that really matter in a 
Bohmian universe; of the variables Q describing the 
fundamental objects in the theory, including the 3-
geometry and matter.‖ (Goldstein, 2007, p. 18) 
Yet, the universal law itself, upon which so much hinges in this explanation, is in-principle 
unknowable and directly susceptible to be ostracised by Bub‘s ‗deep methodological 
principle‘ for example. The answer to this requires drawing on the realist traditions that claim 
that we can know a law exists even if we don‘t know exactly what it is (Bhaskar, 1978). This 
is to widen our transcendental strategy to include the causal ascriptions of reality alongside 
structural durability of objects. This, in turn, was argued for by the abandonment of the 
epistemic atomism of the structural state of matter in phenomena, and shifting the focus on 
the atomism of an enduring object that undergoes changes in the phenomena (Harre, 1996). 
That is, we have to permit ascriptions of reality that result from a causal natural (not logical) 
necessity, as well as what is mediated by the bare structure of extension alone.  
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Our second worry might be that in explanatory sense elements of this constructive approach 
are pushing us back to the disregarded world-view of pre-established harmony. Namely, if 
there is no mechanism through which the material ontology (the particles) affects the effective 
influence transmitter, the universal wavefunction, are we not consigned to the blunt view of 
individual particles locked in a monadic dance choreographed by the universal law? The 
picture is one of perfect clockwork, but clockwork where no hands can be stopped as there 
are no influences actually transmitted between different elements of the mechanism. But to 
accept this criticism is to be too attached to the mechanistic world-view as the only form of 
causal world-view. As the discussion in Chapter 1 showed, this can be historical mistake also, 
and there are precursors even in classical mechanics where we have been forced to accept the 
action-at-a-distance without the mediating mechanism. The question is how we were not 
pushed to considerations of pre-established harmony then. And the answer is, some, like 
Leibniz, were, but the rest of us just took it to be a non-explicable (and thus foundational) 
fact about the world that objects with mass will affect each other at a distance. The effective 
regularity was there (even in the absence of the mechanism) and that was enough. It had to 
be.  
Likewise, we can allow that the universal law specifies (but not transmits) how the 
fundamental objects will affect each other in interactions. Moreover it tells us how the 
relations established between the objects will reflect in their local states, by having some 
glimpse of the law we can learn more about the states of the objects than we can simply from 
observing each of them in isolation (i.e. locally), because the law provides a rule by which 
such inference is legitimised. The law, or what we can derive from it, will also tell us what to 
predictively expect of the objects, but due to limitations of derivation, will not tell us exactly 
what will become of them in the future. The derivation on the other hand should be 
sufficiently formally regulated to alleviate fears of chaotic modification (most notably those 
affecting the possibility of reidentification) of the structured state of the primary qualities of 
the said objects. Thus in our troublesome phenomena we can generate counterfactual 
situations in which we can show how the interventions on one of the particles produced 
‗regulated‘ effects on the distant one (for example by ‗providing‘ the local conditions 
required for informationally rich future measurements on a distant particle in teleportation – 
without actually instantaneously moving the particle itself; as well as allowing the proximal 
experimenter to predict the results of potential measurements on the distant one by ‗reading 
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off‘ the conditions set up in the universal law and the states of the local particle – previously 
coupled with the distant one).  
The fundamental material objects will undergo changes in such circumstances that cannot be 
predicted from the state of their local environment (even from the limited local derivation of 
the limited conditional wavefunction – the mini-law), but that can be predicted – and what is 
most important for us, can be explained – when a more global perspective is adopted, better 
conditionalized on the universal law specifying their changes in time. Just as in Newtonian 
mechanics taking increasing number of distant masses into consideration (but under a rational 
guidance of what is sensible for the given situation) increases the predictive capabilities of 
the change in non-inertial motion of the local mass. We gain better understanding of the 
mass‘ behaviour when seeing it as a system of ‗gravitationally‘ (i.e. 'regulatedly') interacting 
objects, then when trying to account for potentials for re-identification of a single isolated 
massive objects seemingly irregularly undergoing changes of inertial motion (most notably 
the changes of the rate of change of position). The depth of explanation is provided by 
showing how potentially varying the state of the objects crucially involved in the interaction 
changes the phenomena in a regulated way, by showing how adding or removing the masses 
and altering their relative positions affects the phenomena in the way that simply altering the 
position of a single mass in isolation cannot. Yet we have to see how this explanation is better 
for the ‗transcendental‘ argument than the one in which no significance is attributed to the 
mass of the objects themselves, but rather to the general constraining principles governing 
their interplay.  
Of course, just as is the case with the principle approaches, there are further technical 
difficulties to be resolved, most notably those of rigorously showing that given all that we can 
rationally infer about the universal wavefunction we are justified in holding the conditional 
wavefunction to be behave just as expected from the empirically successful bare quantum 
formalism. That is we need a formal demonstration how the system can be for the purposes of 
many versions of the transcendental strategy suitably decoupled from the totality of the 
universe and that most complete Schrödinger equation for the totality of the ontology in the 
universe can at least have an appropriate form (given that it can‘t be specified exactly) 
(Goldstein, 2007, p. 19). Still the arm-waving information provided above should allow us 
enough insight to compare the potential for deeper explanations concordant with the 
transcendental strategy of section 1. 4 and the occurrence of the troublesome phenomena. We 
are also interested in addressing the general structural components of such explanations to be 
184 
 
applied to the common-sense conceptual framework. The starting point, though, should by 
now be clear; we should be able to see what Bohmian Mechanics on the final rendering from 
the end of Chapter 3 says about the nature of independently existing reality.  
4. 4 Explanation and the two approaches   
From the perspective that accepts Bub‘s ‗deep methodological principle‘, the perspective of 
empiricism, even though the local beables enable us to make an easy and intuitive connection 
with the fundamental structural features of the direct experience they cannot furnish a deeper 
explanation than the explanatory models that don‘t contain the right sort of beables at all (the 
principle approaches in our case). Though on the face of it, the constructive approach seems 
appealing because of its structural similarity to the much preferred causal mechanical model, 
at the present stage of development the appeal is a result of an illusion. The reason for that is 
that with committing to metaphysical postulates the constructive approach cannot avoid the 
dangers of the separability violation in the right way. If it consigns them to an action of non-
spatial entity, such as the universal law, it is merely hiding behind another cloak the bare 
phenomenological generalisation of no-signalling prohibition: we cannot know the exact 
mechanism by which the action-at-a-distance phenomena come about. The mechanism is 
there, it does not involve transmission of influences along space-time paths, but we are 
forever prohibited from knowing exactly how it works (how the proscriptions of the law in a 
limited region relate to all the relevant proscriptions in other regions, i.e. what the global 
wavefunction is).
110
 What they effectively say is that though the ultimate universal 
wavefunction is informationally complete (though, crucially, not ontologically complete in 
the terminology of (Maudlin, 2007a)) in-principle limits of knowability prevent us from 
making explanatory use of the completeness. 
So we end up in the same mess as those who claim that effective wavefunctions are 
informationally incomplete (e.g. the Fuchs principle approach as presented above) and then 
have to search for the ontological account of the limits of knowability. What constructive 
explanatory account in fact presents us with is the pre-established harmony situation, where 
distant elements of reality sometimes affect each other without any (epistemically accessible) 
intervening mechanism established between them in space. The effect is ‗transmitted‘ (and 
                                                             
110
 This, of course, holds for the case-study instance as presented here for the specific purpose of comparison. 
There are in fact suggestions in the literature (cf. (Valentini & Westman, 2004) for recent suggestions) how the 
limit of knowability may be circumnavigated or removed, and suggestions for empirical verification should 
certainly be explored. In the present case, however, we take them to still be lacking and that the in-principle 
unknowability as resulting from the quantum equilibrium state holds.  
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that term has to be taken with great caution here) through the causal action of a fundamental 
law, the universal wavefunction, so as to allow for some visible correlations between the 
states of the separated and separable elements of reality. And this, warns van Fraassen 
((1989b, p. 112), original emphasis) can only accomplish two functions: to postulate an entity 
that has either predetermined all our supposedly free interactions, or simply coordinates what 
we call an interaction ‗externally‘ to both parties; or ―to admit that we have no explanation 
but to refuse to consider the correlation mysterious nonetheless‖. Pre-established harmony is 
just not a token causal-mechanical type of explanation, and cannot pride itself on having its 
traditional virtues. Yet as we have seen, the principle approaches struggle to even get a 
deeper explanation off the ground as they refuse to rely on any causal structure that is not a 
product (and not a pre-requisite) of our explanatory conceptualisations of the phenomena. 
Due to ‗troublesome‘ nature of our phenomena of interest they cannot find any such stable 
structure and are forced to relegate explanation-stumps to the unfamiliar territory of abstract 
entities that are strongly mind-dependent.  
The difference between the approaches in the end lies in the philosophical position adopted, 
as might have been expected from the initial empirical equivalence of the different ‗quantum 
theories‘. From the perspective of trying to provide an explanation sufficient for the 
transcendental strategy but limited to the epistemic accessibility of the ontic concepts 
employed, i.e. the perspective where ontology is largely reducible to epistemology, the two 
approaches come strikingly close together, despite explicit methodological differences. The 
principle approaches are forced to admit a dispositional aspect of the properties they venture 
to ascribe to the elements of material reality (the ‘be-ables’ instead of ‗beables‘; cf. (Howard, 
1989)). These properties, despite quantum theories‘ success in providing predictive laws, 
cannot supply sufficiently firm grounds for the ‗transcendental‘ argument. Nothing can be 
known about reality-in-itself, as it is so unpredictably sensitive to observation-intervention. 
The principle approaches are forced to this position because they are unable to say what the 
ultimate nature of ontological elements is, beyond their dispositions to exhibit certain 
properties when prompted to do so by experimenters’ actions. They start off with what is 
directly epistemically accessible and happens to be enshrined in the conceptualisation of 
persisting objects, but there is no possibility of linking (in the present state of the 
development of the programme) the potentially dispositional concepts employed in the 
explanation of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena to this conceptual framework as conformant 
with minimal realist structure in the transcendental strategy. Their explanation of the 
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phenomena (including the ‗troublesome‘ ones) in terms of fundamental ontology cannot 
provide truth-conditions for counterfactual situations centred on the ontological elements to 
provide an explanation that goes beyond the regularities predicted and observed. They leave 
the changes the ontology undergoes as mysteriously holistic and essentially indescribable. In 
that they struggle to both bridge the gap between knowing that the phenomena occur and why 
they occur as they do. Furthermore, the why-regress cannot be easily stopped.  
The constructive approaches overcome this problem, by speculating on the nature of the 
universal law that governs the changes (thus making the changes be real alterations from one 
state of the exiting property to another such state, not from a collapse from a spectrum of 
dispositions into a concrete state). They view the phenomena as a wholesome process of an 
operation of a really existing law on a really existing ontology, with occasional disregard for 
the spatial and mechanical structure relating the existents. Yet they are forced to admit an in-
principle epistemic inaccessibility of this law and rely on elaborate mathematical speculation 
as to how we can gain incomplete glimpses of the requirements of the law. By philosophical 
commitment to viewing the phenomena as more than a series of events, they venture to offer 
grounds for the transcendental strategy of direct structural connections between the 
fundamental ontology and the common-sense conceptualisation of the world. But for the 
argument to succeed they have to modify the starting point of the transcendental strategy to 
recognise more structure in the common-sense conception than was originally envisaged. 
Through this loophole they can make the requirement acceptance of what is in-principle 
forever epistemically inaccessible as real. For it to be acceptable, the anti-realist critics would 
have to be convinced of sound reasons to abandon empirical realism in general analyses of 
the conceptual framework, to replace it by so-called transcendental realism.  
Instead of seeing the principle approaches as conservatively limiting speculation to the 
merely epistemically accessible, we could view them as committed to the ‗epistemic fallacy‘, 
when shying away from the ontological investigations behind the apparent phenomena 
(especially, ‗troublesome‘ phenomena). In that way they commit to the Humean Mosaic of 
series of appearances, such as the informational relations that are established between the 
separated ‗black-box‘ instruments, but that do not inform us of the laws governing the 
objective non-instantaneous behaviour of the black boxes. The laws that they do establish as 
the principle generalisations cannot be understood as causal laws in the material domain at 
all. They can at best concern the information-ontology. And this is to be expected of efforts to 
stick to the metaphysics that is always reducible to epistemology: it creates its own ‗implicit 
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ontology‘ and ‗implicit realism‘ (Bhaskar, 1978) only in special domains. So we get the 
ontology based on the category of experience and a realism based on the presumed 
characteristics of the objects of experiences, in this case the expected informational content of 
the formal quantum states. Bhaskar claims that such strategy leads to the generation of 
methodology that is either irrelevant to science, or relevant to science but inconsistent with 
epistemology. We can see this well in the information-ontology speculation, where we are 
either waiting to be told of what the relevant connection to the material objects of science is, 
or we have to establish the new science of information-manipulation but one that is difficult 
to connect to the conceptual scheme of our everyday (but also experimental in this case) 
experience of objective laboratories and ‗black-box‘ machines.  
The greatest weakness of the principle approaches, despite the expectations we might have 
had of them at the outset is that they struggle to connect the abstract novel ontology to the 
foundational elements of the core-conceptual framework. The ease of unification of concepts 
was meant to be their greatest strength, but in the light of the conceptually challenging 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena its advantages have been lost and the principle approaches have 
been left with inadequate resources to connect the structures of the two ontological realms 
(the informational and the material). On the other hand, when they venture to establish this 
connection they jeopardise either then separable ‗individuality‘ of elements of material 
objects (as in instrumentalism) which their particular methodology aimed to preserve, or the 
requirement of the transcendental stem that there are epistemically accessible facts about the 
world. In the light of the world-making charge, they don‘t provide a way to successfully 
conceptually connect the novel ontology (at this stage this can be entities or properties) with 
the foundational aspect of the common-sense conceptual scheme required for the 
transcendental strategy for simple realism. The novel ontology on its own though, is not 
sufficiently well understood to be able to enter the common-sense conceptual scheme (and 
there are claims that it never will be able to aspire to such status; cf. Timpson, 2004; 2008) 
without this mediation via matter as extended substance.  
In the light of explanation of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena‘ required for the successful 
universal application of the transcendental strategy, the principle approaches lack a 
foundation for a formulation of a causal law that can abandon the perspective of the Humean 
Mosaic. Such mosaic, when featuring elements otherwise included in the ‗troublesome 
phenomena‘, does not on its own provide enough structure to extract concepts of enduring 
objects that play essential role in the starting point of the transcendental strategy. The general 
188 
 
constraining principles of information manipulation do not provide sufficient conceptual 
ground for a causal law ‗limiting‘ changes in matter, and a parallel notion is not offered in the 
information ontology, so the transcendental strategy cannot be constructed. That is their 
weakness as compared to the constructive approaches when providing the explanation needed 
for the transcendental strategy to succeed given the apparent separability violations in the 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena.  
Humean Mosaic as presented above fails to account for the necessity and universality of laws 
which in turn, given our empirical experience of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena, requires an 
explanatory ontology that cannot sustain the transcendental strategy for its very existence. 
The ‗troublesome‘ phenomena teach us that we can come to know more, and manipulate 
more, of the real world when we take it to be a structure of material ontology (with essential 
features related to separability) coupled with (at least partially epistemically accessible) 
causal laws that govern the changes under which it still maintains identity as the fundamental 
object of experience. Reality is on this strategy attributed to (initially) speculative ontology 
on the basis of causal lawfulness as well as direct perception of states of objects.  
Explanations aim at global economy of concepts, but such that provides for a greater variety 
of changes in characterising the object enduring through the phenomenon. In fact, the 
phenomenon is to be set in the conceptual network as the regulated change of the enduring 
object. Through this object-concept link such explanations connect to the transcendental 
strategy which rests on the universal acceptance of central role of the concepts of individual 
enduring material objects. If the concepts taken as central in explanation of the phenomenon 
are not characterised as enduring identifiable entities (and re-identifiable through further 
development of the situation) then such explanations struggle to connect to the realist attitude 
developed through the transcendental strategy that is seen as the background securing 
superiority of such explanations over provisionally constructed narratives. Traditionally, 
primacy of extension was seen as a possible straightforward connector of the speculative 
elements of explanatory narratives and the segment that is directly epistemically accessible. 
That notion of extension carried with it some constrictions on behaviour attributed to 
separation. Quantum theories deny that constricting role of separation. Our case-study 
explanatory constructs are challenged to give an account of what replaces it.  
When we construct explanations we come to rely on more than on what can be predicted, we 
retrodict to an account that makes sense, that unifies a particular experimental experience 
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(which is, crucially, more than just an observation of the local state of material existents upon 
completion of the experiment) with the core elements of the conceptual scheme. The 
constructive approaches that deny the Humean Mosaic can, at least notionally, achieve this 
by showing the phenomena to be a product of extended objects and specific (classically 
unheard of) causal laws, the latter giving rise to the changes in material ontology that cannot 
be accounted for solely from its local powers. It remains to be seen what the price for this 
‗achievement‘ is.  
Fundamental ontology and the acceptance of the universal-law-Bohmian worldview  
The constructive approaches overcome all these obstacles, when they venture beyond the 
limits of direct epistemic accessibility, but we must address the question whether the 
ontological (potentially non-separable) features can be distinguished from the 
epistemological features of the explanation they provide. The aim is to guarantee the 
isomorphism between the gross structure of directly experienced reality, as the prerequisite of 
the transcendental strategy, and the fundamental structure postulated by contemporary 
quantum theory.  Maudlin (2007a) seems to suggest that we can, as Bohmian Mechanics 
marries the ―local beables‖ (entities characterised by the primitive constrictions of extension, 
including related spatial separation) and the non-local, but also non-material wavefunction. 
So, from the perspective of section 1. 4 we seem to be on safe ground: our experience is 
connected to our projections about fundamental ontology through an enduring stability of the 
essential function of the spatial extension (this can be enhanced to have a temporal element in 
the relativistic sense, as well) as given by the theoretical fundamental entities, the spatially 
located material particles with finite extension, separated by finitely extended spatial regions, 
in a word: the local beables. We say to the anti-realist that although tables and chairs are not 
the fundamental elements of our ontology, we can reconstruct them out of the fundamental 
elements that have an irreducible property of spatial extension. We can reconstruct them out 
of essentially similar components.  
Yet, the extended objects we were expecting to provide a conceptual foundation on which to 
unify the scientific and the everyday accounts, seem to harbour a threat for our transcendental 
strategy. Though we cannot consciously and willingly subject them to unpalatable changes, 
we must accept that they can in the end undergo just such changes.  If the phenomena 
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elucidated by the theory involve an abandonment of locally specifiable intrinsic ‗thisness‘111 
of objects, such as seems to be the case with teleportation on a constructive approach 
interpretation, then we seem to lose the desired connection to the common-sense conceptual 
scheme. And the latter we required to get the transcendental strategy off the ground. Though 
maintaining some aspect of the explanatory conceptual framework as primitive and 
fundamental prevents us from a rapid slide into anti-realism of the world-making type (cf. 
(Devitt, 2006); (Devitt, 1997)), there is still a worry that if the concepts of properties we use 
(all of them) have a mere dispositional basis in the real world and no direct structural 
correspondence with the realistic interpretations of contemporary science the common-sense 
realism will not have a sufficient conceptual foundation (in the ‗geometrical‘ structural 
isomorphism alone). The problematic dispositional basis lies in the proscription of the 
‗thisness‘-bearing properties by the universal law, effectively calling for their reduction to the 
law. This is, in a sense, saying that fundamentally there is just a law, but that expectation is 
difficult to connect with the starting point we need to diffuse the world-making challenge. 
Especially, as we also have to admit the universal law is in-principle unknowable. This is 
where taking quantum theory (at least in the case-study instances considered here) seriously 
exposes constructive scientific explanations to difficulties similar to those in the more 
ontologically economical principle approaches, and threatens the tenability of the 
‗transcendental‘ argument of section 1. 4. Now, the crucial thing in the fundamental status of 
some properties for the realist explanation, was the constriction (independent of humans) on 
what could be said about the world. This was the realism‘s upper hand over unrestricted 
world-making, as the latter could not account at all for why some conceptualisations work 
better than others. But, unlike the case of unrestricted world-making (cf. for example 
(Putnam, 1981), (Pettit, 1991)), in the case of fundamental laws we do once again have 
constrictions imposed by the real world: constrictions on what experiences can be expected of 
the phenomena.  
In applying the transcendental strategy we accept that there are two ways in which our 
concepts of dispositional (or secondary quality) properties are restricted: by how they depend 
on us and how they depend on the real world. The later provides a structure-characterised 
base for the transcendental strategy; our conceptual frameworks already contain concepts that 
can be identified as this base. Explanations of the phenomena can then be built through 
                                                             
111
 Again, as a reminder, this is an arm-waving intuitive thisness, not the technical terms of R. M. Adams and 
others.  
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account of causes (which are often elucidated through the explanations of the mechanistic 
style) of the activation of our disposition to judge the situation as characterised by a particular 
secondary quality. Thus we explain away the illusion. But this causal dependence can be 
relied on only if it is open to empirical investigations of the constraints it imposes on our 
thinking and concept formation. And traditionally, again, here we employ the connection of 
theorising with material reality and eventually the everyday material objects (the starting 
point of the transcendental strategy). And those, in the end, rely on a transcendental strategy 
of accepting that some of the concepts essentially associated with them are those ‗natures‘ of 
those objects and as such are not dependent on our judgement. The question we now face is 
whether the law alone can provide the required natures.  
But first, it might be objected that the law we want to rely on, the potential fundamental law 
of temporal evolution, is in-principle unknowable. So we seem to be saying that, unlike the 
world-makers, we can know how it is that some conceptual categorisations are better suited 
to explaining experiences than others, and this knowledge relies on the in-principle 
unknowable ontological element: the universal law. Let us pause to carefully unravel this 
conundrum. To start with, the universal law is not entirely unknowable, as we have useful 
‗effective‘ glimpses of it through the effective wave-functions of the quantum formalism. It 
is, on the other hand, unknowable in sufficient detail to make the formalised ‗glimpses‘ any 
more than epistemic prediction tools. But to argue from that that it is entirely ‗unreal‘ is to 
commit to an ‗epistemic fallacy‘ (Bhaskar, 1978), to expect the ontological claims to be 
confined to the same limits as the epistemic ones (in our case the limits of knowability). 
There is no urgency to accept this limit (which is essentially Bub‘s ‗deep methodological 
principle‘) if there is hope of providing a deeper explanation of the experienced phenomena 
than the principle approaches can hope for.  We can direct our explanations to answer 
ontological questions without having to transpose them into epistemological terms first. We 
can accept Bhaskar‘s claim that causal laws are ontologically distinct from patters of events 
that are epistemically accessible to us. This would allow our transcendental realist of section 
1. 4 to argue that given that we have the science we have (i.e. a functioning quantum 
formalism) the independent reality must exist and be of a certain type. But a further problem 
to resolve is how this type can be unified with a common-sense conceptual scheme so as to 
avoid the charge of world-making.  
The problematic task is then to show how constructive approach explanations can be united 
with the common conceptual scheme, in the way that that unification is easily achieved when 
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the questions are reduced to the epistemological realm. We must also show what further 
benefits an ontological speculation can provide, other than chiding well with the structure of 
the depth of explanation. It is, perhaps, important at this stage to include one final step 
towards the connection with the ‗troublesome‘ phenomenon of teleportation. We have 
already seen its greatest mystery lies in supposedly infinite availability of information to the 
distant experimenter, which has in the end dissolved as a characteristic of a global not a local 
set-up. In other words, that experimenter needn‘t worry that his account of the phenomena 
generated locally will be factually incorrect concerning the local features, only that it can be 
improved by updates from a special person – the holder of the other half of the entangled 
pair. Again, the no-signalling prohibition (enshrined in the structure of the formalism 
already), an epistemic consequence of the quantum equilibrium postulate, guarantees that 
with respect to local predictions (and even subsequent explanations) the distant experimenter 
Bob will not be able to tell whether anything metaphysically significant has happened to the 
object in his possession. However, once he takes Alice‘s manipulations into account, he will 
come to know that the object in his possession has indeed undergone important changes to its 
‗thisness‘. Here is where we tread a fine line separating this account from utter ontological 
holism. Though individual experimenters working locally cannot gather enough information 
to be certain that they can successfully re-identify objects they are working with, the full-
blown world-making is still restricted by the supposed existence of a generative mechanism 
that allows certain changes to the local object, and only those. The worry to address is 
whether this is sufficient to allow the transcendental strategy to get off the ground.  
Namely, if in the teleportation process the particles, the local beables, do actually 
instantaneously traverse the required distance (effectively instantaneously swap places across 
any distance) and carry with them all the interactions with the universal law then our simple 
strategy of reducing composite objects with intrinsic ‗thisness‘ to equally primitive 
constituent local beables fails. This is because the identity of the constituent beables can be 
changed at will from any location in the universe (provided some special operations in the 
past light cone, potentially very deep into the past), and the occurrence of change is not open 
to objective investigation. Some experimenters (Alice) have a unique epistemic position in 
the universe concerning the relevant beables. Given such a situation we have no guarantee of 
locally detectable endurance of the fundamental objects, against which to construct deeper 
explanatory accounts.  
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If on the other hand the beables themselves do not traverse the distance, but merely serve as 
placeholder for different property ascription by the universal law, then we may wonder as to 
their utility in the first place. And here the greatest weakness of the realist project on the 
constructive account is exposed. Detailed analysis of it would take us too far away from the 
limited project of comparison of the explanatory potential of the case-study instances, so only 
a brief sketch will have to do. On one hand it seems that we could replace the constructive 
account as given above by one that removes the very bare place-holder particles and converts 
the informationally rich universal law into the only existential primitive, either as a holistic 
single field in geometrical space or even as s more complex object in higher dimensional 
spaces. This is a return to the Humean Mosaic viewed in its entirety as the variations in 
structure produced by the ontologically holistic wavefunction, all of which structures are non-
separable in a metaphysical sense. We could, as a sketchy illustration, imagine this as a sea 
(that maybe consists of individual ‗water-particles‘ and maybe doesn‘t) where all the 
structures interesting from the perspective of the starting point of the transcendental strategy 
are further structures created by the sea such as waves, and whose identity is not necessarily 
tied to individual component ‗water-particles‘.  A realist might immediately object that this 
illustration also commits us to belief in space and in which both the water-particles and the 
emergent wave-structures reside and endure through changes, which might again give some 
explanatory primacy of individuation to the water-particles occupying specific positions in 
space. But less sketchy structures of this kind can be devised, perhaps along the lines of 
super-substantivalism (cf. (Sider, 2001), (Schaffer, 2007)) which reduces all emergent 
structures to property ascription to space alone.  
Yet we might worry that generation of common-sense concepts along those lines mimics that 
of anti-realist constructivism that effectively leaves the account of how concepts depend on 
the real world unexplainable and empirically untestable, making the explanations offered a 
mere empty facade of constrictions on our thinking and concept generation. Following this 
route is helped by the non-separability inherent in all aspects of the universal wavefunction, 
with no conceptual reliance on the characteristics of concepts from the framework that rely 
on the inherently separable elements of the world. Even with the (principally given and 
unexplainable) no-signalling constriction on prediction, in explanatory retrodiction we admit 
of possibility of dispositional responses that generate object-concepts to be systematically 
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thwarted so even those concepts become inherently vague.
112
 Effectively this in the end 
makes all our concepts inherently vague, barring further explanatory account, which should 
in principle be empirically testable at least in part, of how the concepts of common-sense 
depend on the real world. ―Reality may be indeterminate, and the cognition of reality may be 
subject-involving, in certain surprising ways.‖ (Pettit, 1991, p. 623) In the ascription of the 
independent reality to the bare particle-objects in constructive approach above we tried to 
cling to the notion that something at least can be pointed to as the real constraint on our 
judgements as to the character of the independently existing material reality. In a realistic 
account with some aspects understood as essential the constraints were provided by the 
typings of objects that are not dependent on us to explain the conceptual frameworks they 
provided. ―A little bit of world-making is alright against a background of a world that we did 
not make and that influences our little effort.‖ (Devitt, 1997, p. 255) What we have to bear in 
mind is that the universal wavefunction in this materialised form is still in-principle 
unknowable, so we are short of constrictions for the explanatory account of the difference in 
Alice‘s and Bob‘s local accounts of the, for example, teleportation phenomenon.  
But if the above sketch is a convincing exposition of the slide into anti-realism, such as the 
transcendental strategy tries to avoid and that the explanatory accounts of the ‗troublesome 
phenomena‘ of the constructive approaches aim to outdo, it is one could argue that the view 
advocated by Bohmian Mechanics above cannot avoid collapsing into them. Even on that 
view the distant experimenter Bob cannot ever come to know the important changes that 
occur to the objects in his region of space, until Alice broadcasts the true account of her 
actions on her particle, even though his local object has really changed under the influence of 
the universal law. We don‘t need anything to travel between the distant locations, but the 
important changes to his objects are at some instant prior to his investigations hidden from 
him and anyone else, but not from the other experimenter Alice, until she announces the 
results of her local actions. Now this is not to say that the stability of all objects is forever 
                                                             
112 An intuition behind this is the classical consideration of the Ship of Theseus, all of whose parts (boards, 
beams, masts etc.) get replaced with time by the new wooden elements of the same shape (new boards, 
beams etc.). Though relying on the form alone we can say that it is still Theseus’ ship, particularly as we can 
account for the history of changes of its elements. If ‘another’ ship is reconstructed again from the original 
boards and beams (say they have been cleaned and the rotting has been stopped), when the two ships are 
compared side by side we are still tempted to call the reconstructed one the real Theseus’ ship. In this re-
identification the actual history (from being a part of the ship to being taken out and cleaned) of the particular 
constructive elements (the boards and beams) plays an intuitively important role. This is not to say that 
replacement of constructive elements automatically destroys the identity of objects, nor that individual 
humans become new people when their cells are replaced, but that the account of the history of these 
materially fundamental elements is somehow important in the common-sense accounts of individuation.  
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thrown into doubt, for Bob has a reason to be careful of what he assigns to his local object 
given that it is one half of the original entangled pair (and not just some object picked at 
random), but however hard he tries he will never come to know fully what its local state is. 
Though this needn‘t immediately put the possibility of constructing the transcendental 
strategy into jeopardy, it does place a great onus of what we importantly need to know about 
the world onto the epistemically inaccessible law. Effectively, without knowing what the law 
proscribes, for Bob there has never been any teleportation at all, and yet the explanation of 
the phenomenon requires that the local object has been altered in a dramatic fashion (which is 
just short of saying that it has been entirely replaced by a different object).  
The minimal realist constriction provided by the constructive approach as given in the 
previous chapter, relied on the separability and durability of the material existents, the 
spatially located particles. However, that may not be enough to allow for the explanations of 
the troublesome phenomena that respect the transcendental strategy. For the strategy itself is 
considerably weakened the more of its starting concepts we take to be dispositional (or 
response-dependent in the sense of (Pettit, 1991)). In simplest of terms, the bare durability of 
the extended stuff in space may not be sufficient to explain all the appearances readily found 
in the common-sense conceptual scheme. That is why the most comprehensive, blunt, forms 
of the transcendental strategy, as renewed in for today‘s purposes outside considerations of 
quantum theory, take more of the elements of common-sense framework as directly related to 
the nature of things in the real world, minimising the world-making as much as possible (cf. 
(Luntley, 1995, pp. 118-119; 235 note 6)). This is abandonment of our strategy above to 
select from the conceptual framework in which we present the immediate experience that 
which is directly related to nature of things in the real world, and using it to explain that 
which is illusory. Through the considerations of the ‗troublesome phenomena‘ as presented in 
Chapter 3 we have come to leave only the barest of spatial position as directly characteristic 
of objects of the common-sense framework, and reduced all other aspects to the ‗illusion‘ 
structurally dependent on the universal law.  
As these considerations take us further away from the investigation of the explanatory 
ontologies of the actual case-study instances we shall stop short here with a few remarks. 
Explanation features strongly in our strategy, and it requires a conceptual unification of the 
diversity of phenomena through primitive concepts. Traditionally (cf. illustrations from 
Descartes in Chapter 1), extension is one of those primitive concepts and it has strongly 
featured in the traditional versions of the transcendental strategy. The more blunt of those 
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versions as suggested by Luntley‘s later remarks (1995, p. 235) are ―contentious and still 
poorly understood‖. This is not to say that they are wrong, but only that they require further 
deeper investigation as to how they differ significantly from the anti-realist world-making 
accounts (cf. just for illustration (Rorty, 1980), (Putnam, 1981), (Pettit, 1991)). In the end our 
explanations will require reliance on structures that restrict the world-making, however 
liberating acceptance of some world-making might be. The holistic material structure does 
not provide enough of those restrictions as the typification it provides for the generation of 
concepts is fuzzy due to effective dependence on our judgments to interpret the structure 
emergent from the holistic ontological substratum as such.  
4. 5. Playing the constructive game, retypifying common sense  
This seems to be the precarious situation we are in. To discourage anti-realist criticism we 
had to show the possibility and explanatory utility of the transcendental strategy from the 
basic structures of the common-sense conceptual framework to the fundamental ontology of 
all phenomena experienced in an interaction with the material world.  Those phenomena 
included some ‗troublesome‘ instances generated in the domain covered by quantum theory. 
Those instances appeared troublesome for they seemed to provide an experiential basis for 
the denial of the realist-style validity of the elements of the common-sense conceptual 
scheme we take as the starting point. The latter is most notable as an individual ‗thisness‘, 
given by the constrictions of extension taken as primitive and isomorphic in both the 
fundamental ontology and the objects of common sense experience, including the role of 
spatial separation in the conceptualisation of identity (‗thisness‘). So as not to block the 
possibility of the unified explanation of the everyday experience and the ‗troublesome‘ 
phenomena in terms of fundamental ontology we had to add further non-separable elements 
to it. Yet that very element, the universal non-separable law seems to be more problematic  
than expected as it is outright characterised by ontological holism and potentially more 
important for the desired explanation than the extended material ontology taken to be the 
fundamental connector between the ‗troublesome‘ and the non-‗troublesome‘ in phenomena.  
This is the lesson for explanatory accounts to take from the struggles of constructive 
approaches to provide deeper explanations than principle approaches can (though, for the 
time being, there is still no verdict whether in fact they can achieve that): neither the bare 
surface structure of the phenomena nor the human constructs imposed on the interpretation of 
them are sufficient for deeper explanation. A deep explanation that can still serve the 
transcendental strategy is concerned with the structural constraints which endure despite not 
197 
 
being directly epistemically accessible. That is, in the above account the phenomenon is not 
given by the bare fact of the appearance of the correlations between distant measurements, it 
is given by the whole account of the experimenters‘ production of the correlations with 
manipulations of macroscopic equipment as objects in space and time. This seems to require 
also that our transcendental account starts not only with the conceptual framework of objects 
with certain essential structure (in our simple case, the geometrical structure of spatial 
extension) but with a wider framework of the interactions and changes those objects can 
endure (and still be re-identified as the same objects) and the effects we as human agents (and 
not pure observers) can have on them. This is asking for a slightly higher price for our 
transcendental strategy, but not a price that must be unacceptable to the antirealist critic. 
After all, our experience of interaction with objects is as much as part of our everyday 
conceptual scheme as is the bare experience of perceiving those objects. If so much is 
admitted we can add to the essential requirements of isomorphism not just the durability of 
extended objects but also a notion of regularities of the changes they undergo.  
That is, it seems that we have to be careful not to presuppose in the starting point of the 
transcendental strategy that at any instance a total description of the situation is embodied in 
the purely empirical descriptive concepts employed. Those concepts are ones of objects not 
bare geometrical structure, and the former include an implicit understanding of the 
causal/lawful properties as well as the spatial ones. These properties must also be understood 
as primitive, and not dispositional. The essential structure is given by the objects‘ shape and 
the existent laws that can act on it in the right circumstances. These laws are not observable 
to us in the same way as individual material entities, but are inferentially no less real than 
material structure, and cannot be reduced-away in terms of locally (i.e. not a total description) 
specifiable concurrence of events (though, this is how we ate first come to speculate about 
their existence, to form the required metaphysical projections).  
The price, in terms of conceptualisation, of the constructive depth of explanation  
The constructive approach of Bohmian mechanics, outlined in the previous chapter, denies 
metaphysical separability, whilst nonetheless trying to avoid the threat of ultimate full and 
complete ontological holism. The latter would provide a non-starter for our defence from 
antirealist criticism from section 1. 4. as we take it to invite response-dependency for all 
concepts of the common-sense conceptual framework. In the light of the previous section, the 
constructive approach argues that in the retrodictive explanation of phenomena we must 
contend with the violation of separability as we come to know that the physical processes in 
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some spatiotemporal region are not wholly supervenient on assignment of qualitative and 
quantitative physical properties at the points of the said region and their arbitrarily small 
neighbourhood (cf. (Healey, 2004)). Yet, our limits of knowability, enshrined in the no-
signalling theorem, assure us that even if we could know of the non-separable change of 
properties, the physical laws we can empirically deduce for our region would not have been 
different. There are non-separable changes taking place, but they (due to no-signalling 
prohibition) do not crucially affect the limited predictions we can make about the behaviour 
of objects in the said region, do not affect the possibility of performing manipulative science 
from which to derive the truth-conditions for the relevant object manipulation on the 
extended material ontology in the local region. In other words, though our explanatory 
conceptual framework must not contain total separability, we can still do science; to the 
extent that we do in experimental and descriptive employment of the quantum formalism.  
The problem is that once we come to put things this way we can legitimately ask whether we 
really have a deeper realist explanation of the phenomena, than we have been offered on our 
principle approaches with an instrumentalist slant. Pause just for a moment: the fact that the 
change of properties in the separated region is governed by a well structured law prevents us 
from having to fear the ultimate ontological holism, taking the entire material universe to be 
definable only as an indivisible whole with all partial definitions together summing up to 
insufficient global understanding. Our constructive approach in fact assures us that in any 
given region we can formulate the laws of physics and reconstruct experience of the material 
world on the basis of the properties of local objects (as they are formalised in the bare 
quantum formalism) and infer the existence of empirically inaccessible universal law 
governing their behaviour (in which all the non-separable effects are codified). So there is no 
need for metaphysical holism couched in the non-separable connection of properties of 
objects, the apparent violation of separability is achieved through the dictates of the universal 
law, which is itself immaterial. The central character of the role of extension in our 
conceptualisation of the real ‗mechanisms‘ behind the phenomena does not lose its 
ontological significance: small things still add up to the big everyday things, and only these 
local small things add up to this here local big thing.
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113 But, and this is crucial, our phenomena do not consist only of what is added there but also of what the 
things added are expected to do and to know what that is we can’t simply summarise all the properties and 
propensities of the small things making up the big one. 
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Well, knowing the universal law then would allow us to regain the strong separability in the 
sense of Healey (2004). But, and here is the snag, the limits of knowability prevent us from 
ever knowing the exact details of proscriptions of the law for our given region, though they 
make them stable enough to allow correct probabilistic predictions of the future phenomena, 
and law-abiding accounts of the past ones. But predictions are not explanations. And our 
explanation explicitly involves action at a distance: in the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena (we 
come to know once we take a more global view) a change in the intrinsic properties of one 
system induces a change in the intrinsic properties of a distant system without there being any 
process that carries the influence contiguously in space and time (Berkovitz, 2007).  
This seems to be the consequence for a conceptual scheme to be employed in explanations of 
the troublesome phenomena and the construction of the transcendental strategy. As the 
universal law is in in-principle epistemically inaccessible, save for some details, to fend off 
the slide into excessive dispositionalism (where everything is reduced to the dispositions of 
the law, but those are unknowable) we must employ the tried and tested technique of relying 
on the ‗geometrical‘ isomorphism between then common-sense conceptual scheme of re-
identifiable objects and the fundamental ontology of spatially situated particles (the local 
beables). Yet to justify the existence of an external criterion of correctness of explanatory 
conceptualisations of this reduction of the empirically accessible to the empirically 
inaccessible, especially with respect to the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena, we must postulate the 
existence of the non-local universal law that affects the conditions of re-identification of the 
fundamental ontology. In that, as we struggle to conceptualise the details of a causal 
connections between separated elements of the fundamental ontology, we must make the 
universal law primitive and modify the starting conceptualisation of the empirically 
accessible in phenomena to include both the spatial extension of objects and their 
subscription to (unknown) law. Our starting point in the transcendental strategy must also 
include the objective nomological structure of the world.  
Otherwise we face the problem of not being able to account for the external constraints on 
our explanatory conceptualisation, we are again threatened by the excessive dispositionalism 
charge which we cannot dispel as our transcendental strategy cannot get off the ground. This 
is because the initial conceptualisation of the separate re-identifiable objects in space is just 
an illusion imposed by us onto the essentially holistic fundamental ontology of forever 
inaccessible world-stuff. Our typification, our carving of the world-stuff into manageable 
concepts is just an illusion, and any such carving is as good as another: a game of freely 
200 
 
constructing the facade before the noumenal world. But on such account all explanations are 
equally vacuous, as there is no matter of fact as to what explain what. The price to pay for 
this (in the absence of a satisfyingly primitive account of causation) is to view the world from 
the outset (the very simplest starting point of the conceptual scheme employed in everyday 
conduct) as characterised not just by momentary spatial relations, but also by the mind-
independent (primitively characterised) nomological structure. This mysterious guiding-hand-
behind-events requirement may be too much of a price to pay on some worldviews. 
Especially as the theory itself demands that the universal law behind quantum phenomena 
(and fundamentally behind most physical phenomena) remains in-principle epistemically 
inaccessible. Furthermore, the role of the law at times becomes so fundamental as to affect 
the very individuation of the materially fundamental ontology, the particles, inviting a 
question whether those are again illusory projections included to save appearances, most 
notably the starting point of the transcendental strategy.  
What this leaves us with is a road to modification of the starting point conceptual scheme, but 
not a modification that is outright unacceptable. We start from arguing for the necessary 
minimal typification of experience into that of enduring objects. This is an uncontroversial 
route the starting point of which is forged by Devitt ( (1997); and as presented in Chapters 1 
and 3 above). To produce any explanations of the experience, and particularly deeper 
explanations of experience it is desirable to have some account as to how the real world 
affects our formation of concepts (rather than leaving us to freely dream up conceptual 
schemes of our choosing, even permitting they have internal consistency). In the latter case 
all our conceptual connections depend on our judgements (or even unwilling dispositions) 
that something is the case or that a set of concepts is in some way interrelated. But we cannot 
call upon the external world to account for a causal influence on how these judgements come 
to be formed, and why some of them might be more appropriate accounts of our experience 
than others (this may be appropriate to a particular purpose, even fulfilment of a pragmatic 
aim like acquiring more experiences significantly like some given experience).  
As we cannot take an external position and view the world as it is, it is prudent to start from a 
shared ground, that of the common conceptual framework. As noted by Devitt, above, anti-
realist interpretations of the experience as presented through the common-sense conceptual 
framework (or any similar conceptual framework, for that matter) cannot explain our 
experience. Even simple realism of the most basic kind has the tools to start producing 
explanations of the experiences given the common sense conceptual framework. The idea is 
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that the basic germs of the realist accounts, which may grow to be extremely complex in the 
case of explication of formal contemporary theories, are already present in the said 
conceptual framework. We can then construct increasingly deeper explanations of an 
increasingly wider range of phenomena. But for the explanations to be possible in the first 
place, we need a transcendental step: a necessary condition for breaking the anti-realist 
explanatory impasse. Again (cf. Chapter 1), this is not a strict necessity of the form usually 
employed in the transcendental strategy, but an explication of the sensible conceptual 
commitment the possibility of explanation of experience as encoded in the common sense 
conceptual framework.  
From here we rapidly proceed from accepting that we all have thoughts about material 
objects to ‗necessitation‘ of the commitment to the conceptual scheme that sees the objects as 
existing independently of us in an objective framework of space and time. This commitment 
can further be distinguished from a sensorily similar commitment that there appear to be 
objects existing independently of us by further investigation of how the notion of those 
objects participates in our objective accounts of the world, including the intersubjective 
communication. The said commonsense conceptual scheme with the prior commitment sees 
the material objects (which are also in space and time, in some way that needn‘t be precisely 
specified at this stage) ontologically basic. In this way the persons engaged in the 
communication can identify and re-identify the particulars that are being spoken about. Other 
than demonstrative pointing to the objects, they can also be identified (given a ‗thisness‘ as 
suggested in Chapter 1) by providing a description which, in the given circumstances, applies 
uniquely to the particular elements of reality concerned. Being ontologically basic within the 
common sense conceptual scheme, material objects do not need further reference to 
particulars of a different sort (Strawson, 1959).  
As we investigate the nature of material reality in greater depth we come to uncover a number 
of illusions inherent in the above conceptual scheme, which must be removed from the 
scheme of the ontologically basic. Many of the identifying properties of material objects are 
dispensed with, but the germ of structure immediately evident and independent of our 
judgment remains, that of the necessary primary quality of extension in space. The identity of 
objects remains founded in the combination of identities of smaller objects that make them 
up, all related to each other through definite relations in space. Though our explanations no 
longer take the material objects as we perceive them as fundamental, they tell us how the 
appearance of the objects arises out of their fundamental structure, and the typification that 
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does not slip away long this route is the extended structure of objects as constructed out their 
constituents. When the structure is subject to change, the details of the change can be tracked 
along the change of positions and shape in space. The germ of the connection between the 
Manifest and the Scientific images (Sellars, 1963) is given in the shared nature of extension 
in both the account of fundamental physical ontology and the directly perceivable material 
objects. Of course, there are other fundamental properties as well, but those can be added as 
attachments to the objects identified through their extended structure.  
Yet, this kind of image might still lead us down the wrong path, and in some cases it seems to 
have done so for centuries. For sometimes it appears as if we have not taken on board the 
lessons required for a starting point for our transcendental strategy above. Namely, though we 
have argued for the conceptual primacy of the common-sense conceptual framework and the 
search for the realist metaphysics out of its ontological commitments, the commitments have 
strayed to one side only. With excessive focus on the spatial (geometric) structure, we have 
again allowed too great a reduction of the elements of what were supposed to be 
ontologically basic concepts. The focus on spatial structure alone allows for a return of the 
anti-realist suspicions through the back door. For the macroscopic spatial structures are again 
nothing but an illusion, and though there is an account of how the common-sense 
conceptualisation of experience arises and the required germ of connection is in place, we can 
allow for judgements that reduce the supposed ontologically basic concepts to products of an 
illusion. The world may exist independently and be made of the fundamentally extended 
things, but the structures that we see as arising from those things are nothing but castles in the 
sky. The generalised thing, the supposed fundamental unit of a realist ontology is an illusion, 
a human projection onto the real external world in the same way that a visible image is a 
projection onto a structure of pixels. When quantum theories threaten to deny the 
individuating characteristics to supposed fundamental elements, our entire house of cards 
threatens to collapse. If the spatial arrangements of the fundamental elements are not stable, 
then the structures we see as arising from them are not stable either. The anti-realist says once 
more that the transcendental step cannot be legitimately made, that by committing to the 
illusory structures we are not thereby committing to any further beliefs about the origin of the 
shared experience. If the directly re-identifiable material objects are nothing but provisional 
spatial (and even the significance of that condition can now be questioned) arrangements of 
the even in-principle non-individuatable fundamental elements, then we cannot explain our 
experiences as they are given even in the common sense conceptual scheme. That is, we 
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cannot explain them in a better way than the anti-realist accounts can describe the same 
experience. It is important to note that this further difficulty arises only when we accept that 
the fundamental elements of the realist structure do not have an individuating identity, even 
in principle, regardless of their position in the overall spatial (or geometrical) structure.  
And as Harré ((1996), and elaborated in Chapter 3 above) reminds us, the fundamental unit of 
the realist ontology is not the totality of the directly perceptible situation (the instantaneous 
state of the extended structure), but a generalised thing. ―Things and other invariants through 
change are ineliminable fundamental elements of experience‖ (Harre, 1996, p. 312). The 
common sense conceptualisation of experience relies on more than the geometric structure 
and relation between illusory constructions, it includes at every step the notion of invariance 
through change. And the generalised objects, those fundamental referents for re-
identification, are not a conjunction of structure statements, but something more. The further 
element can be provided by the notion of primitive laws governing the changes that the said 
objects can undergo. The laws account for the external limitations of the changes that the 
objects can undergo, thus participating in the very notion of the definition of an object 
(though, admittedly, not in the same way as the geometric structure or some other materially 
fundamental element might). They also provide limitations that provide for deeper 
explanations given as conceptual connections between the experienced phenomenon 
featuring the said object and the counterfactual situations it can be conceptually envisaged in. 
The same notion of laws allows us to account for the changes that the fundamental elements 
of extended ontology undergo at the ‗ontologically deeper‘ level, providing explanations even 
for the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena that arise in the domain of quantum theory. So, even in the 
cases where it seems that the individuating ‗thisness‘ cannot be attributed to the particulars of 
fundamental ontology, the universal law governing their behaviour allows for their 
individuation and re-identification when required. Joining those phenomena to the common-
sense conceptual framework does not then commit us to the ontological holism, which would 
eventually invalidate the possibility of identification and individuation of material objects 
within the common-sense conceptual scheme. In summary we are philosophically permitted a 
commitment to the conceptual individuation of material objects within a commonsense 
conceptual scheme, and further ontological commitments as required by the simple 
transcendental strategy.  
As Worall  (1989) notes, realism in general has been pronounced dead before, but has 
successfully resurfaced. What the above discussion teaches us is that the worth of realism in 
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explanation should not be easily abandoned, even at the price of modifying what is 
considered primitive and constituent of the common-sense conceptual scheme. That is not to 
say that we can and should go changing the basics of the everyday conceptualisation of the 
world as we please every time a slightly troublesome physical theory needs to be 
accommodated. But it does permit that we look hard at the elements of the conceptual scheme 
and reason about possibilities of seeing them in a different light so as to accept new 
primitives which we were previously hoping to reduce to some others. In our case universal 
laws of temporal evolution have to be admitted as primitive and recognised as such in the 
common-sense conceptual framework. There is no a priori reason why good-natured anti-
realists would not accept this move, provided that appearances of the phenomena are saved as 
they are, and that we can still talk of those phenomena in the way that we ordinarily do. 
Accepting laws as primitive, along the lines that Harre and Bhaskar suggest, seems to allow 
for all this. There is, nonetheless, a high price to pay in admitting that there are foundational 
elements that we must accept as epistemically inaccessible and open only to inferential 
guesstimates that do not show signs of empirical improvement as yet. If that is the price, so 
be it, say those intent on commitment to realism of some sort. There are of course those for 
whom this may be a step too far to make, but in abandoning ship at this stage they must go 
back over the ground covered from those first tentative steps of the transcendental strategy. 
They must ponder the potential for explanations of the phenomena, including the troublesome 
ones, and the general worth of explanations. They must also be prepared to address additional 
problems that plague our principle approaches, which initially wanted to avoid any tinkering 
with the common-sense conceptual scheme, but then struggle to connect their account of the 
phenomena with even the most basic elements of the realist outlook (that there are material 
objects behind the troublesome phenomena in the first place). The only other alternative is to 
embrace the ontological holism and search for some kind of reconstruction of experience 
along those lines. Though they are not impossible, the above argument aims to suggest that 
they cannot follow the route of the simple transcendental strategy traversed above, but must 
start from scratch in accounting for the conceptualisation of experience as an error arising 
from historical misconception or sensory deception. Whilst this is by no means an impossible 
route to take its struggles with the anti-realist criticisms along the lines of dispositionalism 
seem much greater than those attempted here.  
Perhaps ‗rejecting the grammar which tries to force itself on us‘ (Wittgenstein, 1967) is to 
accept that ordinary, everyday concepts of objects in spatial framework and temporal 
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duration and interaction presuppose inclusion of lawful, entirely externally conditioned, 
behaviour of those objects over and above the external limitations of their structure as 
identified through space and time. A chair is then more than certain spatial structure before 
us, it is a durable object whose temporal structure is, just as the spatial one, limited by what 
primitive laws of nature allow its material constituents to do and suffer. What the direct 
comparison of our approaches teaches us is that perhaps we looked in the wrong place from 
the start. Given the empirical equivalence of the two approaches perhaps the secret of their 
differentiation is not in which can axiomatically construct a better explanation of the world 
that contains the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena, but what our expectations of the understanding 
of the world must be in the light of the troublesome phenomena. Both our approaches would 
agree that we can‘t get to the nature of the fundamental entities in a direct empirical way, that 
we cannot distinguish between them empirically (which just is to restate the empirical 
equivalence). To break the equivalence we must look into the starting position of the search 
to see how the equivalence has arisen in the first place and how the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena 
have come to be seen as troublesome. The idea is that saying that we must start with objects 
that can be successfully reidentified is not problematic in itself, but simply relegates the 
problematic aspects to another domain as yet to be addressed. Whether it is the new ontology 
of abstract information-entities or the more classical one of local beables, the interesting 
question is how the phenomena that display the non-local connections between separated 
directly empirically accessible (macroscopic) objects can be generated.  
And for that we need a different conceptual starting point. What our transcendental 
requirement must recognise is that the starting point cannot be the conceptualisation of 
individual objects solely on their intrinsic properties reducible to extension. Instead, we must 
conceptualise the objects as elements of generative mechanisms that contain both their spatial 
location and the universal laws that contribute to their local changes, but are themselves not 
bound by the requirement of locality or separability. The idea is not to identify things by the 
stability of their spatial position but by the stability of the role they play in the generation of 
processes. One may wonder whether this is not just making the processes ultimately 
fundamental, with the object-entities as their more or less enduringly recognisable features. 
This is certainly one avenue to explore, but it is not of necessity the only route left to take. 
For one thing it would make the construction of the transcendental strategy difficult, as we 
would have to not just modify, but fully replace its starting point, one of the world 
characterised in part by the concepts of macroscopic objects. To alleviate that difficulty we 
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can hold on to the concept of objects but claim that the concept is not completely adequate 
when understood in terms of primary qualities alone.  
The objects are not just what exists in terms of certain permanence of extension. The objects 
exist in a sense that they can be re-identified through the changes of a certain type. The key to 
the type in question is that there is a recognisable natural law governing the change, rather 
than a combination of such laws or a haphazard string of changes that cannot be understood 
as a law. It is the role of the law in interaction with objects that has to be better understood 
and investigated, and it is the recognition of conceptual foundation rooted in both laws and 
objects that distinguishes the principle and constructive approaches above. For the former 
turn to be inadequate in providing an explanation, primarily a conceptual connection between 
knowing that a phenomenon occurs and understanding why and how it does, for they lack any 
tool for identification of relevant (and then eventually shown to be conceptually fundamental) 
objects. The latter play up to this requirement, but must provide extra work in showing how 
this is not just a trick to fit the ready-made mould of the explanatory model. To do that they 
must look into ways to break the limits of knowability, finding ways to suggest how this 
might be done. Alternatively, we could try to rebuild explanatory ontology in terms of the 
structure emergent from the fundamental holistic entity, following the empiricist line 
(including the Humean Mosaic of the momentary state matter) and avoiding search for deeper 
causal mechanisms. Even when ignoring the attendant technical difficulties (such as the 
preferred choice of the formal basis for the decoherence that makes the emergence of the 
desired structures possible) such explanatory constructions cannot rely on our simple 
transcendental strategy as they lack the ‗germ of the solution‘ for the connection of the 
directly observable experience and the fundamental physical ontology. There are other 
possible emergent and stable structures that are not in correspondence with our conceptual 
framework, but might be in good correspondence with some other possible such framework 
(making the existing one contingent in the fundamental structure, not just details). As the 
transcendental strategy starts with the preference for the essential features of the existing 
conceptual framework, explanatory ontology along the lines of the emergent structure would 
struggle to fend off the worldmaking charges and ontological relativity.  
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CONCLUSION  
The primary issue addressed in this thesis was the comparison of two case-study instances of 
methodological and explanatory approaches to ‗troublesome‘ phenomena in the domain of 
quantum physics. In light of anti-realist criticism, which claims that beyond a limited network 
of concepts related to direct experience objective competition of explanatory narratives is not 
possible, as well as that different explanations are as good as each other, the thesis 
investigates the different strengths and weaknesses of two explanatory approaches: the 
principle and constructive one. Such anti-realist criticism is potent not only from a purely 
philosophical perspective, but also for a wider-reaching conclusion that contemporary science 
in general cannot offer convincing explanations, and that it is sometimes not even in the 
business of doing so, beyond the limited perspective of direct experience. If in fact we require 
that the directly experienced phenomena be seen as part of a unified whole of material reality 
then even in this sturdy everyday domain we lack objective explanations due to explanatory 
deficiencies in its foundational ontology, in the hypothesized primary constituents of all 
things material.  
The two methodological approaches were initially chosen for their clear opposition in 
conceptualisation of the problem. The principle approaches were expected to overcome the 
said explanatory deficiencies of the hypothesised primary constituents by relying on the 
concepts familiar from everyday discourse and explaining the phenomena in the framework 
of generalised constrictions on natural processes, without reference to the ontological 
elements inaccessible to direct experience (i.e. concepts outside the scope of the common-
sense conceptual framework). Though at first glance this might seem a strained strategy, it 
has been shown to work in well-known instances in the history of physics, such as 
thermodynamics and special theory of relativity. The explicit advantages expected were the 
unification of the phenomena that would otherwise require separate explanations and stronger 
explanatory potency by elimination of brute coincidences between competing explanatory 
narratives. The explanatory model such approaches were expected to fit in was one of 
unification, covering a wide range of phenomena within a strictly delineated conceptual 
framework. The constructive approaches, on the other hand, opted to openly rely on the 
hypothetical elements inaccessible to direct experience, focusing on the elimination of the 
supposed deficiencies or their rebuttal. Their general explanatory model was a widely popular 
one of causal-mechanical interaction, explanation of phenomena as causal processes arising 
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from the physically deducible (though not always directly perceptible) interaction of the 
fundamental ontological elements, interaction characteristic of the said elements‘ properties 
and propensities.  Through the evaluation of the way these general models dealt with the 
specific issues arising in the domain of quantum theory the aims was to distil conclusions for 
a generalised explanatory strategy concerning material reality.  
In addressing these issues the thesis opens with a survey of the role and nature of 
explanations in modern and contemporary physical science. It proceeds to argue for the 
importance of explanation in scientific discourse, rather than the separation of the two as has 
repeatedly been suggested throughout the history of modern physics, and commitment of 
‗pure‘ science to descriptions useful for prediction and technological development. Moreover 
the opening chapter argues that although explanatory narratives are essentially 
epistemological constructions, they require a general metaphysical backing through the 
explainer‘s and explainee‘s commitments to take the concepts and higher structures 
composed of them as directly referential. Part of the success of the explanatory constructions 
examined in this thesis will be evaluated on the acceptability of the commitments that stand 
behind (as a ‗backing‘) the concepts we employ in everyday communication, the ontological 
characteristics from the title.   
Thus the opening chapter outlines the ‗transcendental strategy‘ to be employed in comparing 
the ontological worth of the opposing explanatory strategies. Though a partial misnomer, the 
said strategy requires of all speakers of a given language, in our case any natural language 
used to provide the required explanations supplemented by the minimum necessary 
formalism of quantum theory, to accept that limitations to our acting and thinking rationally 
commit us to a conceptual framework that contains objects existing independently of us in 
objective space and time. It is then a further task for our explanatory approaches to try to fit 
in the explanatory narratives constructed to provide understanding of the troublesome 
phenomena with this general strategy. A historical overview outlines how this was achieved 
through the development of physics from early modern times to the occurrence of 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena with the rise of quantum theory in early 20th century. To permit 
the increase in knowledge through detailed empirical investigations the transcendental 
strategy is forced to select between the more and less fundamental elements of the conceptual 
scheme. The latter are then subjected to change under increased empirical investigation and 
the former provide a permanent and stable connection between the old and the new, between 
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the directly experienced and the hypothetically explanatory. Historically, physical spatial 
extension and the geometric properties provided this desired connection.  
When quantum theory appears on the scene it introduces some phenomena that require a 
careful selection of the agreed upon set of characteristics used to construct explanations that 
respect the essential elements of the common-sense conceptual framework. By violating 
separability, these phenomena seem to call for explanations that do not share the widely 
accepted minimal conceptual framework of objects in space and time. For the latter requires 
that these objects can claim an existence independent of one another insofar as they occupy 
different parts of space. The objects may be in discernible interaction, but they ought to have 
separate intrinsic states that can be altered through such interaction. Moreover, composite 
objects should acquire all their properties from the constituents‘ intrinsic states and locally 
intrinsic interactions.  
If the phenomena in the domain of quantum theory violate separability the transcendental 
strategy for realism is threatened by denial of the possibility of spatiotemporal separation as 
the primary objective criterion of individuation of the elements of foundational ontology, 
elements which play a foundational role in the most universal conceptual scheme. In other 
words, they form the core element of every conceptual scheme as they are particulars that can 
be identified and re-identified without reference to the particulars of a different sort. The 
‗troublesome‘ phenomena from the domain of quantum theory seem to invite a holism that 
denies the possibility of the application of a transcendental strategy, and thus pose a 
challenge for the conceptual connection between explanatory narratives suited to quantum 
theory and the simple and sturdy common-sense conceptual scheme, a starting point of the 
transcendental strategy.  
It is further outlined in Chapter 1 how the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena such as the EPR 
correlations and the more novel ‗teleportation‘ raise questions about the continuous existence 
of individual particulars in a systematic way predicted and confirmed by the theory. Chapter 
1 concludes by acknowledging the general preference in literature for causal-mechanical type 
(constructive approaches) of explanations over those of the unificatory type (principle 
approaches). The following two chapters are devoted to examining the strengths and 
weakness of the case-study instances of the two approaches in the light of the general 
problems each of the explanation types encounters in the specific situations, most notably the 
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requirements of contrastive explanations which cannot be easily cast into the causal-
mechanical mould.  
The second chapter surveys the epistemological position of one of the founding fathers of 
quantum theory, Niels H. Bohr, as an introduction to the principle approaches, presented as 
neo-Bohrian in methodology. They accept the necessary limits to epistemic accessibility and 
adopt an overall agnosticism about the structure of material reality out of which the perceived 
phenomena arise. They focus on the general limitations to knowledge gathering and 
information transmission between conscious subjects as sufficiently clear foundations upon 
which to build the explanations of the troublesome phenomena, without having to connect 
them to concepts of individual material objects (of any particular size or type) that are 
threatened by the non-separable aspects of the phenomena. In other words the Fuchs and the 
CBH methodological programmes call for a change of perspective that would eliminate the 
need for the jeopardised connection between the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena and the common 
sense conceptual framework.  
Following a classification of Bohr‘s philosophical position as principle theory (shying away 
from even the possibility of mechanical conceptualisation of matter of ‗microscopic‘ size) 
with a Kantian twist (the necessity of classical concepts for objective description of the 
physical realm), Fuchs‘ programme sees the supposed quantum descriptions of matter as 
codified epistemic guesses about the future macroscopic outcomes of measurement. Yet to 
avoid the pitfalls of instrumentalism Fuchs ventures into constructive domain, but on a weak 
footing of ‗inherent sensitivity‘ of reality to all empirical observation. The CBH programme  
(named after R. Clifton, J. Bub and H. Halvorson), explored in much greater detail on 
account of methodology, metaphysics and explanatory potential, aims to reconstruct the 
theory within a suitable mathematical framework with minimal ontological commitments (the 
epistemic ‗black boxes‘). They propose to see the macroscopic objects in physical interaction 
as mere displays of output and input states from the perspective of ‗information 
transmission‘, with no epistemic access to their material structure (nor any need for such 
access). Unlike Fuchs, the proponents of the CBH programme claim that they do not show 
that the theory deals with the epistemological concerns of the observers nor that the basic 
stuff of the world is informational, but that the principle-style explanatory account is the best 
that can be achieved about the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena.  
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However, the explanations so constructed struggle to provide sufficient features for the 
transcendental strategy to remove the criticism of a vacuous narrative. Though such 
explanations satisfy key segments of the unification-type explanations in general, they leave a 
gaping hole in the connection between the conceptual parts of the universal constraining 
principles they rely on and the successful connection they achieve between knowing that a 
phenomenon occurs and why it occurs. As in the case of thermodynamics, this can be an 
extremely useful predictive tool and even goes some way to providing an explanation, but 
when deeper explanations appear as contenders it is left wanting. The principle explanatory 
strategy, though nominally respecting the existence of material objects and their necessary 
separability, in the very provision of explanation does not respect that we conceptualise 
situations in terms of re-identifiable objects. Though elaborately avoiding the separability-
violating threats to the transcendental strategy, the principle approaches must commit at least 
to some novel ontology of their own. The latter, on the other hand, is taken to be the first 
stage of its development, difficult to connect with the common-sense conceptual framework 
which was the starting point of the transcendental strategy.  
The third chapter outlines the history of one particular type of the constructive approaches, 
the one following the work of D. Bohm and well suited to the particulars of the constructive 
strategy through insistence on the point particle as the fundamental ontological element. Such 
particle nominally satisfies the requirements of a re-identifiable object in space and time, 
though the accompanying element of the quantum field or potential (required to reproduce 
the specifically quantum ‗troublesome‘ phenomena) is presented as marred with explanatory 
inadequacies, especially in the light of the novel phenomenon of ‗teleportation‘.  Even 
without teleportation, the ‗particles plus the real field‘ view struggles to maintain sufficient 
‗intrinsic thisness‘ of the particles in certain situations, and thus to prevent the slide into a 
fundamentally field-based holistically non-separable ontology.  
Following further introductory presentations of the philosophical notions of causes, 
properties and deterministic realism, an ontology of equally real (but ontologically of distinct 
type) particles and universal laws governing their behaviour is presented. Such ontology 
accepts non-separability through abandonment of the Humean mosaic that sees only 
momentary arrangements of material objects as really existing at any given time (and thus 
making the laws governing their changes a mere human projection onto the real state of 
affairs). The non-separable aspect of the phenomena is relegated to universal law though, and 
thus not attributed to the material constituents. A summary of the technical arguments 
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connecting quantum theory with such a worldview is presented and the ‗troublesome‘ 
phenomena are recast in new light. A new problem arises though, for the said explanatory 
construction requires not only an abandonment of the Humean mosaic as the foundational 
conceptual commitment, but also an acceptance of the epistemic barrier to access to the said 
universal law due to an axiomatically attributed state the whole of the universe is in. Thus the 
ontological elements are all named, but a barrier to their direct empirical investigation is once 
again raised.  
Chapter 3 concludes with a survey of satisfaction of the criteria for explanation set out in 
Chapter 1 by the final constructive approach based on the point particles and the universal 
(though epistemically obscured) law. It is shown that the constructive approaches fare better 
in satisfying the Lipton criteria of explanation, and as is to be expected of the ontological, 
causal-mechanical explanations they show potential for providing deeper explanations 
(something that is discussed in greater depth in the subsequent chapter) than the principle, 
unification-style explanations can. This allows the transcendental strategy to be given through 
reliance on the concepts of enduring objects and non-local universal laws.  
Yet this seems to require that in the transcendental strategy we change the starting point from 
objects being defined in terms of primary qualities alone into objects conceptualised as 
enduring individuals subject to the universal law. The nature is now ‗cut at the joints‘ not 
along the lines of instantaneous structure in space, but through the selection of structure 
across law-permitted changes in space and time. But a final caveat opens here, especially in 
the light of the ‗troublesome‘ phenomena introduced above: how can we justify the 
fundamental role given to material ontology, the point particles, if so much of their 
contribution to the overall structure is dispositional on the proscriptions of the universal law 
and is not intrinsic to the given ontological elements themselves? Such questions open up the 
validity of adherence to the transcendental strategy at all, given the conceptual obstacles 
raised by contemporary quantum theory.  
The final Chapter turns to a presentation of the general characteristics of deeper explanations. 
It is shown that deeper explanations do require some notion of laws as conceptual 
background against which the permissible alternatives to the experienced phenomena are 
evaluated. Furthermore, deeper explanations focus on the explanatory narrative that has an 
object, a system undergoing a regulated change, at its centre. This object has to be re-
identifiable in its own right, not just as a structural feature of the phenomenon to be 
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explained. On such an account of the depth of explanation, especially when metaphysical 
projections beyond, but related to, the constraining principles are sought after, the principle 
approaches are found wanting. As they generally shy away from any specification of the 
metaphysics of the elements of reality responsible for the experience of the phenomena it 
becomes unclear how what is supposed to be explanatory on their account can actually be so. 
Furthermore, even the transcendental strategy that the sturdy and non-specific principle 
approaches were expected to connect well to, becomes problematic when they aim to clearly 
separate from straightforward instrumentalism. Both the Fuchs and the final Bub 
(representing CBH) approaches display inclinations toward a metaphysically fundamentally 
indeterministic universe (in the present, not just the future sense), one that cannot be 
isomorphically related to the common-sense conceptual framework. The structures available 
on such a view then struggle to give rise to re-identifiable objects that endure through change.  
Finally, lessons from the principle and the constructive approaches are combined to diffuse 
the threat of separability violations for the very core of the foundational conceptual scheme, 
the isomorphic connection between the physically fundamental ontology and the objects of 
everyday experience through the primary qualities of material existents. Observed regularities 
in the separability violations themselves are employed to show how they affect the predictive 
and explanatory aspects of the interpretations of quantum formalism respectively. As the 
separability violations can never be used for superluminal signalling, epistemic and 
metaphysical restrictions can be combined to allow for the construction of the explanatory 
models which respect the formal requirements of the theory and the realism-supporting aims 
of the transcendental strategy.  
They do have to lean on neo-Bohrianism to some extent though, in admitting explicit 
limitations to our epistemic access, but dare venture beyond it in asking for metaphysical 
projections that can account for the core features of the basic conceptual scheme and suggest 
areas of investigations where the said limitations might be experimentally removed (cf. the 
breaking of the quantum equilibrium). The constructive approaches suggest respecting the 
structurally important role that point particles play in connection between the common-sense 
conceptual framework and the vagaries of contemporary physics (by playing the role of local 
be-ables, however flimsical), and the non-material nature of the universal law of temporal 
evolution not subjected to limitations of separability. But this brings forth consequences for 
the starting point of the transcendental strategy, the core conceptual scheme. It requires that 
that very scheme admits as the fundamental ontological unit not the totality of the directly 
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perceptible situation (the instantaneous state of the extended structure including fields), but a 
generalised thing.  
The common sense conceptualisation of experience must rely on more than the geometric 
structure and relation between illusory constructions, it must include at every step the notion 
of an object enduring through regulated change. As metaphysical limiters of the changes the 
objects can undergo, the universal (and ontologically non-material) laws participate in the 
very definition of an object (though admittedly not in the same way as the geometric structure 
or some other directly observable feature). Thus the ‗troublesome‘ nature of some 
phenomena in quantum physics need not just draw consequences for the axiomatic structure 
of the explanatory conceptualisations specifically constructed for them, but can influence 
what our expectations of the understanding of the world that contains the troublesome 
phenomena ought to be like. A transcendental strategy of arguing for realism must start not 
with the conceptualisation of individual objects solely on their intrinsic properties reducible 
to extension, but use also the generative mechanisms that contain both their spatial location 
and the universal laws that contribute to their local changes across time. These laws 
themselves are not, though, bound by the requirements of locality and separability. The idea 
is to identify things by the stability of the role they play in the generation of processes. 
Simply put, to understand a ‗chair‘ we must see it as capable of smashing a window as well 
as having four legs and a backrest.  
An avenue for further research opens up in connection between the above discussion and the 
so-called Everettian conceptual approach to contemporary physics. The latter makes the 
spatially extended, but holistically conceived structure as absolutely primary, though 
conceptually disassociated from the everyday objects of experience. Though this might be a 
natural route to take in response to the impermanence of the intrinsic properties of the point 
particles in some experimental situations (crucially involving precise position as well) it is 
metaphysically demanding (through calling for parallelly existing but unperceivable 
universe-duplicates) and difficult to connect to the starting point of our transcendental 
strategy for realism.  
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